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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this causal-comparative and correlational research study was to determine if
differences exist in educators’ perceptions of the North Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus
and assess any relationships between educators’ perceptions and their Education Value-Added
Assessment System (EVAAS) score using a 28 question Likert-item survey. To recruit and retain
highly effective educators, it is essential for politicians and school administrators to assess and
understand educators’ perceptions of any pay-for-performance program. Data were gathered
using the Teacher Performance Pay Attitudinal Survey (TPPAS), from 174 fourth-eighth grade
educators in the seven far western North Carolina school districts. An ANOVA with three
eligibility groups (a) no bonus, (b) one bonus, and (c) two bonuses was calculated with no
statistically significant differences found in mean scores of educators’ perceptions of the North
Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus. A Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient was
calculated with a positive association found between an educator’s perception score and EVAAS
growth score. Finally, teacher perceptions of the performance bonus were compiled and reported
with regard to demographic categories as they related to the knowledge and understanding and
teacher efficacy of the current North Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus. Recommendations
for future research include developing an understandable performance pay program with a
feasible goal linked to teacher effort that is fairly measured and distributed.
Keywords: performance pay, EVAAS, expectancy theory, equity theory, goal-setting theory
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Overview
In two reports, namely 2016–2017 State of the Teaching Profession in North Carolina:
Report to the North Carolina General Assembly and Third Grade Read to Achieve Teacher
Bonus Program: Report to the North Carolina General Assembly, the North Carolina
Department of Public Instruction (2018a, 2018b) announced that no conclusive evidence could
be found that the North Carolina Teacher Bonus Program had a positive effect on teachers’
instructional quality or impacted teacher retention rates among school districts. There are very
few published studies regarding teacher perceptions of the current North Carolina Teacher
Performance Bonus Plan and whether these perceptions have any impact on teacher
performance. The purpose of this study was to examine any differences in educator perceptions
of the current bonus plan and determine whether any predictive relationship existed between
these perceptions and the educators’ instructional performance. The background of teacher
compensation plans is discussed along with the purpose, problem statement, and significance of
the study. Chapter One concludes with the introduction of the research questions as well as
definitions germane to the study.
Background
Because more money is allocated to teacher salaries than to any other educational
expense, teacher compensation plans are very prominent in almost every educational financial
debate and give rise to frequent calls for teacher compensation policy reform (Baker & Gordon,
2014; Jones, 2013; Jones & Hartney, 2017; Cornman, Zhou, Howell, & Young, 2018). The most
recent data available shows during the 2014–15 school year, U.S. public schools spent $239
billion on salaries and wages for instructional personnel and an additional $95 billion on
employee benefits (Cornman et al., 2018). These expenditures account for 58% of the total
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amount in K–12 public schools and 89% of instructional monies allocated (Cornman et al.,
2018). Thus, teacher salaries can have significant consequences for how school districts and
administrators staff their schools and are critical to the productivity of every K–12 public school
system (Podgursky & Springer, 2011; Springer & Taylor, 2016).
Beginning in the 1800s and continuing to the present day, teacher compensation has
evolved in light of changing social, economic, and educational needs (Protsik, 1995; Springer &
Gardner, 2018). Over time there have been three major shifts in teacher compensation – paying
teachers room and board, a grade-based salary schedule, and a single salary schedule (Baker &
Gordon, 2014). All of these methods have now merged into the most recent reform attempt
known as merit or performance based bonus pay programs (Vigdor, 2008).
In the early days of the one-room schoolhouse, the school was designed to meet the needs
of the surrounding community (Protsik, 1995). One teacher provided basic academic skills, a
moral education, and was primarily compensated with room and board (Protsik, 1995; Springer
& Gardner, 2018). This pay system encouraged the teacher to maintain positive relations with
community members and a high moral character as reflected throughout the community
(Springer & Gardner, 2018). As the US moved into the 20th century, teacher preparation became
more rigorous and required higher levels of education as schools began to echo the changing
bureaucracy and industrial revolution (Protsik, 1995; Springer & Gardner, 2018). During this
time, a grade-based salary system was established aligned with the economic components of the
larger communities and school districts. The new salary system rewarded secondary more than
elementary teachers based on the amount of education required for the positions (Protsik, 1995).
Additionally, women and minorities also received lower pay than non-minority men did, in
accordance with the societal biases of the period (Protsik, 1995).
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The single salary pay schedule emerged from a greater demand for advanced teacher
skills later in the 20th century (Brodsky, DeCesare, & Kramer-Wine, 2010). The pay scale also
addressed the undisguised discrimination against teachers of certain grade levels, gender, and
races (Podgursky & Springer, 2007b). This pay scale is still in use today in the majority of
school districts across the US (Podgursky & Springer, 2011). However, teachers are still paid
differing amounts based on years of experience and educational level as well as receiving other
salary supplements for extracurricular activities such as coaching a sport or advising a club
(Podgursky & Springer, 2007b, 2011). Proponents of the single salary pay structure, which is
completely based on education level and years of experience, argue its effectiveness based upon
the objective nature of the schedule (Liang& Akiba, 2015; Rothstein, 2015). There is little to no
room for subjectivity or biased opinions since pay can accurately and consistently be assessed
(Conroy & Gupta, 2016). Critics of the salary based system contend there are few, if any,
methods to reward individual efforts (Meng & Wu, 2015). Many schools are understaffed in
subjects such as mathematics and science because these content area teachers can earn higher
wages in nonteaching occupations (Meng, & Wu, 2015).
Currently, there are many forms of alternative bonus pay structures from pay differentials
based on subject area, grade, or geographic location of the school to increased salaries for
increased responsibilities such as heading departments or mentoring other teachers (Loeb,
(Amrein-Beardsley, Polasky, & Holloway-Libell, 2016; Miller & Strunk, 2009). The alternative
pay structure garnering the most interest across the US is that of rewarding teachers based on
student growth outcomes (Liu, Xu, & Stronge, 2017; National Education Association [NEA]
Department of Teacher Quality, 2011). This form of output-based bonus compensation has
proven highly controversial when proposed or implemented (Baker, 2014; Brodsky, DeCesare,
& Kramer-Wine, 2010). Advocates of a performance pay plan state that rewarding teacher
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effectiveness encourages all teachers to seek continuous improvement in their instructional
practices (Baker, 2014; Balch & Springer, 2015; Hendricks, 2014). Given the ever-changing
composition of student bodies with unique challenges such as varying income levels, family
structures, and racial/ethnic backgrounds, it is imperative for school districts to recruit and retain
high quality teachers (Adnot, Dee, Katz, & Wyckoff, 2017).
North Carolina’s Teacher Performance Bonus Plan, which was implemented during the
2016 legislative session, included bonuses for some specialized high school teachers and third
grade reading teachers but most recently has been expanded to include elementary and middle
school mathematics and some language arts teachers (S. 257-N.C. Gen. Ass., 2018). These
bonuses ranging from $2,300 to $6,400 are granted to public school teachers for their students’
exceptional growth as evidenced by end-of-grade (EOG) exams (S. 257-N.C. Gen. Ass., 2018).
However, science, social studies, and some language arts teachers, whose students have met the
same growth assessment criteria, are not eligible for the rewards (S. 257-N.C. Gen. Ass., 2018).
North Carolina is certainly not the only state experimenting with connecting a bonus pay plan to
student outcomes, and North Carolina’s plan shares many characteristics with other plans across
the nation (Balch & Springer, 2015; Brehm, Imberman, & Lovenheim, 2017; Swain, Rodriguez,
& Springer, 2019). However, educators continue to have concerns regarding the monetary
amount awarded, the basis for evaluation, and who is eligible as well as exactly what inspires or
persuades teachers to improve their educational practices (Balch & Springer, 2015; Brehm et al.,
2017; Swain et al., 2019). Research shows successful bonus pay plans must establish and ensure
teacher motivation, clear and specific goals, and equitable distribution of rewards (Purvis,
Zagenczyk, & McCray, 2015; Rice, Malen, Jackson, & Hoyer, 2016; Munroe, 2017).
Three prominent theories explaining teacher motivation were used as the conceptual
framework for this study. First, Flake et al. (2015) assert that expectancy theory explains why
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individuals are motivated by perceived efforts or inputs being rewarded by certain outputs or
rewards. When viewed from an educational perspective, expectancy theory is linked to a
teacher’s perceptions of the extent to which their individual efforts will influence student growth
or achievement associated with the financial reward (Purvis et al., 2015). When applied to
education, goal-setting theory addresses teachers’ motivation to respond to extrinsic rewards
embedded in financial incentives (Rice et al., 2016). Finally, fairness, a key tenet of equity
theory, is the idea of equal opportunity in consideration of all teachers for merit pay regardless of
grade level, subject area, or school demographics (Munroe, 2017).
Regardless of the underlying inspiration – expectancy, goal-setting, or equity, research
indicates teacher motivation, job satisfaction, and student learning outcomes are reciprocal
(Cowan & Goldhaber, 2018; Dee & Wyckoff, 2015; Liu et al., 2017). Liu et al. (2017) attribute
this reciprocity to an increased educator self-efficacy encompassing efficacy for student
engagement, instructional strategies, and classroom management. Kobussen, Kalagnanam, and
Vaidyanathan (2014) contend job satisfaction is a multidimensional construct with an
individual’s salary ranked among the top three factors. Moreover, job satisfaction increases when
a performance pay plan is perceived to be equitable across peer groups and target incentives are
similar (Kobussen et al., 2014; Mintrop, Ordenes, Coghlan, Pyror, & Madero, 2018). Dee and
Wyckoff (2015) assert performance pay plans improve teacher effectiveness, leading to
increased student learning through the voluntary attrition of low-performing teachers. Finally,
Cowan and Goldhaber (2018) state teacher quality to be among the top school-based influences
on student learning.
Teachers are the compelling force within school systems, and their efforts are both
significant and worthwhile to society (Rothstein, 2015). High-quality teachers are undeniably
one of the most definitive resources school districts have for improving and increasing student
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achievement (Desimone, Hochberg, & McMaken, 2016; Skourdoumbis, 2014). Unfortunately,
nationwide teacher shortages have made the goal of recruiting and retaining talented and
effective classroom teachers a daunting task for school districts (Brevetti, 2014). With the
increased rigor of national standards and school-based accountability sweeping our nation’s
public schools, many state policymakers and school district administrators are seeking alternative
compensation pay schedules such as a performance pay plan based on students’ academic
achievement (Jones & Hartney, 2017). The dilemma then becomes one of how to define student
and teacher performance along with which teachers are eligible for the additional bonus pay
(Arnstine & McDowell, 1993; Dee & Wyckoff, 2015; Loeb, Miller, & Strunk, 2009).
Problem Statement
The primary goal of every educator, parent, and community stakeholder should be to
ensure each child receives a quality education. Research shows that teachers are the most
important factor in predicting student success (Skourdoumbis, 2014). In the past, lawmakers
have developed teacher recruitment and retention initiatives such as school performance bonuses
(Lauen & Kozlowski, 2013; Vigdor, 2008) and differential pay programs (Lauen & Kozlowski,
2014; Liang & Akiba, 2015) aimed at attracting highly qualified and effective educators. This
form of merit-based pay is not an uncommon practice in a school setting or a non-school sector
and is intended to inspire and persuade employees to increase productivity and effectiveness (Liu
et al., 2017). However, pay for performance in public schools is a controversial topic and has
often been noted to detrimentally affect the learning environment and school culture, especially
when linked to student achievement and teacher evaluation (Gius, 2014; Hendricks, 2014; Jacob
& Springer, 2008; Munroe, 2017). Prior studies suggest that more research with regard to the
amount of the reward, the issue of fair practice, and the accuracy of performance measures is
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needed before implementing educator incentive pay plans (Jones & Hartney, 2017; Munroe,
2017; Rice, Malen, Jackson, & Hoyer, 2015; Springer & Taylor, 2016). Research shows many
states and school districts across the US are assigning teacher effectiveness value-added scores
using the Statistical Analysis System – Education Value-Added Assessment System (SAS
EVAAS) score model (Rovai, Baker, & Ponton, 2014; Vosters, Guarino, & Wooldridge, 2018).
Controversy then arises when these quantitative value-added scores are used to determine which
teachers qualify for the educator incentive pay plan (Vosters et al., 2018).
Most recently, North Carolina teachers have been compensated with a teacher
performance bonus based on their EVAAS growth measure (SB. 299-SL2018-5 N.C. Gen. Ass.,
2018). As North Carolina school leaders and state policymakers continue to search for ways to
improve student performance, they must be able to identify and understand current teacher
perceptions of the North Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus Program (2018). While it is
essential for politicians to understand educators’ attitudes and concerns, it is also imperative
school administrators identify and understand any relationships between the educators’ attitudes
toward the performance bonus program and their corresponding EVAAS score. Any identifiable
relationships would assist school leaders as they make critical staffing decisions affecting student
learning. The problem is more specific quantitative research is needed to gauge what is necessary
to garner teacher support of this alternate compensation system and identify any relationships
between a teacher’s attitude toward performance pay and corresponding EVAAS growth score.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this study was threefold. First, the study was conducted to determine
whether differences and/or relationships existed in the attitudes and perceptions of fourththrough eighth grade educators regarding the current North Carolina Teacher Performance
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Bonus. Next, the study determined the strength and direction of any linear association between
an educator’s perception score regarding the North Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus and the
educator’s EVAAS growth score. Finally, educators’ perceptions of the North Carolina Teacher
Performance Bonus were compiled and reported regarding teacher efficacy, individual
performance, and implementation. The study incorporated a causal-comparative and
correlational research design (Rovai et al., 2014; Warner, 2013). Due to the personal nature of
this study, teacher interviews and focus groups would not have provided the honesty needed and
may have added the potential for the bias and inconsistencies an anonymous survey would allow.
Additionally, the closed-ended questions contained in the survey allowed for proportions of the
target participants’ attitudes and perceptions to be calculated and assessed at a statistically
significant level (Rovai et al., 2014). Thus, descriptive statistics were computed and reported
(Table 16) regarding educators’ perceptions as scored by an anonymous 28-question Likert-item
survey (Adkins, 2004). An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was calculated to test for differences
using the independent variable, teacher eligibility, with three groups and the dependent variable,
educators’ perceptions (Warner, 2013). The three groups for the independent variable were (a)
teachers not eligible for any bonus, (b) teachers eligible for one bonus, and (c) teachers eligible
for two bonuses. Fourth- through eighth-grade mathematics teachers and fourth through fifth
grade reading teachers were eligible for the North Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus. Fourththrough eighth-grade science and social studies teachers and sixth through eighth grade reading
teachers were not eligible. More specifically, a fourth- through eighth-grade teacher who only
taught science or social studies or a sixth- through eighth-grade teacher who only taught reading
was not eligible for any bonus. A fourth or fifth grade teacher who taught either mathematics or
reading and science or social studies or a sixth- through eighth-grade mathematics teacher was
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eligible for one bonus. Finally, a fourth or fifth grade teacher who taught both mathematics and
reading was eligible for two bonuses. The dependent variable, educators’ perceptions, was
generally defined as the overall perceptions about and attitudes toward the North Carolina
Teacher Performance Bonus. Furthermore, educator perceptions were divided and reported as (a)
knowledge and understanding; (b) individual efficacy; (c) impact on individual performance –
motivation; (d) impact on individual performance – negative impact; (e) implementation –
appropriateness, fairness, and goal alignment; and (f) amount and proportion of performance
bonus.
Next, a Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient was computed to determine the
strength and direction of any linear association between an educator’s perception score regarding
the North Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus and their corresponding EVAAS growth score as
calculated by the North Carolina Department of Public Instruction (NCDPI) and the SAS
Institute (Rovai et al., 2014; Warner, 2013). Each educator’s EVAAS growth score was linked to
that educator’s overall perception score regarding the North Carolina Teacher Performance
Bonus by the last five digits of their 10-digit employee identification number generated by the
North Carolina Department of Public Instruction. The last five digits of the 10-digit employee
identification number were provided to each school district’s EVAAS coordinator so they could
provide the respective teacher’s EVAAS growth score to the researcher while maintaining
confidentiality.
Finally, based on demographic categories, educators’ perceptions were reported as
percentages with regards to the knowledge and understanding and teacher efficacy of the North
Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus (Tables 21–29).
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Participants were drawn from a purposive convenience sample of fourth- through eighthgrade educators in the seven far western North Carolina counties. More specifically, the sample
itself consisted of approximately 150 fourth- through eighth-grade educators who teach English,
mathematics, science, or social studies. The sample was representative of the target population in
terms of current teaching assignment, years of experience, gender, personal level of educational
attainment, school socio-economic status, and receipt of a prior performance plan award. This
information was collected through the 28 question Likert-item survey instrument.
Significance of the Study
Many research studies have not only been devoted to determining what motivates
teachers to remain in the education profession but have also examined whether a monetary
reward influences this decision (Baker, 2014; Rice et al., 2015; Springer & Taylor, 2016). Is it
fair to reward teachers for student performance? Should administrators make staffing decisions
based on student growth measures while so much that affects student growth is beyond teachers’
control? The answers to these questions and more were all integral parts of this study and the
future of performance pay plans within the K–12 public education school system.
The results of this study prove beneficial to many organizations and individuals including
federal and state policymakers as well as to local district and school administrators. Gaining
insight into factors affecting teachers’ perceptions of a performance plan and what motivates
teachers benefit and guide future alternative compensation policies. Additionally, the results also
provide school administrators with an understanding of teacher retention issues and better equip
them to appropriately staff their individual school positions.
Because the single salary pay schedule is the dominant form of pay among K–12 public
schools, much of the research regarding merit pay has been conducted in the business sector
(Conroy & Gupta, 2016; Frey, Homberg, & Osterloh, 2013; Guis, 2013). Additionally, much of
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the research involving performance pay in the educational sector is based on teacher evaluations
and not student achievement (Amrein-Beardsley, Polasky, & Holloway-Libell, 2016; Rice et al.,
2015). If future merit pay plans, including the one analyzed in this study, become the norm
across K–12 public schools, educational stakeholders must understand all aspects, including
both positive and unintended consequences (Balch & Springer, 2015; Berk, 2016; Brehm et al.,
2017; Guis, 2014). These gaps in the literature were addressed by analyzing teachers’
perceptions of a performance pay plan that is in its fourth year of implementation and how these
perceptions could potentially predict future teacher effectiveness and student achievement.
Research Question(s)
The following research questions guided this research:
RQ1: Are there differences in educators’ perceptions of the North Carolina Teacher
Performance Bonus Plan among fourth- through eighth-grade educators eligible for no bonus,
one bonus, or two bonuses?
RQ2: Is there a relationship between an educators’ perception score of the North
Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus and the educators’ EVAAS growth score?
RQ3: What are fourth- through eighth-grade educators' perceptions of the North Carolina
Teacher Performance Bonus Plan in regards to (a) subject taught, (b) years of experience, (c)
gender, (d) personal level of educational attainment, (e) Title 1 school, and (f) receipt of
performance pay?
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Definitions
The following key terms are used throughout this study and are defined based upon the purpose
of the study.
1. Equity Theory – Individuals are motivated by fairness or the idea that similar inputs
receive similar outcomes or are equitable (Horne, Foley, & Flora, 2014)
2. EVAAS – Education Value-Added Assessment System (EVAAS) score; an analytic
system used to measure teacher effectiveness and predict a students’ growth over time for
multiple subjects for multiple grades across a minimum of three years (Vosters et al.,
2018)
3. Expectancy Theory – An individual’s motivation is an outcome of how much the
individual wants a reward, the likelihood the effort will lead to the expected outcome, and
the belief the effort will lead to the reward (Flake et al., 2015)
4. Goal Setting Theory – Effects of setting goals on subsequent performance as defined by
the measure of importance the goal has to the individual and self-efficacy (DishonBerkovits, 2014)
5. Performance Pay – An alternative pay plan that compensates teachers based on valueadded measures or student achievement and growth data; may be used interchangeably
with merit pay (Podgursky & Springer, 2007a)
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
Overview
This literature review begins by defining expectancy, equity, and goal-setting theories in
the context of the conceptual framework and related to teacher perceptions of pay for
performance programs (Mintrop, Ordenes, Coghlan, Pryor, & Madero, 2018). The historical
context and call for educational reform in the US is depicted (Baker & Gordon, 2014) and pay
for performance programs in school and non-school sectors from other states and countries are
detailed. Prior North Carolina performance pay school- and individual-based programs are
thoroughly explained including the intended results and unintended consequences of each. Next,
the current North Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus Program (2017) is defined (N.C. Gen.
Ass., 2018). Teacher evaluation models created to measure and improve teacher effectiveness are
outlined. Finally, previous research findings about the effects on perceptions of performance pay
programs as related to educator attitudes, motivations, performance, and student achievement are
chronicled.
Conceptual Framework
The success of educator incentive programs relies on the assumption that financial
rewards for teachers will motivate them to choose certain teaching positions, put more effort into
their teaching, and engage in professional development (Yuan et al., 2013). The impact of
financial incentives on teacher behaviors such as instructional practices, level of effort, job
decisions, and working conditions such as job stress and collegiality has been the focus of much
research (Flake, Barron, Hulleman, McCoach, & Welsh, 2015; Rice et al., 2015; Yuan et al.,
2013). This study applied the major components of Vroom’s expectancy theory, Adam’s equity
theory, and Locke’s goal-setting theory, and directly related them to the motivational aspects,

29
facets of rewards versus outputs, and focus of setting challenging objectives of performancebased pay in an educational setting (Adams, 1963; Locke & Latham, 2006; Vroom, 1995).
Expectancy Theory
Vroom’s expectancy theory examines the relationship between one’s internal needs and
the resulting effort expended to meet these needs (Vroom, 1995). It is the belief that if one works
harder, the outcome will be better (Vroom, 1995). However, the outcome can be affected by
having the right tools (e.g., resources, skills, and necessary supports) to complete the task (Field,
2015; Kobussen, Kalagnanam, & Vaidyanathan, 2014; Rice et al., 2015). Purvis, Zagenczyk, and
McCray (2015) describe expectancy theory as a process theory of motivation and the motivation
behind answering the question “What is in it for me?”
According to Rice et al. (2015) expectancy theory models motivation as a function of
three factors (a) valence, (b) expectancy, and (c) instrumentality. Valence is the importance an
individual places upon the expected outcome or degree of the personal allurement of the rewards
that follow either the group outcome or an individual’s performance (Purvis et al., 2015; Rice et
al., 2015; Yuan et al., 2013). The second component, expectancy, is the belief an increased effort
will lead to increased performance or the measure of the probability that such efforts will achieve
the intended outcomes (Purvis et al., 2015; Yuan et al., 2013). Finally, instrumentality is the
assumption that if an individual performs well, a valued outcome will occur (Rice et al., 2015;
Yuan et al., 2013). For an individual to actively participate in a performance pay plan, the
stakeholder would have to view the organization’s climate as positive and support motivation
with high levels of valence, expectancy, and instrumentality (Purvis et al., 2015; Vroom, 1995).
The combination of these three factors contribute understanding to an individual’s
participation in pursuing the group or individual outcome whether by active participation, token
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participation, or counter-implementation (Vroom, 1995). In the context for this study, teachers
who actively participate believe increased efforts result in increased student achievement,
leading to a monetary reward that teachers value. Token participation involves an individual
simply going through the motions in order to appease superiors while exerting very little effort
and may occur three ways (Purvis et al., 2015). First, one may have a low level of expectancy
with high levels of instrumentality and valence. This form of participation could be that of a
teacher who supports a bonus pay plan but does not feel capable of achieving increased student
growth. Purvis et al. (2015) characterizes a second form of token participation as one with a low
level of instrumentality and high levels of expectancy and valence. This describes a teacher who
assumes that the additional monetary bonus will not be awarded. The last form of token
participation, a low level of valence and high levels of instrumentality and expectancy, results
from a teacher not valuing the monetary bonus as a result of increased efforts (Purvis et al.,
2015).
Finally, counter-implementation is defined as sabotaging or actively opposing any
initiatives if the outcome is undesirable to the individual (Purvis et al., 2015). One example could
be a teacher undermining any successful efforts because the teacher does not feel the reward is
large enough or worth the effort. This type of participation could be exhibited by a teacher who
is ineligible for the bonus pay and thus works against other teachers. Thus, Purvis et al. (2015)
summarizes the three factors as an individual either having a strong positive motivation (active
participation), a neutral motivation (token participation), or a strong negative motivation
(counter-implementation) to pursue the targeted outcome.
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Equity Theory
Adams’ (1963) equity theory is based on a fair balance of hard work or skills against
salary or recognition. Equity theory is further explained as an employee’s input or effort equaling
his or her reward or output (Mintrop et al., 2018). Conroy and Gupta (2016) define this as
teachers comparing their own performance, level of effort, and years of experience to their own
pay or salary. When employees feel the ratio of the input and output are equally relevant to
others, they are satisfied (Conroy & Gupta, 2016; Mintrop et al., 2018). If an individual
perceives his or her own input/output ratio is disparagingly compared to that of another
individual, he or she is more likely to balance the equity by either reducing his or her own effort
or leaving the organization (Schmidt, 2015). Equity theory provides a framework to organize a
work situation that is equitable, consistent, and free of self-interest (Conroy & Gupta, 2016).
In an educational context, research shows there are many factors affecting the equity, or
fairness, of teacher performance pay and should not be viewed through the lens of higher pay for
higher performing teachers (Liu, Zhao, & Xie, 2016; Meng & Wu, 2015). On the contrary,
Tirivayi, van den Brink, and Groot (2014) posit monetary incentives may recruit and retain more
effective teachers, whereas lower-performing teachers would either improve their instructional
practices or leave the profession entirely, leading to a more advanced workforce. Horne et al.
(2014) argue equity theory is a better way to examine merit pay than expectancy theory is but
that equity theory also has limitations of what teachers deem as fair, such as deciding how the
pay is allotted and implemented. An additional limitation is teachers of low performing students
being needlessly punished for achievement or growth they are unable to control (Horne et al.,
2014). With regard to the traditional teaching salary structure, a proponent of equity theory
would argue it to be unbalanced since a beginning teacher would receive less pay than a veteran
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teacher while still giving the same effort and attention to their instructional practices (Horne et
al., 2014; Podgursky & Springer, 2011). Similarly, or an Advanced Placement (AP) teacher
would be paid equally to another teacher on the same salary scale but would not receive
additional pay for the assumed increased work load of planning and grading associated with an
AP course (Horne et al., 2014).
Goal-Setting Theory
Goal-setting theory states the act of defining a challenging goal contributes to better
performance (Mintrop et al., 2018; Rice et al., 2015). In the 1960s, Edwin Locke defined goalsetting theory as the theory that setting specific and challenging goals along with appropriate
feedback contribute to better task performance (Locke & Latham, 2006). In practice, providing a
specific high-performance goal leads to a better performance outcome than setting no goal or
vague goals (Dishon-Berkovits, 2014; Tirivayi et al., 2014). However, two factors affect the
success of attaining any goal (a) the importance of the goal to the individual, and (b) selfefficacy (Dishon-Berkovits, 2014; Ford, Van Sickle, Clark, Fazio-Brunson, & Schween, 2017;
Frey et al., 2013; Rice et al., 2015). Moreover, Tirivayi et al. (2014) asserts that how the
incentive to achieve the goal is determined and communicated to stakeholders is crucial to the
influence on accomplishing the goal. Rice et al. (2015) distinguish program fairness and goal
attainability as two mediating elements of goal-setting theory.
The motivation behind goal-setting theory may be extrinsic, intrinsic, or a combination of
the two (Locke & Latham, 2006). In an educational setting, an extrinsic motivator may be a
monetary reward or public recognition (Kelley et al., 2002). Mintrop et al. (2018) noted many
teachers consider bonus money as recognition and validation of their hard work and
achievements. Extrinsic motivators, such as monetary incentives, may also have negative effects
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on teacher behavior such as encouraging teachers to teach to the test, exclude lower-performing
students from testing, and cheating such as changing test answers or giving students the correct
answers (Jacob & Levitt, 2003; Tirivayi et al, 2014). An intrinsic motivator may be improved
student performance or the job satisfaction of meeting a goal (Kelley et al., 2002). Teachers are
encouraged and experience positive emotions when earning a monetary reward (Mintrop et al.,
2018). Whereas, it is assumed many teachers choose the profession because of high intrinsic
motivation, monetary incentives may adversely affect a teacher’s intrinsic motivation by
undermining their self-determination, self-esteem, and self-efficacy, which ultimately leads to a
sense of powerlessness and demotivation (Tirivayi et al, 2014).
Integrating Expectancy, Equity, and Goal-Setting Theories
Performance pay programs attempt to motivate teachers with monetary rewards and the
integration of the three theories - expectancy, equity, and goal-setting emphasize the
motivational aspect of the monetary incentive (Yuan et al., 2013). A teacher’s job satisfaction is
a multi-dimensional construct that pertains to many factors including (a) summative evaluations,
(b) salary and/or bonuses, (c) supervisors, (d) colleagues, (e) teacher working conditions and
climate, and (f) the job itself (Conroy & Gupta, 2016; Kobussen et al., 2014). Behavior results
from conscious choices to maximize pleasure or intended results (Mintrop et al., 2018). A crucial
aspect of the expectancy theory is that it relies on perceptions (Rice et al., 2015). These
perceptions of or associations with the expected outcomes are not related to self-motivated
rewards (Rice et al., 2015). The personal satisfaction with performance evaluations and pay
depends on the value the individual places on the reward (Kobussen et al., 2014). Expectancy
theory is further complemented by goal-setting theory by outlining the prescribed conditions a
teacher’s efforts will be influenced thus attaining the goal (Kelley et al., 2002; Yuan et al., 2013).
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Rice et al. (2015) contend that to be successful, a performance pay program must (a)
offer pertinent and sufficiently large rewards; (b) demonstrate attainability with connections to
the effort and reward; and (c) conclude in measurable goals with perceived fairness, thus
increasing the motivational potential of the financial incentive. Thus, a performance pay program
must be credible (Frey et al., 2015). A performance pay plan should establish challenging goals
that instill motivation and encourage stakeholder support (Dishon-Berkovits, 2014).
Additionally, a performance pay plan should maintain the perceived fairness sought by educators
(Rice et al., 2015; Tirivayi et al., 2014; Yuan et al., 2013).
Any compensation policy begins with the assumption that a monetary reward contributes
to a significant effect on an employee’s behavior (Frey et al., 2013). However, while research
also reveals teachers are interested in financials rewards (Rice et al., 2015), other evidence
suggests they are less receptive to financial incentives as a result of a service-before-self attitude
(Frey et al., 2013; Rice et al., 2015). Neito (2013, p. 91) refers to this idea of selfless dedication,
stating, “Teachers enter the profession for any number of reasons, but neither fame nor money
nor the promise of lavish working conditions is at the top of the list.” Research has shown when
teachers perceive the reward as attainable (e.g., a feasible goal), linked to individual effort (e.g.,
harder work results in better rewards), and fair in terms of reward distribution (e.g., equivalent
input/output ratios) the motivational capability of the financial incentive increases (Chiang,
Wellington, Hallgren, Speroni, Herrmann, Glazerman, & Constantine, 2015; Dishon-Berkovits,
2014; Flake et al., 2015; Frey et al., 2013; Kobussen et al., 2014; Mintrop et al., 2018; Rice et al.,
2015).
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Related Literature
The overwhelming majority of public school teachers are paid on a single salary schedule
(Gius, 2013). However, many school districts across the US are experimenting with performance
pay compensation plans (Dee & Wyckoff, 2015). This section begins with a brief historical
review of teacher compensation reform followed by descriptions of other performance pay
programs across the nation. North Carolina’s prior performance pay programs are explained
alongside the current program. Finally, research findings on educator perceptions of
performance-based pay programs and the effects of these programs on student achievement are
presented.
Call for Educational Reform
From focusing on the 3 R's - reading, writing, and arithmetic in a small one-room
building to sprawling school campuses in which student interests drive curriculum decisions, the
educational system in the US has undergone many changes and reforms since the 1800s
(Springer & Gardner, 2018). Not only does the physical makeup of the schools look extremely
different, but teacher demographics have also changed. Teachers are no longer predominantly
young White women who stay in the position until they marry (Springer & Gardner, 2018).
The evolution of school facilities and increased teacher diversity have not been the only
revisions to education. Teacher compensation is reflected in the many changes from the early
years of education. Teachers in the 1800s were compensated based on a room and board model
in which a teacher moved from home to home of their students on a weekly basis (Springer &
Gardner, 2018). The student’s family was entrusted to supervise the teacher and ensure she had
the proper moral character required to be a good role model (Springer & Gardner, 2018). As the
number of schools grew to form school districts, teaching standards also became more
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stringent. With these more rigorous standards, a grade-based teacher compensation model
emerged. This model was reflective of the level of skills needed to educate students. Teachers in
elementary schools were viewed as not needing the same level of skills as those in high schools.
Thus, as students progressed through elementary to middle to high school, their teachers’ salaries
increased. At the turn of the 20th century, the majority of educator pay models moved into a
single salary schedule. In this compensation model, a teacher’s salary was based on two criteria:
highest degree held and years of teaching experience.
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) was a pay for performance program
established by the federal government that passed down federal standards to state and local
governments. The NCLB forced school districts, Local Education Authorities (LEA), to be held
accountable for student performance. With this new accountability, states and local governments
have struggled to find a way to hold schools responsible for student achievement.
Performance Pay Programs in an Educational Setting
There are many forms of teacher compensation programs beyond the single salary
schedule. Career ladders, sometimes referred to as knowledge or skills-based pay, create
different levels or categories rewarding teachers with increased salaries based on increased
credentialing or assuming additional school responsibilities (Baker, 2014). Completing an
advanced degree, pursuing dual certifications, or achieving National Board for Professional
Teaching Standards (NBPTS) certification are all examples of knowledge or skills-based pay
(Balch & Springer, 2015; Cowan & Goldhaber, 2018; Rice, 2015). Difficult-to-staff bonuses
have also been awarded to teachers willing to teach subjects such as mathematics, science, and
special education (Adnot et al., 2017). Another type of difficult-to-staff bonus is incentives,
recruitment and retention bonuses, offered to teachers willing to teach in schools that
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traditionally serve a large population of socioeconomically disadvantaged, minority, or lowperforming students (Adnot et al., 2017; Baker, 2014; Grissom & Strunk, 2012).
Federal incentive programs have methodically altered how the majority of public school
teachers in the US are annually evaluated and, in some cases, alternately compensated (AmreinBeardsley, Polasky & Holloway-Libell, 2016). Through the use of student achievement data that
measures growth via value-added models (VAMs) or growth models (student growth percentiles,
SGP), the amount of “value” that a teacher “adds” or “detracts” from a student’s growth on a
standardized assessment over the course of the school year is measured (NEA Department of
Teacher Quality, 2011; NCDPI, 2018; North Carolina General Assembly, 2018).
In 2007, the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) appropriated $99 million per annum to school
districts across the US (Jacob & Springer, 2008). The money was awarded on a competitive basis
to fund the advancement of principal and teacher performance pay plan programs (Jacob &
Springer, 2008; Koppich, 2010; Podgursky & Springer, 2007a, 2007b). These federal grants
were awarded to many school districts across the nation including schools in Alaska, Illinois,
Colorado, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, California, Tennessee, and Pennsylvania
(Jacob & Springer, 2008; Podgursky & Springer, 2007a, 2007b). The nature of the programs
ranged from teacher and principal value added measures to taking on additional duties and
obtaining additional certifications (Podgursky & Springer, 2007a, 2007b). While the TIF did not
have the support of the NEA or the American Federation of Teachers in 2008 (Koppich, 2010;
Podgursky & Springer, 2007a), it still remains a federally funded grant program (U. S.
Department of Education, 2018). Appropriated by the U.S. Congress, TIF grant funding reached
nearly $500 million from 2006 to 2011 with President Obama allocating an additional $200
million in 2009 to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act for the development and
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implementation of teacher performance incentive plans (Springer & Taylor 2016). Fourteen new
grants were awarded during the 2017 fiscal year (U. S. Department of Education, 2018). The
program then expanded to include the Teacher and School Leader Incentive Program (TSL)
which allocated approximately $88 million to grantees for opportunities to increase teacher
effectiveness and student achievement (U. S. Department of Education, 2018). Since the
program’s inception over 2,000 schools in 36 states and Washington, D. C. have benefited from
the teacher incentives. The following section highlights several states’ performance pay
initiatives based on types of teacher compensation programs.
Non-Student Achievement Teacher Compensation Programs
In the 2011-12 school year, Missouri did not have a state-wide policy for rewarding
teachers, which gave school districts the power and flexibility to administer various performance
pay programs funded through TIF grants (Liang & Akiba, 2015a). Hoping to contribute to the
growing body of research on the implementation of differing performance pay programs, Liang
and Akiba (2015a) studied 125 midsize to large school districts in Missouri in an effort to not
only identify the percentage of school districts in Missouri that offered incentive pay programs
but also to understand the characteristics of these programs. The study (Liang & Akiba, 2015a)
found that 68% of the school districts offered no incentive program, 17% one program, 11% two
programs, and 4% three or more programs. Characteristics of these incentive pay programs
included additional pay for National Board certification, performing additional duties such as
mentoring new teachers, obtaining advanced degrees for existing teachers, and bonuses to
teachers new to the district for teaching assignments in subject areas with teacher shortages and
difficult-to-staff schools (Liang & Akiba, 2015a). Liang and Akiba’s (2015a) study also found
that small and economically disadvantaged school districts are less likely to provide incentives
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for National Board certification or offer additional performance pay programs, which could be a
concern for recruiting and retaining effective quality teachers in small rural districts.
In a further study, Liang and Akiba, (2015b) examined statewide longitudinal survey data
from the 2009-10 middle school mathematics teachers in Missouri to determine any relationship
between the teachers’ performance-related pay and improvements in their practice of
constructivist instruction instead of solely relying on student achievement on a standardized test.
This study found a positive association between performance-related pay and improvement of a
teacher’s practice of constructivist instruction, possibly indicating the priority should be on
teaching practices rather than student achievement data when determining monetary incentives
(Liang & Akiba, 2015b).
Similar to Tennessee’s program to retain and recruit highly effective teachers to highneed schools, Washington State began awarding salary incentives of $3,500 per year to any
National Board certified teacher (NBCT) in 2000 and subsequently raised the incentive to $5,000
in 2007 (Cowan & Goldhaber, 2018). Lawmakers in Washington then amplified these efforts
with the introduction of the Challenging Schools Bonus (CSB) which awarded an additional
$5,000 to NBCTs in high poverty schools (Cowan & Goldhaber, 2018). With this new incentive,
the number of NBCTs almost doubled and annual state spending on NBCT bonuses increased
from $10 million to $45 million by 2014 (Cowan & Goldhaber, 2018). While the program was
very successful in increasing teacher certifications and credentialing, Cowan and Goldhaber
(2018) deemed the program did not lead to appreciable gains in student achievement.
Denver Public Schools’ Professional Compensation System for Teachers (ProComp),
adopted in 2004 was a collaborative effort between the Denver Classroom Teachers Association
and the Denver Public Schools (Goldhaber & Walch, 2012; Podgursky & Springer, 2007b).
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According to Podgursky and Springer (2007), funding for the ProComp system was bolstered by
a November 2005 ballot action of an additional $25 million in taxes by Denver voters and a
$22.67 million five-year Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) award from the US Department of
Education (USDoE) and has become one of the most widely known teacher performance pay
plan programs. The ProComp approach enabled teachers to earn variable pay supplements
through four components including (a) knowledge and skills, (b) professional evaluation, (c)
market incentives, and (d) student growth (Goldhaber & Walch, 2012; Koppich, 2010;
Podgursky & Springer, 2007b). The largest monetary award came from the knowledge and skills
element in the form of a 9% salary index bonus for NBPTS certification (Podgursky & Springer,
2007b). Receiving an excellent professional evaluation provided a 3% salary index bonus
(Podgursky & Springer, 2007b). Market incentives were defined as incentives to those teachers
for teaching in difficult-to-serve schools such as alternative schools or schools with a high free
and reduced-price lunch student population and difficult-to-staff teaching assignments such as
those with high turnover and vacancy (Goldhaber & Walch, 2012). Teachers serving in one of
those schools or areas were eligible for a 6.4% bonus per school and teaching assignment
(Goldhaber & Walch, 2012). While this plan also included a student growth component,
composed of teacher and school-wide growth standards, it was three times less than the monetary
award for achieving NBPTS certification (Podgursky & Springer, 2007b). In a study of the
Denver Public Schools’ ProComp plan, Goldhaber and Walch (2012) documented significant
learning gains for students of teachers enrolled in the program particularly in middle school
mathematics and high school reading. Conversely, while results were not significant in middle
school reading, they were negative along with those for high school mathematics (Goldhaber &
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Walch, 2012). Goldhaber and Walch (2012) noted a possible spillover effect to teachers not
enrolled in the program from the ProComp implementation.
Student Achievement Teacher Compensation Programs
Performance related pay systems attached to increased student achievement vary not only
in the individual components but also in their results. The following sections detail various
programs across the US and the noted inconsistent results.
Positive Results. During the 2012–13 school year the Tennessee Department of
Education (TDOE) in coalition with the Tennessee’s Governor’s Office offered one-year
retention bonuses ($5,000) to any Level 5 teacher (Springer et al., 2016; Swain et al., 2019). A
Level 5 teacher was defined as receiving a teacher evaluation of 425 or greater and taught in one
of the eighty-three priority schools (Swain et al., 2019). Priority schools were the bottom 5% of
schools based on a composite proficiency of assessment scores (Springer et al., 2016; Swain et
al., 2019). Upon completing a study of this relatively short incentive program, Springer et al.
(2016) concluded that in terms of recruiting and retaining highly effective teachers in high-need
schools, the effect of the retention bonus was small but considerably significant and allowed
optimism regarding the potential of these bonuses. Moreover, in a study designed to assess the
effectiveness of this program on student gains, Swain et al. (2019) showed larger test score gains,
especially on state reading exams.
With the introduction of the Merit Award Program (MAP) in 2007, the Florida State
Legislature replaced the previous performance pay program, Special Teachers Are Rewarded
(STAR), with a $147.5 million appropriation to provide bonuses of at least 5% but no more than
10% of the average district salary for teachers (Jacob & Springer, 2008; Podgursky & Springer,
2007b). While 40% of the funding was dedicated to improving professional practices based on
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principal evaluations, the remaining 60% was awarded based solely on student performance
(Podgursky & Springer, 2007b). When conducting a voluntary online survey of teachers in the
School District of Hillsborough County in Florida regarding teacher attitudes’ toward the MAP
and STAR performance pay programs, Jacob and Springer (2008) found only moderate support
for performance pay with the majority of teachers inclined to be most favorable towards
individual teacher performance rather that school or grade-level performance. While Jacob and
Springer (2008) did not address a link between performance pay and student achievement,
additional findings included a significant association between teacher support for any
performance pay plan and teacher experience, principal leadership, and teacher self-efficacy.
In 2008 Texas began another state-funded program, District Awards for Teacher
Excellence (DATE) after the Texas Legislature opted not to reauthorize the Governor’s
Educator Excellence Award Program (GEEAP) and reallocated a portion of those funds to
further expand the DATE program, increasing funding to approximately $197 million annually
(Springer, Lewis, Podgursky, Ehlert, Taylor, Lopez, Ghoshdastidar, & Peng, 2010). This new
voluntary program encompassed 203 school districts representing approximately 16% of all
public school districts in Texas and contrasted with prior performance plans in that significant
teacher involvement in the development of the plan and matching funds from the school district
were required (Springer et al., 2010). However, in subsequent years, the local matching funds
requirement was dissolved, and participation increased (Springer et al., 2010). The majority of
DATE plans included teacher incentives based on their students’ performance on statestandardized assessments instead of school-wide student performance (Springer et al., 2010).
Challenges to the success of each school district’s plan design included fair measures of educator
performance and adequate personnel and data systems to implement the plan (Springer et al.,
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2010). Overall, Springer et al. (2010) noted teachers had a positive experience citing an increase
in student achievement and a decrease in teacher turnover in those schools offering larger
monetary awards.
Mixed Results. The GEEAP, which was one of the single largest teacher performance
pay plans of its time, was created in 2006 by then Texas Governor Rick Perry (Podgursky &
Springer, 2007b). Consisting of three elements (a) the Governor’s Educator Excellence Grant
(GEEG), (b) the Texas Educator Excellence Grants (TEEG), and (c) a district level grant, the
GEEAP provided approximately $330 million annually to high-performing, high-poverty public
schools in Texas (Podgursky & Springer, 2007b; Springer & Taylor, 2016). These three major
initiatives included school-based awards ranging from $40,000 to $290,000 per year based on
student enrollment with 75% of the award going directly to full-time classroom teachers based
on objective measures of student performance and the remaining 25% distributed to all school
personnel (Podgursky & Springer, 2007b; Springer & Taylor, 2016). This remaining 25% was
based on both student performance and on teacher effectiveness as it pertained to student
achievement such as professional development, teacher mentoring and induction programs,
stipends for participation in after-school programs, signing bonuses for teachers in difficult-tostaff subjects, and/or programs to recruit and retain effective teachers (Podgursky & Springer,
2007b; Springer & Taylor, 2016). In a later study of the GEEG incentive program about
designing incentives for public school teachers, Springer and Taylor (2016) found reasonably
strong evidence the monetary awards affiliated with the program were associated with increased
teacher turnover for those not receiving awards and a largely reduced rate of turnover for those
teachers who received awards.
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Nashville, Tennessee’s Project on Incentives in Teaching (POINT) program was
conducted in the Metropolitan Nashville Public School (MNPS) from 2006 to 2009 and
rewarded individual middle school mathematics teachers on their value-added scores calculated
using the students’ year-to-year growth average on the statewide mathematics assessment (Yuan
et al., 2013). Teachers with value-added scores that reached the 80th, 85th, and 95th percentile
from the prior school year received bonuses of $5,000, $10,000, or $15,000 respectively (Yuan
et al., 2013). In the program’s initial year, 283 teachers participated, while 148 teachers
participated in the program’s final year with an expected attrition rate equal to historical rates of
turnover among middle school mathematics teachers due to teachers either leaving the district or
moving to a different grade level or subject (Yuan et al., 2013). According to a study conducted
by Yuan et al. (2013) while the average annual monetary bonus dispersed was between $9,623
and $11,370, approximately one-half of the participating incentive eligible teachers reported
making few to no changes to their instructional practices, especially those instructional practices
significantly associated with student learning outcomes.
Through the use of an alternative achievement test (e.g., Northwest Evaluation
Association’s (NWEA) Measures of Academic Progress for Primary Grades (MAP)), along with
the state criterion-referenced, standards based test developed by the Pearson Corporation, state
lawmakers in Arizona attempted to create more value-added ineligible teachers, K–2 teachers, to
obtain a more fairly and inclusively eligible merit pay program (Amrein-Beardsley et al., 2016).
Using the NWEA MAP along with the state assessment, Amrein-Beardsley et al. (2016) found
that growth is very difficult to measure and primarily depends on the type of test used as well as
the growth model used to calculate test results over time. Additionally, the researchers advised
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against this form of value-added measure until a more common assessment and accountability
system could be implemented (Amrein-Beardsley, 2016).
In 2007–08, the New York City Department of Education along with the United
Federation of Teachers introduced a voluntary program, the Schoolwide Performance Bonus
Program (SBPB), that provided financial monetary rewards to teachers, support staff, and
counselors in high-needs elementary, middle, K-8, and high schools based on district progress
reports of student performance on standardized tests (Marsh & McCaffrey, 2012; Podgursky &
Springer, 2011; Springer et al., 2012). The SBPB was geared to reward groups of educators
rather than individuals, $3,000 per full-time staff member, based on the premise of motivating
educators on school performance while enhancing collaboration (Marsh & McCaffrey, 2012;
Podgursky & Springer, 2011; Springer et al., 2012; Yuan et al., 2013). However, after several
studies showed the program did not improve school or student outcomes after two years of
implementation, New York City abolished the program in July 2011 (Fryer, 2011; Goodman &
Turner, 2011; Podgursky & Springer, 2011).
Prior North Carolina Performance Pay Programs
The following sections highlight North Carolina’s first attempt at a performance pay plan
beginning in 1996 as well as subsequent revisions to the programs. The results of these programs
conclude the section.
ABC’s of Public Education – School Based
In 1996, North Carolina implemented a statewide bonus system called, ABCs
(Accountability, Basics, and Control) of Public Education in which financial incentives were
awarded to teachers in schools where students met or surpassed test score achievement targets in
mathematics and reading (Vigdor, 2008). Created by the NCDPI (2006) in conjunction with
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North Carolina lawmakers, the ABCs program was comprised of two tiers (a) teachers in
schools that show “exemplary” growth in student test scores receive $1,500, and (b) teachers in
schools with “expected” growth receive a $750 bonus. The ABCs program defined the subject
areas of mathematics and reading in grades 3–8 as well as specific courses in high school as
those to be measured (NCDPI, 2006).
The method for setting the school specific targets for test score growth was a very
contentious issue and the specific formula for calculating those targets was revised over time
(Vigdor, 2008). In 2003–04, the North Carolina legislative session examined and identified
several key ways to improve the program (NCDPI, 2006). Unfortunately, errors were found in
the formula used to evaluate a school’s test score gains. As the standardized tests were revised,
the formula did not translate to reflect these revisions, and awards were given to schools in
which the gains were found only in a small group of students within the school. The 2005–06
school year began with a revised formula used to identify a school’s student test score growth.
Race to the Top Act of 2011– School and Individual Based
North Carolina’s Race to the Top (RttT) program identified several performance based
incentives designed to increase educator effectiveness and retain effective educators (Lauen &
Kozlowski, 2013, 2014; Vigdor, 2008). Similar to the ABC’s program implemented in 1996,
RttT awarded a $1,500 bonus to all certified staff in schools that achieved high growth but also
added a $500 individual-level incentive to teachers of tested subjects whose classrooms exceeded
expected growth, regardless of school-wide performance (Brevetti, 2014; Lauen & Kozlowski,
2013, 2014; Liang & Akiba, 2015).
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Intended Results and Unintended Consequences
Teachers initially expressed support of the programs, and the North Carolina Association
of Educators (NCAE) advocated not only maintaining but even expanding the bonuses. In every
year of the program, the majority of North Carolina’s public schools qualified for the teacher
bonus. Vigdor (2008) found the bonus program had a positive impact on students’ scores on the
high-stakes standardized test used to determine the school’s bonus.
Vigdor’s (2008) analysis of the ABCs program along with research completed by Lauen
and Kozlowski (2013, 2014) on the RttT Act (2011) found no evidence that either program had
any impact on low-stakes test scores or any evidence of a narrowing of the achievement gap
between African-American and Caucasian students. Moreover, the achievement gap between
minority subgroups combined with those students receiving free or reduced-price lunch and all
other students actually increased during the life of the bonus award programs (Lauen &
Kozlowski, 2013, 2014; Vigdor, 2008). Another unintended consequence was the migration of
teachers away from difficult-to-staff and low-performing schools with at-risk students (Vigdor,
2008). Teachers took positions at schools in more advantaged school districts at a lower salary
(Vigdor, 2008). However, Lauen and Kozlowski (2014) noted that, in general, teachers not only
reported that they were unaware of the performance incentive but that the additional financial
incentive would not have changed their teaching practice.
Additionally, Mintrop et al. (2018) and Frey et al. (2013) describe pay-for-performance
incentives as a double-edged sword. By eliminating intrinsic motivators or service commitments
(e.g., compassion, civic duty, self-sacrifice, and socially and personally meaningful work)
through the use of extrinsic motivators (e.g., fear of sanctions or expectations of financial
incentives) employees may become demoralized with themselves, their colleagues, and

48
education as a whole (Frey et al., 2013; King et al., 2015; Mintrop et al., 2018). Mintrop (2018)
also noted that after receiving individual bonuses, teachers found themselves retreating into
silence so as not to offend those teachers who did not receive a financial reward. Moreover,
teachers who did not receive a bonus felt inept with a decreased perception of themselves as
competent educators (Mintrop et al., 2018).
North Carolina Alternative Pay Programs
North Carolina’s current salary schedule and bonuses are defined in the first section. The
current North Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus Program is thoroughly detailed in the final
section.
Salary Schedule/Level and Bonuses
According to the North Carolina General Assembly (2018), North Carolina teachers are
paid based on a salary schedule with beginning teachers holding a bachelor’s degree starting at
$35,000 with increased increments of pay every five years. Teachers with 25 years’ experience
and above are awarded an additional $385 bonus each year (N.C. Gen. Ass., 2018). Teachers
holding a master’s degree or above are allocated an additional 10% of their salary, and teachers
holding NBPTS certification are given an additional 12% of their salary (N.C. Gen. Ass., 2018).
Additionally, AP and International Baccalaureate (IB) teachers are eligible to receive $50
(Section 8.8) for each student scoring a 3 or better on the AP exam or a 4 four or better on the IB
exam. Career and Technical Education (CTE) teachers of certain courses may also receive either
$25 or $50 for students gaining industry credentials or certifications (N.C. Gen. Ass., 2017).
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Current North Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus Program
North Carolina Session Law 2017–57 authorized individualized bonuses based on
teachers’ value-added measures for grades 3–8 mathematics and reading teachers (N.C. Gen.
Ass., 2018). Specifically, the following three categories of teachers are eligible for these bonuses
(a) Third Grade Teacher Reading Bonus – Read to Achieve (Section 8.8C), (b) Fourth and Fifth
Grade Teacher Reading Bonus (Section 8.8D), and (c) Fourth- through Eighth-Grade Teacher
Math Bonus (Section 8.8E, N.C. Gen. Ass., 2018). The Fourth and Fifth Grade Teacher Reading
Bonus and the Fourth- through Eighth-Grade Teacher Math Bonus were both added to the
program to be implemented in the 2017–2018 school year (N.C. Gen. Ass., 2018). Eligible
fourth- through eighth-grade teachers were entitled to the funding based on their individual
Education Value-Added Assessment System (EVAAS) score for the respective reading and/or
mathematics scores. Funds were allotted as bonuses to the top 25% of teachers in each school
district according to the EVAAS score. Teachers who qualified for the bonus could receive the
following monetary incentives (a) $2,150 for an EVAAS score in the top 25% of teachers in
North Carolina for fourth to fifth-grade reading or fourth to eighth-grade mathematics from the
previous school year and/or (b) $2,150 for an EVAAS student growth index score in the top 25%
of teachers in their respective LEA for fourth and fifth-grade reading or fourth to eighth-grade
mathematics from the previous school year (N.C. Gen. Ass., 2018). A teacher may receive a
maximum of two bonuses in each section of the law in any given year. Thus, a fourth grade
English Language Arts, ELA, teacher who is in the top 25% of teachers in his or her LEA and in
North Carolina would receive $4,300,and a fourth or fifth-grade ELA and mathematics teacher
who is in the top 25% of his or her LEA only is also eligible for two bonuses equaling $4,300.
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Measuring Teacher Effectiveness
Teacher evaluations are comprised of many components from summative assessments of
classroom performance to formative feedback that may result in improved teaching and learning
(Mintrop, Ordenes, Coghlan, Pryor, & Madero, 2018). While administrator evaluations
conducted through classroom observations still remain the most prevalent form used to evaluate
educators on a daily basis, many school districts are also assigning teachers a value-added score
to measure teacher effectiveness based on their students’ achievement growth in the four core
subjects of reading/ELA, mathematics, science, and social studies (Springer et al., 2012).
Education Value-Added Assessment System
The EVAAS score is calculated by comparing a student’s current year test score with that
of how the student was expected to score on the test had the student been taught by an average
performing teacher in the same subject and grade level (North Carolina General Assembly, 2018;
Springer et al., 2012). Many issues surround the idea of using a standards-based, criterion
referenced assessment to assign an educator effectiveness score to educators (Amrein-Beardsley
et al., 2016; Berk, 2016; Hendricks, 2014). These research based issues of concern include but
are not limited to (a) the reliability and consistency of measuring teacher effectiveness over time,
(b) the validity to appropriately address what is defined as an effective teacher, (c) inherent
biases based on student assignments to teachers, and (d) the fairness of putting all teachers in the
same category regardless of subjects taught (Moran, 2017; Podgursky & Springer, 2007a;
Rothstein, 2015; Winters & Cowen, 2013).
Research Findings of the Effects on Educator Perceptions of Performance Pay Programs
The following sections highlight the mixed results research on the effects on educator
perceptions of performance pay programs.
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Teacher Attitudes
A teacher’s attitude can have a significant impact in the workplace (Jeon & Wells, 2018).
Zee and Koomen (2016) indicate a teacher’s positive attitude may foster higher levels of job
satisfaction, increased self-efficacy, and lower levels of stress and burnout. Negative attitudes
can breed an unwillingness to work collaboratively, reduced quality of work product, and a
lackluster performance resulting in a toxic work environment (Woestman & Wasonga, 2015).
While a few studies (Liu et al., 2016; Baker, 2014) have found negative attitudes towards a
teacher performance pay plan, the majority of research (Guis, 2014; Goldhaber et al., 2011;
Jacob & Springer, 2008) shows mixed results.
Negative Attitudes. Liu et al. (2016) conducted a mixed methods investigation of
Chinese teachers’ attitudes toward performance pay in which the effects of such policies on
collaboration, motivation, and job stress were studied. Liu et al. (2016) found minimal support
for teacher performance pay citing the top two negative indicators as increased stress and the size
of the bonus. An examination of New Jersey music teachers regarding merit pay found more than
50% of the 619 teachers surveyed were mildly to strongly against school-wide bonuses based
upon school performance (Baker, 2014).
Mixed Attitudes. In a block-randomized controlled design of nine urban middle schools
in the Round Rock Independent School District of Texas, Springer et al. (2012) studied 159
teams of teachers teaching the core subjects – mathematics, reading, science, and social studies
from 2008 to 2010. The researchers’ intent was to determine any affects a team bonus, based on
a value-added measure of student performance on a combination of the Texas Assessment of
Knowledge and Skills (TAKS) tests and district benchmark assessments, had on teachers’
attitudes toward the monetary reward and teaching or their teaching practices and any differences
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in the attitudes or instructional practices of those teachers who earned the bonus and those who
did not (Springer et al., 2012). Two surveys were administered each year to the bonus
intervention and control groups to addresses teachers’ attitudes, perceptions, and instructional
practices relating to the school environment (Springer et al., 2012). While no significant
differences were found between the two groups in terms of teacher behavior, Springer et al.
(2012) noted possible explanations such as 54% of the bonus intervention teachers not fully
understanding the criteria for earning a bonus, 78% of the bonus intervention teachers noting
they would not change their instructional practices in order to win the bonus possibly implying
the monetary reward was insufficient; and 59% of the teachers in both groups not feeling that
the method used to award the bonus was fair.
Using data from the Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) from 1990, 2004, and 2007,
Guis (2014) found no distinction in job satisfaction among teachers who earn merit pay
compared to teachers who do not. When analyzing teacher attitudes by demographics along with
characteristics such as trust and level of respect, Goldhaber et al. (2011) concluded merit pay
should be implemented with some combination of subject-area pay, combat pay, or other
incentives. Of the 3,121 classroom teachers surveyed, female teachers, more experienced
teachers, and teachers active in a teachers’ union were less supportive of performance-based pay,
while high school teachers and teachers in schools with higher numbers of students eligible for
free and reduced-price lunch were more supportive of performance-based pay (Golhaber et al.,
2011). Additionally, trust among colleagues and administration was found to have mixed results
regarding teacher attitudes (Golhaber et al., 2011; Lauen & Kozlowski, 2014). Teachers were
less supportive of any performance pay plan when a higher sense of trust and respect between
colleagues was evident (Golhaber et al., 2011). Conversely, additional studies show teachers
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with a higher sense of trust in and respect for their administrator were found to be more
supportive of a merit pay program (Golhaber et al., 2011; Jacob & Springer, 2008). Jacob and
Springer (2008) found similar results when examining Florida’s Special Teachers are Rewarded
(STAR) program and Merit Award Program (MAP) articulating that 56% of the teachers in 199
traditional and magnet schools in the Florida School District of Hillsborough (SDHC) believed
an incentive pay plan would hinder the school’s collaborative culture.
Teacher Motivation
Exactly what motivates teachers? Motivation comes in many forms, both intrinsic and
extrinsic, and research has produced mixed results with respect to motivating teachers (Tirivayi
et al., 2014; Yuan et al., 2013). In their research findings, Marsh and McCaffrey (2012) disclosed
the New York City Schoolwide Performance Bonus Program (SBPB) did not affect teacherreported attitudes, perceptions, or behaviors. The researchers noted the SBPB was not a strong
motivational tool because of the lack of understanding, expectancy, valence, buy-in, or perceived
fairness (Marsh & McCaffrey, 2012). A research study of 700 Chinese teachers in the provinces
of Guangdong and Shaanxi conducted by Meng and Wu (2017) characterized the effectiveness
of a merit pay policy depends on the relationship between the employee’s public service
motivation (PSM) and the perceived policy effectiveness. Meng and Wu (2017) concluded that
individuals with a low level of merit pay policy expectation may have a higher level of public
service motivation implying that job satisfaction and motivation do not depend on monetary
rewards. Similarly, Luaen and Kozlowski (2013, 2014) found that teachers were adamant the
performance pay programs in North Carolina in no way influenced their teaching and in many
ways could “ultimately damage collegiality and collaboration efforts in their school-efforts
which, they believed, were instrumental for student growth and learning” (p. 30, 2014).
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In a study to determine the attitudes and perceptions regarding a performance pay plan in
a Southwest Florida school district, Adkins (2004) found statistically significant differences in
motivational items among groups with varying levels of experience. Survey respondents with 20
or fewer years of experience reported statistically significant higher levels of agreement (p < .01)
than respondents with 21 or more years of experience (Adkins, 2004). Adkins (2004) also found
significant differences (p < .01) with administrative respondents reporting higher levels of
agreement than instructional respondents regarding the motivational impact of performance pay.
Jones (2013) examined data from the Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) and found evidence
that Florida teachers participating in an individual performance pay plan increased work hours
by almost 25%.
Many teachers are motivated to earn more but also fear students underperforming
resulting in dismissal threats (Dee & Wyckoff, 2015). In a study of the District of Columbia
Public Schools complex performance pay plan, Dee and Wyckoff (2015) found the threat of
dismissal linked to multiple measures of teacher performance to increase the voluntary attrition
of low-performing teachers by more than 50% while also increasing the attainment of high
performing teachers who remained with an effect size of 0.24. Yuan et al. (2013) evaluated three
different performance pay programs (a) Project on Incentives in Teaching (POINT) in Nashville
public schools, (b) Pilot Project on Team Incentives (PPTI) in Texas’s Round Rock Independent
School District, and (c) School-Wide Performance Bonus Program (SPBP) in New York City
Public Schools and found no evidence of increased motivation or a change in instructional
practices. Similar results were found in Lauen and Kozlowski’s (2013) study of North Carolina’s
teacher performance incentives with one teacher stating the program was “not going to change
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anything about the way I teach…We don’t teach to get extra money. It’s not why we do it” (p.
16).
Teacher Performance
Adkins (2004) noted more than 80% of the 492 instructional participants stated a general
disagreement that the performance pay plan incentivized them to increase their efforts or alter
their instructional practices. Dee and Wyckoff (2015) presented evidence that a performance
assessment plan with large enough incentives purposely increased teacher performance whether
by ineffective teachers being dismissed or presumed behavioral responses to incentives.
Using data from the SASS, Jones (2013) found evidence that Florida teachers
participating in an individual performance pay plan increased work hours by almost 25% and
teacher turnover increased. Jones (2013) also discovered evidence nationwide, with the
exception of Florida, female teachers responded to performance pay plans by working 12%
fewer hours per week and decreased participation in unpaid activities. Male teachers and new
teachers reacted positively to performance pay incentives (Jones, 2013). Using a statewide
survey of middle school mathematics teachers in Missouri, Liang and Akiba (2015) found a
positive association between the improvement of instructional practices and a performance pay
program yet found no association between the same incentive program and student achievement.
Teacher Expectancy
Yuan et al.’s (2013) examination of the three different pay for performance programs
showed that while teachers were confident in their instructional practices, they doubted that
increased efforts would lead to higher student achievement and over 50% of the teachers did not
feel they would be awarded a bonus. Moreover, the amount of the rewards was too small for
teachers to be interested in the bonus, and an increase in job level stress was reported by teachers
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in all three programs (Yuan et al., 2013). Jacob and Springer (2008) found similar results as
Goldhaber et al. (2011) citing teachers who were found to have a higher sense of self-efficacy
and an affirmative view of their administrator were also more supportive of performance pay.
Research Findings on the Effects of Performance Pay Programs on Student Achievement
Research shows mixed results regarding whether performance pay programs affect
student achievement (Balch, & Springer, 2015; Barrera-Osorio & Raju, 2017; Gius, 2013;
Hendricks, 2014; Rothstein, 2015; Shifrer, Turley, & Heard, 2017; Yuan et al., 2013). Added to
this mystery are the multitude of performance pay programs from across the US including
individual and group performance pay programs (Tirivayi et al., 2014). The following sections
outline current research findings about individual and group performance pay programs based on
student achievement.
Individual Performance Pay Programs
Several research studies on the SPBP conducted from 2007 to 2011 in New York City
found this schoolwide performance pay program did not improve the schools or student
outcomes (Goodman & Turner; 2011; Marsh & McCaffrey, 2012). Goodman and Turner (2011)
cited evidence that group bonuses might actually weaken collaborative efforts and the structure
of the pay scheme is important. Marsh and McCaffrey (2012) along with Fryer (2013) added to
the research stating no improvement to student achievement was seen at any grade level.
Springer, Ballou, Hamilton, Le, Lockwood, McCaffrey, Pepper, and Stecher (2010)
completed an experimental study of 297 middle school mathematics teachers, grades 5–8, from
2006 to 2009 and found no significant effects on mathematics assessment scores. Conversely,
Tirivayi et al. (2014) summarized the results of various other individual teacher incentive
programs reporting positive effects on mathematics and reading test scores based on a sample of
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elementary school in Arkansas from 2005 to 2007 as well as an increase in mathematics test
scores but no significant effects on reading test scores from an experimental study of 129
elementary schools in Tennessee from 1985 to 1989. In a review of Austin Independent School
District’s pay-for-performance program, Balch and Springer (2015) reported students attending
schools participating in the program during the first year experienced significantly larger test
score gains compared to those schools not participating. While no additional gains were found in
the second year of implementation, no evidence was found that students lost any of the previous
academic gains (Balch & Springer, 2015).
Group Performance Pay Programs
Lauen and Kozlowski (2013, 2014) used quantitative data from the NCDPI and
qualitative data from teacher interviews and surveys to study North Carolina’s RttT initiative,
which included a $1,500 per-teacher school-wide bonus (2013) and an additional $500
individual-level incentive the following year (2014) created to incentivize the instructional
efforts of teachers in North Carolina’s poorest-performing schools based on student growth. The
comparative descriptive analyses (Lauen & Kozlowski, 2013, 2014) were guided by research
questions designed to define the characteristics of bonus-eligible and bonus-winning schools,
determine any improvements in students’ outcomes over time, examine educator attitudes and
perceptions of the program, and study the effects the incentive programs had on teachers’
instructional practices, particularly the addition of the individual tested classroom incentive.
Beginning with the 2011–12 school year, 118 K–12 public schools were designated as the
lowest-performing schools and eligible for the bonus. Of these, 23 schools earned the schoolwide bonus for growth while in the 2012–13 school year, 106 schools were eligible with 35
earning the school-wide bonus for growth (Lauen & Kozlowski, 2013).
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With regards to the Springer et al. (2012) experimental study of group or team incentives
on nine urban middle schools from 2008 to 2010, no effect of the incentive on student outcomes
was found in any of the four core subject areas (Tirivayi et al., 2014). Fryer’s (2013)
experimental study on school-wide incentives in 233 of New York City’s urban elementary,
middle, and high schools from 2007 to 2010 also showed no significant effects on test scores
with diminished student achievement in the larger schools. Confusion regarding the incentive
scheme and how the performance report card was calculated was offered as a potential
explanation for the contradictory results as compared to similar studies (Fryer, 2013). Goodman
and Turner (2011) also conducted a similar experimental study on New York City urban
elementary schools from 2007 to 2009 with comparable results to the Fryer (2013) study with no
significant effects on test scores. This result was attributed to free riding negating the effect of
group incentives even though teachers understood the incentive plan (Goodman & Turner, 2011).
Summary
The success of any performance pay plan assumes that a monetary reward is directly
related to an employee’s motivation. Vroom (1995), Adams (1963), and Locke (2006) each
contemplated the deeper significance of motivation based on their respective theories –
expectancy, equity, and goal-setting. Vroom’s (1995) expectancy theory defines work place
motivation on the premises of the reward being valued, effort producing results, and success
being attainable. Adams (1963) contends that workplace motivation is directly correlated to the
employee’s perception of the equity, fairness, and justice of the task. Finally, Locke (2006)
asserts the motivation for achieving a high performance goal is determined by setting specific,
measurable, realistic, and timely action steps. Regardless of the motivation or theory behind
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completing a task, each theorist posits an employee’s values, beliefs, and perceptions of a task
permeate the process (Adams, 1963; Locke, 2006; Vroom, 1995).
Research on the attitudes and perceptions of any teacher performance pay plan show both
positive and mixed results (Adkins, 2004; Podgursky & Springer, 2007b; Yuan et al., 2013).
Teacher recruitment and retention bonuses awarded to highly effective teachers (Swain et al.,
2019) were regarded as favorable and produced an increase in state reading scores. Positive
support was also garnered for performance pay plans based solely on student performance citing
increased student achievement and strong associations between teacher support for the plans and
teacher experience and self-efficacy (Jacob & Springer, 2008; Springer et al., 2010). The
overwhelming majority of the research has shown mixed results for any performance pay plan
(Amrein-Beardsley et al., 2016; Podgursky & Springer, 2007b, 2011; Springer & Taylor, 2016;
Yuan et al., 2013). Although teachers were found to be supportive of an incentive plan, many
reported making few to no changes to their instructional practices associated with student
learning or there was no significant improvement to student outcomes (Marsh & McCaffrey,
2012; Springer & Taylor, 2016; Yuan et al., 2013). No known study has documented purely
negative results. However, the research literature (Chiang et al., 2015; Podgursky & Springer,
2007b) reflects a performance pay plan incentivizes those who prefer or prosper within such a
plan. Finally, no definitive research was found regarding a relationship between a teacher’s
perceptions of an incentive plan and their corresponding teacher effectiveness or value added
measure.
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODS
Overview
The study incorporated a causal-comparative and correlational research design. This
chapter explains the data collection, procedures, and data analysis used in the study.
Design
The research study was a combination of causal-comparative and correlational
methodologies. First, a causal-comparative design was used to determine if any differences
existed between the dependent variable, fourth- through eighth-grade educators’ perceptions of
the North Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus Plan, and the independent variable of teacher
eligibility. The latter consisted of three groups: (a) teachers not eligible for a bonus, (b) teachers
eligible for one bonus, and (c) teachers eligible for two bonuses. An educator who only taught
science or social studies was not eligible for a bonus. Educators who taught mathematics in the
fourth through eighth grades or reading in the fourth or fifth grade were eligible for one bonus.
Finally, if the educator taught both mathematics and reading in the fourth or fifth grades, they
were eligible for two bonuses. The dependent variable, educators’ perceptions, was more
specifically defined as those perceptions of the North Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus Plan
with regard to (a) individual efficacy and goal attainment, (b) individual impact on performance,
(c) implementation of process, and (d) value and equality of reward. Warner (2013) describes a
causal-comparative and ex post facto research study as one that examines the differences
between naturally occurring variations in the independent and dependent variables. This study
determined any differences between the perceptions of the three groups of educators who were
not randomly assigned but rather were grouped based on the particular characteristic of
eligibility for the North Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus Plan.
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A correlational research design was used to determine and evaluate any quantitative
relationship between an educator’s perception score regarding the North Carolina Teacher
Performance Bonus Plan and that educator’s EVAAS growth score. If a relationship existed
between the variables, it was examined to determine its direction and magnitude. According to
Warner (2013), a quantitative correlational research study involves the collection and
examination of numerical data to describe and interpret relationships. Data were gathered from
the Teacher Performance Pay Attitudinal Survey (TPPAS), a 28-question survey using five
Likert scale rankings from Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree (Adkins, 2014). Rovai et al.
(2014) state a nonexperimental correlational research methodology is used to determine if any
relationship exists between two or more quantitative variables in order to understand and assess
any relationship without any attempt to influence it. In terms of this study, neither variable was
manipulated or controlled.
Research Questions
The research focused on educators’ attitudes and perceptions of the implementation of the
current North Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus. The research questions drew upon the
theoretical framework of equity, expectancy, and goal-setting theories. The research questions in
the study were as follows:
RQ1: Are there differences in educators’ perceptions of the North Carolina Teacher
Performance Bonus Plan among fourth- through eighth-grade educators eligible for no bonus,
one bonus, or two bonuses?
RQ2: Is there a relationship between an educators’ perception score of the North
Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus and the educators’ EVAAS growth score?
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RQ3: What are fourth- through eighth-grade educators' perceptions of the North
Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus Plan in regards to (a) subject taught, (b) years of
experience, (c) gender, (d) personal level of educational attainment, (e) Title 1 school, and (f)
receipt of performance pay?
Null Hypotheses
The null hypotheses for this study were the following:
H01: There are no statistically significant differences in educators’ perceptions of the
North Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus Plan among fourth- through eighth-grade educators
eligible for no bonus, one bonus, or two bonuses as shown by the Teacher Performance Pay
Attitudinal Survey.
H02: There is no statistically significant relationship between an educators’ perception
of the North Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus and the educators’ EVAAS growth score as
shown by the Teacher Performance Pay Attitudinal Survey.
Participants and Setting
The study was conducted beginning in fall 2020, and participants were drawn from a
purposive convenience sample of fourth- through eighth-grade educators located in the western
region of North Carolina. Sample participants from this non-probability sample were fourththrough eighth-grade teachers in the far western counties of North Carolina during the 2018–19
school year. The districts are herein identified as School Districts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. More
specifically, the sample itself consisted of fourth- through eighth-grade educators who taught
English, mathematics, science, or social studies. The sample was representative of the target
population in terms of teaching assignment, years of experience, gender, personal level of
educational attainment, school’s socio-economic status, and prior eligibility award status, which
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information was collected through the survey instrument. Because of the potential bias of
underrepresentation of the three eligibility subgroups, a random sample of those participants who
fully completed the survey was not used for the study (Warner, 2013). Instead, the results from
all participants who fully completed the survey were included in the data analysis.
Population Overview
The seven far western counties of North Carolina were chosen for several reasons. These
counties and the population therein represented a population of educators often overlooked by
their state government and representatives. School systems across the state of North Carolina are
very different geographically, culturally, and socio-economically. Research has often been
conducted in larger urban areas and smaller rural areas are often overlooked (Chiang et al.,
2015). Although educators in these areas follow the same guidelines and policies as others, they
are often met with many challenges when fulfilling their job requirements. The counties are
located in the Appalachian Mountains, several of the counties border Tennessee, Georgia, and
South Carolina; and they are all approximately five hours away from the state capitol. Thus, not
only are these school districts geographically isolated within their own state, but it is very
difficult for these educators to travel to any professional development or legislative sessions in
which their voices can be heard.
Although the school systems in these seven counties are geographically isolated, they
represent a varied mixture of communities ranging from a K–8 elementary/middle school with a
student population of less than 200 students to a K–5 elementary school with over 600 students
(NCDPI, 2019). In three counties, the school system was the largest employer. Additionally,
several counties had over 20% of the population living below the poverty level.
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Population Demographics
According to the NCDPI (2019), School Districts 1 through 7 had between three
and fifteen schools in each district during the 2018–19 school year (Table 1). The smallest school
district had 1,118 students and 91 teachers during the 2018–19 school year while the largest
school district had 7,142 students and 486 teachers (Table 1). School Districts 1, 5, 6, and 7 had
more than twice the number of schools as the remaining three school districts (Table 1) with
School Districts 1 and 7 (Table 1) having more than three times the number of schools in School
Districts 2 and 3 (NCDPI, 2019). Every elementary school in the proposed study was designated
as a Title 1 school and received federal funding based on the high percentages of low-income
students (Cornman et al., 2018).
Table 1
Population - School District Composition
School
District
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Number of
Schools
13
3
3
4
11
9
15

Number of
Students
3,150
1,275
1,118
7,142
4,432
3,621
1,950

Number of Full-Time
Licensed Teachers
261
98
91
486
312
250
137

Beginning in the 2018–19 school year, the North Carolina Department of Public
Education School Report Card began to report a teacher’s years of experience as follows: (a)
beginning teacher: 0–3 years of experience, (b) experienced teacher: 4+ years of experience, and
(c) provisional teacher: a teacher with a four-year degree but not holding a North Carolina
teacher certification (NCDPI, 2019). As shown in Table 2, the majority of the teacher population
across the seven far western school districts was comprised of experienced teachers (NCDPI,
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2019). No school district had more than 15% of teachers with three or fewer years of experience
(Table 2).
Additionally, Table 2 shows teacher effectiveness ratings for the 2018–19 school year as
measured by the North Carolina Educator Evaluation System (NCDPI, 2019). Teachers were
assigned an overall effectiveness classification based on five observational standards (a)
leadership, (b) respectful environment for a diverse population of students, (c) knowledge of
content, (d) instructional practices, and (e) reflective educator (NCDPI, 2019). Each of these
standards was rated from “not demonstrated” to “distinguished” for each teacher (NCDPI, 2019).
Educators were deemed to “Need Improvement” if they demonstrated a less than proficient
rating on any one of the five standards or “Effective” if they were rated at least proficient on all
five observational standards (NCDPI, 2019). Finally, a “Highly Effective” teacher earned a
rating of accomplished or distinguished on all five of the observational standards (NCDPI,
2019). In each of the seven school districts, the majority of teachers received an “Effective”
evaluation (NCDPI, 2019).
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Table 2
Population – Teacher Experience and Effectiveness

School
District
1
2
3
4
5

Years of Experience
Beginning
Experienced
Teachers
Teachers
0–3 Years
4+ Years
9.8%
89.4%
6.6%
93.4%
10.9%
89.1%
12.5%
87.5%
8.3%

91.7%

Teacher Effectiveness
Needs
Improvement
15.6%
13.4%
13.4%
11.8%

Effective
55.8%
43.9%
43.9%
58.8%

Highly
Effective
28.6%
42.7%
42.7%
29.5%

11.5%

51.9%

36.6%

6
14.5%
85.3%
10.2%
66.1%
23.6%
7
13.8%
86.2%
15.7%
56.0%
28.4%
Note. Years of experience may not equal 100%. Teachers without a teaching certificate,
provisional teachers, were not counted in the totals.
Instrumentation
Constructed by Adkins (2004), the survey instrument was the Teacher Performance Pay
Attitudinal Survey, TPPAS (Appendix O), which has also been used and cited in other research
studies regarding teachers’ perceptions of motivation and compensation of performance pay
programs (Forand, 2012; Marsh, 2014; Russ, 2015; Soupir-Fremstad, 2013). The researcher
obtained written permission from the author, Gregory K. Adkins, before utilizing the survey
(Appendices M–N).
Adkins (2004) developed the survey instrument questions using the theoretical and
research framework of expectancy, equity, and goal-setting theory to increase validity. Content
validity was ensured by engaging a panel of experts to validate whether the content and
questions of the survey were appropriate and followed the theories and research framework
(Adkins, 2004). Additionally, an estimate of instrument reliability was obtained using
Cronbach’s coefficient alpha. The survey was divided into six scales with the score of reliability
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for, “(a) knowledge and understanding - Questions 7–8, α=.813, (b) individual efficacy Questions 9–13, α=.735, (c) impact of individual performance-motivation Questions 15–19,
α=.890, (d) impact on individual performance – negative impact Questions 20–22, α=.888, (e)
teacher performance pay implementation – appropriateness Questions 23–24, α=.804, and (f)
teacher performance pay implementation – fairness Questions 25–26, α=.769” (Adkins, 2004, p.
111).
The survey (Appendix O) contained 28 questions as well as allowed participants to add
additional comments about the North Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus (2018) and took no
more than 15 minutes to complete. The first six questions were used to collect demographic
information on the educators and their schools using nominal and ordinal variables. The
remaining questions (7–28) were measured on five Likert scale rankings from Strongly Agree to
Strongly Disagree and focused on six previously mentioned components (a) knowledge and
understanding; (b) individual teacher efficacy; (c) impact of individual performance –
motivation; (d) impact of individual performance – negative outcomes; (e) teacher performance
pay implementation – appropriateness, fairness, and goal alignment; and (f) amount and
proportion of performance bonus (Adkins, 2004). Responses will be as follows (a) Strongly
Agree = 5, (b) Agree = 4, (c) Neutral = 3, (d) Disagree = 2, and (f) Strongly Disagree = 1. The
response data were presented as percentages for each item to demonstrate the level of agreement.
Strongly Agree/Agree responses indicated a general agreement with the item and Strongly
Disagree/Disagree indicated a general disagreement with the item. Neutral responses indicated
no opinion on the item.
Survey scores from the TPPAS ranged from a low score of 22 to a high score of 110 on
questions 7 through –28. The lowest score of 22 indicated a participant had no comprehension of
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the current plan, was unmotivated by additional pay, believed the current plan is unfair, and had
no expectation of additional pay for meeting student achievement goals. The highest score of 110
indicated a participant fully comprehended the current plan, felt their teaching abilities
significantly affected their ability to receive performance pay, was motivated by a performance
bonus, was not affected by an increased workload or stress, and felt additional compensation
should be rewarded for meeting student achievement goals.
Procedures
Before beginning the study, the researcher obtained permission (Appendix A) from the
Liberty University Institutional Review Board (IRB). A permission letter (Appendix B) was
personally given to each superintendent of the seven school districts during a meeting to explain
the purpose of the study and obtain permission (Appendices C–I) to administer the questionnaire
to the fourth- through eighth-grade educators in their respective school districts. The researcher
also requested permission to work with each district’s EVAAS coordinator to collect the fourththrough eighth-grade educators’ EVAAS growth score. The EVAAS score is a value-added
measure of a student’s academic growth based on state tests assigned to represent a teacher’s
effectiveness in the classroom (Rovai et al., 2014; Vosters et al., 2018). According to the SAS
Institute Inc. (2021), the EVAAS model is used to predict a student’s score on a given
assessment based on any prior assessment data along with the expectation the student will make
at least an average amount of one year’s growth in the tested subject. An educator’s EVAAS
growth score is then determined by comparing the amount of growth achieved by the educator’s
students to the average amount of growth in the tested subject (Vosters et al., 2018). To protect
the anonymity of participant responses and their confidential EVAAS growth score, the
researcher requested each participant use the last five digits of their unique 10-digit state
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identification code when completing the survey and to identify the school system in which they
work. The researcher provided each school district’s EVAAS coordinator with a spreadsheet
including the last five digits of each participant’s 10-digit state identification code. The school
district’s EVAAS coordinator subsequently provided the researcher with the EVAAS growth
score corresponding to these five-digit identification numbers.
Obtaining permission from the school districts and conducting the research was managed
in the following order:
1. Obtained permission to conduct research from the Liberty University Institutional
Review Board (Appendix A)
2. Requested and obtained permission from each school district’s superintendent to conduct
research (Appendices B–I)
3. Requested and obtained permission to use the survey instrument, Teacher Performance
Pay Attitudinal Survey (Appendices L–M)
4. Constructed the online version of the survey instrument using online survey tool, Survey
Monkey (Appendix N)
5. Requested each school district send the initial participant email requesting consent to
participate (Appendix J). The email contained the survey link.
6. Participants completed the survey using only the last five digits of their unique 10-digit
employee identification number and the name of the school district in which they taught.
7. One week after the initial participant email, a reminder email was sent to participants
(Appendix K) along with the survey link.
8. Survey remained live for two weeks.
9. Survey was extended for an additional two weeks to increase participation.
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10. Obtained each participant’s EVAAS growth score from each school district’s EVAAS
coordinator using the last five digits of their identification number.
11. Inputted all data into the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS).
12. Performed an analysis of variance for Research Question 1.
13. Calculated an overall educators’ perception score using survey responses.
14. Calculated the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient for Research Question 2.
15. Reported and compared percentages as determined for Research Question 3.
16. Compiled and analyzed any comments regarding the six sections of the survey.
The initial participant email (Appendix J) outlined the purpose of the study, time needed
to complete the survey, and thanks for participation in advance. The email also indicated that
participation was completely voluntary and confidential. The only identifying information used
was the last five digits of the participant’s unique 10-digit identification number and the name of
their school district. Each participant’s 10-digit identification number was only available to the
participant and the school district’s EVAAS coordinator maintaining confidentiality. The link to
the survey was distributed in the initial participant email.
Data Analysis
Warner (2013) recommends an ANOVA to compare the mean scores of a dependent
variable on three or more independent groups. Thus, an ANOVA was calculated using the
continuous dependent variable, educator perceptions, and the independent variable, teacher
eligibility, with its three groups (a) teachers not eligible for a bonus, (b) teachers eligible for one
bonus, and (c) teachers eligible for two bonuses (Warner, 2013). Additionally, a Pearson
Product-Moment correlation was used to assess any relationship between the two continuous
variables (Warner, 2013). For this research study, any correlation was used to establish the
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strength and direction between the values of the two variables: EVAAS growth score and
educators’ perceptions (Warner, 2013).
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CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS
Overview
This research study was conducted to determine overall educator perceptions of the North
Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus and any relationship these perceptions may have with the
educator’s EVAAS growth score. Educator perceptions of the performance bonus were measured
using the Teacher Performance Pay Attitudinal Survey, TPPAS (Adkins, 2014). Participants
included 174 fourth- through eighth-grade teachers in the seven far western school districts of
North Carolina. This chapter is divided into four sections. The first two sections reiterate the
research questions and null hypotheses for this study. Descriptive statistics are provided in the
third section. The final section presents the results and analysis of data as related to the null
hypotheses.
Research Questions
The research questions for this study are the following:
RQ1: Are there differences in educators’ perceptions of the North Carolina Teacher
Performance Bonus Plan among fourth- through eighth-grade educators eligible for no bonus,
one bonus, or two bonuses?
RQ2: Is there a relationship between an educators’ perception score of the North
Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus and the educators’ EVAAS growth score?
RQ3: What are fourth- through eighth-grade educators' perceptions of the North
Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus Plan in regards to (a) subject taught, (b) years of
experience, (c) gender, (d) personal level of educational attainment, (e) Title 1 school, and (f)
receipt of performance pay?
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Null Hypotheses
The null hypotheses for this study are as follows:
H01: There are no statistically significant differences in educators’ perceptions of the
North Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus Plan among fourth- through eighth-grade educators
eligible for no bonus, one bonus, or two bonuses as shown by the Teacher Performance Pay
Attitudinal Survey.
H02: There is no statistically significant relationship between an educators’ perception of
the North Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus and the educators’ EVAAS growth score as
shown by the Teacher Performance Pay Attitudinal Survey.
Sample Demographics
The survey instrument was administered to 174 fourth- through eighth-grade teachers in
the seven far western school districts in North Carolina. All survey responses, as shown in
Tables 3 through 7, were downloaded into a Microsoft Excel file and transposed for importing
into the Statistical Packager for the Social Sciences (SPSS). Demographic variables obtained
from Questions 2 through 6 on the TPPAS were measured on a nominal scale and reported as
percentages using descriptive statistics in a table format. The resulting data are presented in order
to note how the participants as a whole responded.
Sample Demographics Overview
Tables 3 through 7 provide demographic information about the participants and include
(a) years of experience as a professional educator, (b) gender, (c) personal level of educational
attainment, (d) socio-economic status of the school - Title 1 designation, and (e) receipt of prior
performance award. Only 7.5% of the participants had been teaching less than three years and
30.4% of the teachers had three to ten years of experience (Table 3). More than half of the
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participants, 62.1%, had 11 to 20 years’ teaching experience (Table 3). No participants had more
than 20 years of teaching experience (Table 3).
Table 3
Participant Sample - Years of Experience
Number of Years
Less than 3 years
3 to 10 years
11to 20 years
21 or more years
Total

Number
13
53
108
0
174

Percentage
7.5%
30.4%
62.1%
0%
100%

The majority of the participants (86.8%) were female, mirroring the most recent
percentages provided by the National Center for Education Statistics (2020) with 89% female
teachers in public elementary schools (Table 4). Twenty-three male participants (13.2%)
completed the survey (Table 4).
Table 4
Participant Sample - Gender
Gender
Female
Male
Total

Number
151
23
174

Percentage
86.8%
13.2%
100%

The percentage of participants with a post baccalaureate degree was 41.4% compared to
the national average of 55% (National Center for Education Statistics, 2020). One hundred and
two teachers (58.6%) held a baccalaureate degree and 65 teachers (37.4%) 65 also held a
masters’ degree (Table 5). Table 5 shows a very small percentage of teachers held an educational
specialist degree (2.9%) or a doctoral degree (1.1%).
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Table 5
Participant Sample - Level of Educational Attainment
Highest Degree
Baccalaureate
Master’s
Specialist
Doctorate
Total

Number
102
65
5
2
174

Percentage
58.6%
37.4%
2.9%
1.1%
100%

An overwhelming majority of the participants (84.5%) taught in a Title 1 school, which is
commensurate with the socio-economic characteristics of the seven school districts (Table 6).
One hundred forty-seven participants (84.5%) worked in a Title 1 school, and 27 participants
(15.5%) taught in a school that did not have Title 1 school status (Table 6).
Table 6
Participant Sample - Title 1 School Status
Title 1 School
Yes
No
Total

Number
147
27
174

Percentage
84.5%
15.5%
100%

Approximately, one-third (30.5%) of the participants had received performance pay in
the past (Table 7). One hundred twenty-one teachers (69.5%) had not received prior performance
pay (Table 7). To be eligible for performance pay, the teacher had to teach ELA in grades 4 or 5
and/or mathematics in any grade from fourth- through eighth-grade (NCDPI, 2020a).
Additionally, the teacher must have an EVAAS score in the top 25% of their respective school
district or the state for the subject taught (NCDPI, 2020a).
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Table 7
Participant Sample - Receipt of Prior Performance Pay Award
Receipt of Performance Pay
Yes
No
Total

Number
53
121
174

Percentage
30.5%
69.5%
100%

Sample Demographics by Eligibility Status
The number of fourth- through eighth-grade educators within the seven counties was
approximately 400. This study aimed for a minimum sample size of approximately 150
participants with a minimum of 30 per group to ensure at least a 90% chance of judging the
medium effect to be statistically significant (Warner, 2013). According to Gall, Gall, and Borg
(2007), when conducting an analysis of variance with three groups, the minimum sample size
needed to adequately ensure at least a 70% chance of judging the effect to be statistically
significant is 126 participants with a power level of .70 with an estimated eta squared effect size
of .05 at alpha = .05. The study consisted of 174 participants.
Because similar research had not been found regarding the North Carolina Performance
Pay Plan with the three groups of educator eligibility, Warner (2013) suggests using a small
effect size of ƞ2 = .20 and a power of .80 to determine the minimum required n per group of 14.
Additionally, when computing a test of relationships, a minimum sample size of 28 is desired for
an alpha of .05 with a power of .80 and a medium effect size (Warner, 2013). The sample
consisted of 73 teachers not eligible for a bonus within the seven school districts (see Table 8)
because they taught ELA in either sixth, seventh, or eighth grade or taught science or social
studies only. There were 71 teachers eligible for one bonus, and 30 teachers were eligible for
both performance pay bonuses (see Table 8). Tables 8 through 13 provide the demographic
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information based on the three levels of teacher eligibility and include (a) current teacher
assignment, (b) years of teaching experience, (c) gender, (c) level of educational attainment, (d)
the school’s Title 1 designation or socio-economic status, and (e) receipt of a prior performance
award under the current performance pay plan.
Table 8 shows the breakdown of subjects taught for all participants who completed the
survey by eligibility for the teacher performance bonus. Fourth- through eighth-grade
mathematics teachers and fourth through fifth grade reading teachers are eligible for one North
Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus (NCDPI, 2020a). Fourth- through eighth-grade science and
social studies teachers and sixth through eighth grade reading teachers are not eligible (NCDPI,
2020a). More specifically, a fourth- through eighth-grade teacher who only teaches science or
social studies or a sixth- through eighth-grade teacher who only teaches reading is not eligible
for any bonus (NCDPI, 2020a). A fourth through fifth grade teacher who teaches either
mathematics or reading and science or social studies or a sixth- through eighth-grade
mathematics teacher is eligible for one bonus (NCDPI, 2020a). Finally, a fourth or fifth grade
teacher who teaches both mathematics and reading is eligible for two bonuses (NCDPI, 2020a).
Approximately half of the teachers who completed the survey only teach one subject (a) ELA –
22, (b) mathematics – 29, (c) science – 22, and (d) social studies – 16 (Table 8). Many of the
other teachers taught two subjects, which is common in many small school districts across the
state because of funding issues such as those who taught ELA and social studies – 22 or
mathematics and science – 14 (Table 8). Additionally, teachers in elementary classrooms are
sometimes asked to teach all four core subjects in a self-contained classroom as is shown in those
participants, 29, who taught ELA, mathematics, science, and social studies (Table 8).
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Table 8
Teacher Assignment - Eligibility Status

Subject Taught
ELA Only
Mathematics Only
Science Only
Social Studies Only
ELA & Social Studies
ELA & Science
Mathematics & Science
Mathematics & Social Studies
Science & Social Studies
ELA, Mathematics, & Science
ELA, Science, & Social Studies
ELA, Mathematics, Science, & Social
Studies
Total

Level of Eligibility
No Bonus
1 Bonus
22
9
0
28
22
0
16
0
10
13
0
1
0
14
0
1
3
1
0
1
0
1
0
2
73

71

2 Bonuses
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
29

Total
31
28
22
16
23
1
14
1
4
2
1
31

30

174

1

Approximately, 62% of all survey participants had between 11 and 20 years of
experience (Table 9). The majority of these participants were either eligible for no bonus or one
bonus, 40 and 47, respectively (Table 9). No teachers with 21 or more years of experience
completed the survey (Table 9).
Table 9
Years of Experience - Eligibility Status

Years of Experience
Less than 3
3 to 10
11 to 20
21 or more
Total

Level of Eligibility
No Bonus
1 Bonus
2 Bonuses
12
1
0
21
23
9
40
47
21
0
0
0
73
71
30

Total
13
53
108
0
174
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The overwhelming majority of participants were female, 151 teachers (Table 10). Of the
female teachers, 57 were not eligible for a bonus and 65 were eligible for one bonus (Table 10).
Twenty-three male teachers participated with sixteen not eligible for a bonus, six male
participants eligible for one bonus, and only one male teacher eligible for two bonuses (Table
10).
Table 10
Gender - Eligibility Status

Gender
Female
Male
Total

No Bonus
57
16
73

Level of Eligibility
1 Bonus
2 Bonuses
65
29
6
1
71
30

Total
151
23
174

Of the 73 survey participants not eligible for a bonus, 40 held a baccalaureate degree, 32
a master’s degree, and 1 a doctoral degree (Table 11). The majority of teachers eligible for one
bonus (43) had obtained their baccalaureate degree and 23 teachers had also obtained their
master’s degree (Table 11). Nineteen survey participants eligible for two bonuses had a
baccalaureate degree, ten a Master’s degree, and only one an educational specialist degree (Table
11).
Table 11
Level of Educational Attainment - Eligibility Status

Degree Attained
Baccalaureate
Master’s
Specialist
Doctorate
Total

No Bonus
40
32
0
1
73

Level of Eligibility
1 Bonus
2 Bonuses
43
19
23
10
4
1
1
0
71
30

Total
102
65
5
2
174
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One hundred forty-seven teachers were employed in a Title 1 school (Table 12). Of those
147 survey participants, 55 were eligible for no bonus, 62 were eligible for one bonus, and 30
were eligible for two bonuses (Table 12). Of the 27 participants not employed in a Title 1 school,
18 teachers were not eligible for a bonus, and 9 teachers were eligible for one bonus (Table 12).
Table 12
Title 1 School - Eligibility Status

School Title 1 Status
Yes
No
Total

No Bonus
55
18
73

Level of Eligibility
1 Bonus
2 Bonuses
62
30
9
0
71
30

Total
147
27
174

Table 13 reports the number of participants who had received a prior performance award.
The majority of survey participants (121) had not received a performance award. Of those
teachers who were eligible for one bonus, 29 had received a bonus and 42 had not received a
bonus.
Table 13
Receipt of Prior Performance Award - Eligibility Status
Level of Eligibility
Prior Performance Award
Yes
No
Total

No Bonus
6
67
73

1 Bonus
29
42
71

2 Bonuses
18
12
30

Total
53
121
174

Descriptive Statistics
The study initially had 174 participants. However, nine of these participants did not fully
complete the survey. Thus, the descriptive statistics and corresponding analysis of data for each
of the research questions are based on 165 participants with 67 participants eligible for no bonus,
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69 participants for one bonus, and 29 participants for two bonuses (Tables 14 &15). Participants
were not eligible for a bonus if they only taught science or social studies in fourth through eighth
grades or ELA in sixth through eighth grades. Those who taught mathematics in the fourth
through eighth grades or reading in the fourth or fifth grade were eligible for one bonus.
Educators who taught both mathematics and reading in the fourth or fifth grade were eligible for
two bonuses. Participants completed the TPPAS consisting of 28 survey questions focusing on
educator perceptions of the current North Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus.
The survey responses identified any differences in fourth through eighth grade educators’
perceptions of the North Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus. The first six questions of the
survey are demographic questions and were not included as part of the overall educators’
perception score. Participants completed the remaining 22 questions using a Likert scale rating
from 1 to 5, indicating “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”. The overall educators’
perceptions score consisted of a minimum score of 22 points up to a maximum score of 110
points with a mean of 42.82 and standard deviation of 10.29 (Table 14). Additionally,
participants were asked to provide their EVAAS score. This score quantifies an educator’s
effectiveness using student testing data with a score ranging from -10 to 10 (Vosters et al., 2018).
A score from -1 to 1 is indicative of a teacher whose students are progressing commensurate with
the state growth standard average (Rovai et al., 2014). An educator EVAAS score above 2
suggests that teacher’s students are performing substantially above the state growth average
while a score of -2 is typical of students with less than average growth (Rovai et al., 2014). Of
the 165 participants who fully completed the survey, the researcher was able to identify and
match 108 EVAAS growth scores to an overall educators’ perceptions score with the assistance
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of the school district’s EVAAS coordinator. Table 14 shows the mean EVAAS score as 0.74
with a standard deviation of 2.62.

Table 14
Overall Educators’ Perception Scores and Education Value-Added Assessment System Score
Variable
Overall Educators’ Perceptions Score
EVAAS Score

Mean
42.82
0.74

Standard Deviation
10.29
2.62

N
165
108

Table 15 shows the three groups of teachers based on eligibility status had very similar
overall educators’ perceptions mean scores: (a) no bonus (M = 41.79, SD = 8.31), (b) one bonus
(M = 43.91, SD = 11.51), and (c) two bonuses (M = 42.62, SD = 10.29).
Table 15
Overall Educators’ Perception Survey Scores by Eligibility Status
Dependent Variable
Overall Educators’ Perceptions
Score

Eligibility Status
No Bonus
One Bonus
Two Bonuses

Mean Standard Deviation N
41.79
8.31
67
43.91
11.51
69
42.62
10.29
29

Table 16 provides the mean and standard deviation by individual survey question and
eligibility status as well as a total. Each question is based on a Likert scale rating from 1
(Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree). Question 27 asked each survey participant to rate the
amount of the performance pay by dollar amount. A score of 1 indicated no dollar amount should
be awarded while a score of 5 indicated the amount should be more than $2,000. Question 28
asked each participant to rate the amount of the performance pay reward by base salary
percentage. The salary percentages ranged from 0%, for a score of 1 to more than 10%, for a
rating of 5 on the survey.
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The majority of participants (Table 16) agreed or strongly agreed their individual
performance had a significant influence on student achievement: (a) no bonus (M = 3.9, SD =
0.9), (b) one bonus (M = 4.1, SD = 0.8), and (c) two bonuses (M = 4.2, SD = 1.1). However, the
survey scores indicate lower levels of agreement and higher levels of variability within each
eligibility status (Table 16) when teachers were asked if their individual performance had a
significant influence on receiving performance pay (a) no bonus (M = 2.8, SD = 1.3), (b) one
bonus (M = 3.1, SD = 1.4), and (c) two bonuses (M = 3.1, SD = 1.4). Additionally, lower levels
of agreement were stated across all eligibility levels (Table 16) regarding altering instructional
practices as a result of performance pay (a) no bonus (M = 2.1, SD = 0.8), (b) one bonus (M =
2.3, SD = 1.2), and (c) two bonuses (M = 2.5, SD = 1.2) and modifying assessment methods as a
result of performance pay (a) no bonus (M = 2.1, SD = 0.8), (b) one bonus (M = 2.4, SD = 1.2),
and (c) two bonuses (M = 2.5, SD = 1.2).
Table 16
Descriptive Statistics by Survey Question and Eligibility Status
Eligibility Status
No
One
Two
Bonus Bonus Bonuses
2.3
2.9
2.5
1.0
1.4
1.3

Survey Question
7. Clearly understand the process for
awarding teacher performance pay

Mean
St. Dev.

8. Clearly understand the process for
calculating the amount of performance pay

Mean
St. Dev.

2.0
0.9

2.5
1.4

2.0
1.0

2.2
1.2

9. Individual performance significant
influence on student achievement

Mean
St. Dev.

3.9
0.9

4.1
0.8

4.2
1.1

4.0
0.9

10. Individual performance significant
influence on receiving performance pay

Mean
St. Dev.

2.8
1.3

3.1
1.4

3.1
1.4

3.0
1.3

11. Adequate resources to support efforts to
obtain performance pay

Mean
St. Dev.

3.1
1.2

3.3
1.1

3.3
0.9

3.2
1.1

Total
2.6
1.3
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Eligibility Status
No
One
Two
Bonus Bonus Bonuses
3.7
3.6
3.3
1.1
1.0
0.9

Survey Question
12. Adequate administrative assistance to
support efforts to obtain performance pay

Mean
St. Dev.

13. Equal opportunity to receive
performance pay

Mean
St. Dev.

2.4
1.2

2.9
1.3

2.5
1.3

2.6
1.3

14. Student body composition greater
impact on receiving performance pay
than individual teacher effort

Mean
St. Dev.

3.6
1.0

3.6
1.2

4.0
0.9

3.7
1.1

15. Performance pay is an incentive to work
harder to improve student achievement

Mean
St. Dev.

2.8
1.2

2.9
1.3

2.7
1.3

2.8
1.2

16. Performance pay encourages participation
in staff development

Mean
St. Dev.

2.8
1.2

2.7
1.2

2.6
1.2

2.7
1.2

17. Increasing the size of performance pay
would increase motivation to Improve
student achievement
18. Altered instructional practices as a result
of implementation of performance pay

Mean
St. Dev.
Mean
St. Dev.

3.2
1.2
2.1
0.8

2.9
1.3
2.3
1.2

2.6
1.3
2.5
1.2

3.0
1.3
2.2
1.0

19. Modified assessment methods as a result
of implementation of performance pay

Mean
St. Dev.

2.1
0.8

2.4
1.2

2.5
1.2

2.3
1.1

20. Workload has increased as a result of
implementation of performance pay

Mean
St. Dev.

2.5
0.9

2.5
1.1

2.5
1.0

2.5
1.0

21. Experienced increased stress as a result
of implementation of performance pay

Mean
St. Dev.

2.8
1.1

2.8
1.2

2.8
1.2

2.8
1.2

22. Work longer hours as a result of
implementation of performance pay

Mean
St. Dev.

2.6
1.0

2.6
1.2

2.6
1.0

2.6
1.1

23. Additional compensation for outstanding
Individual performance

Mean
St. Dev.

3.6
1.2

3.4
1.2

3.1
1.1

3.5
1.2

24. Additional compensation for meeting
student achievement goals

Mean
St. Dev.

3.5
1.2

3.4
1.2

3.1
1.1

3.4
1.2

25. Performance pay plan fairly distributed
26. Performance pay plan aligned with school
goals to reward performance

Mean
St. Dev.
Mean
St. Dev.

2.2
1.0
2.5
0.9

2.3
1.1
2.6
1.1

2.3
1.1
2.7
1.1

2.3
1.0
2.6
1.0

27. Amount of the performance pay by
dollar amount
28. Amount of the performance pay by
salary percentage

Mean
St. Dev.
Mean
St. Dev.

3.7
1.6
3.2
1.5

3.7
1.6
3.4
1.7

3.1
1.7
2.8
1.5

3.6
1.6
3.2
1.6

Total
3.6
1.0
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Results
The following sections detail the results of the study. Information is provided for each
null hypothesis including the corresponding statistical test and data analysis. A more detailed
analysis regarding each survey question follows by the demographic variables (a) years of
experience, (b) gender, (c) level of educational attainment, (d) Title 1 school status, and (e)
receipt of prior performance pay. Finally, an analysis of survey comments is provided.
Null Hypothesis #1
Null hypothesis #1 states, “There are no statistically significant differences in educators’
perceptions of the North Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus Plan among fourth- through
eighth-grade educators eligible for no bonus, one bonus, or two bonuses as shown by the Teacher
Performance Pay Attitudinal Survey.” A one-way ANOVA was used to test this hypothesis.
According to Gall et al. (2007), a one-way ANOVA is used to determine any statistical
differences between the means of three or more independent groups.
Data Screening
Data screening was conducted on the variables. The data were scanned for
inconsistencies. A visual inspection of the boxplot (Figure 1) for univariate outliers in each
group of the independent variable, eligibility status and, for the dependent variable educators’
perceptions was conducted. Figure 1 shows the presence of outliers found in the group of
teachers who received no bonus (case 7) and one bonus (case 6). The one-way ANOVA was run
with and without the outliers in the data set with no statistically significant change to the results.
Thus, in order to protect the integrity of the data, the outliers remained in the data set (Warner,
2013).
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Figure 1
Overall Educators’ Perception Score by Eligibility Status

Assumption Tests
Assumptions were addressed for the one-way ANOVA. Of the three tests of normality
conducted (Table 17), none showed a deviation from normality in any eligibility group. A
Shapiro-Wilk test showed no departure from normality in the educators’ perceptions score (a) no
bonus, W(67) = 0.98, p = .53; (b) one bonus, W(69) = 0.99, p = .55; and (c) two bonuses, W(29)
= 0.95, p = .21 (Table 17).
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Table 17
Eligibility Status and Educators’ Perceptions Scores

Overall
Perception Score

Eligibility
Status
No Bonus
One Bonus
Two Bonuses

Kolmogorov-Smirnova
Statistic
df
Sig.
.104
67
.070
.057
69
.200*
.121
29
.200*

Shapiro-Wilk
Statistic
df
Sig.
.984
67
.527
.985
69
.553
.952
29
.208

*. This is a lower bound of the true significance.
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction

The assumption of homogeneity of variances was violated, as assessed by Levene’s test
(Table 18) for equality of variances (p = .012). Because the assumption of homogeneity of
variances was violated, Warner (2013) suggests, interpreting the results of the Welch’s ANOVA.
Table 18
Levene’s F Test of Equality of Equal Variances Scores

Overall Educator Perception Score

Levene Statistic
10.117

df1
2

df2
162

Sig.
.012

Data Analysis for Null Hypothesis #1
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to determine if there were any statistically significant
differences in educators’ perceptions of the North Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus Plan
among fourth- through eighth-grade educators eligible for no bonus, one bonus, or two bonuses
as shown by the TPPAS. There were no statistically significant differences in the overall
educators’ perceptions score between the different eligibility groups, Welch’s F(2, 72.126) =
0.756, p = .473 (Table 19). Thus, no post hoc testing was conducted. Based on this statistical
analysis, the researcher failed to reject the null hypothesis and concluded there were no
statistically significant differences in educators’ perception score regarding the North Carolina
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Teacher Performance Bonus Plan among fourth- through eighth-grade educators eligible for no
bonus, one bonus, or two bonuses as shown by the TPPAS.
Table 19
Welch’s Tests of Equality of Means

Overall Educator Perception Score

Welch Statistic
0.756

df1
df2
Sig.
2 72.126 .473

Null Hypothesis #2
Null hypothesis #2 states, “There is no statistically significant relationship between an
educators’ perception of the North Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus and the educators’
EVAAS growth score as shown by the Teacher Performance Pay Attitudinal Survey. A product moment correlation coefficient was computed. According to Gall et al. (2007), a productmoment correlation is calculated to determine the measure of the strength and direction of
association between two continuous quantitative variables.
Data Screening
Data screening was conducted on the variables. The data were scanned for
inconsistencies. Figure 2 shows a scatterplot of the educators’ perceptions score against an
educator’s EVAAS growth score with no extreme bivariate outliers. Both independent and
dependent variables are continuous variables and are paired with each other (Warner, 2013).
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Figure 2
Scatterplot of 2018–19 Education Value-Added Assessment System Score by Overall Educator
Perception Score

Assumption Tests
To assess linearity a scatterplot of educators’ perceptions score against an educator’s
EVAAS growth score was plotted. A visual inspection of this plot suggests a positive, linear
relationship and a moderate association between the two variables (Figure 2). While the
histograms for both variables do not show perfect normal distributions shapes (Figures 3–4), the
bivariate distribution is not extremely different from bivariate normal (Warner, 2013).
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Figure 3
Histogram of Overall Educators’ Perception Score
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Figure 4
Histogram of 2018–19 Education Value-Added Assessment System Score by Overall Educator
Perception Score

Data Analysis for Null Hypothesis #2
A Product-Moment Correlation was run to determine if there was a statistically
significant relationship between an educator’s perceptions score regarding the North Carolina
Teacher Performance Bonus and the educator’s EVAAS growth score as shown by the TPPAS.
There was a statistically significant positive correlation between an educators’ perceptions score
regarding the North Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus and the educators’ EVAAS growth
score, r(108) = .288, p < .01 (Table 20). The educator’s EVAAS growth score explained 8% of
the educator’s perception score regarding the North Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus. Thus,
the researcher rejected the null hypothesis and determined there was a statistically significant
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relationship between an educator’s perception of the North Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus
and the educator’s EVAAS growth score as shown by the TPPAS.
Table 20
Pearson’s Product-Moment Correlation

2018–19 EVAAS
Score

2018–19
EVAAS
Score
1

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
108
*
. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Overall
Educator’s
Perception Score
.288*
.003
108

Descriptive Analysis for Research Question #3
Research question #3 sought to determine fourth- through eighth-grade educators'
perceptions of the North Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus Plan obtained through the
TPPAS. In particular, participant percentages were calculated for the following demographic
categories (a) years of experience, (b) gender, (c) personal level of educational attainment, (d)
Title 1 school, and (e) prior receipt of performance pay. The following sections highlight any
compelling features gleaned from the survey responses including an analysis of participant
comments.
Knowledge and Understanding
Regardless of the demographic category, an overwhelming majority of participants do not
understand the process for awarding or calculating teacher performance pay (Tables 21–24).
More than half of the participants across all years of experience and gender do not understand the
process for awarding or calculating teacher performance pay (Tables 21–22). These percentages
increase to a minimum of a 60% level of disagreement with respect to calculating teacher
performance pay by Title 1 school status and receipt of prior performance pay.
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Table 21
Knowledge and Understanding by Years of Experience
Strongly
Strongly
Years of Experience
Disagree
Disagree Neutral Agree
Agree
#7. Understand the process of
awarding performance pay
Less than 3 years
(n = 13)
15.4%
38.5%
38.5%
7.7%
0.0%
3 to 10 years
(n = 53)
24.5
32.1%
20.8% 17.0%
5.7%
11 to 20 years
(n = 108)
25.9%
26.9%
13.9% 25.0%
8.3%
#8. Understand the process of
calculating performance pay
Less than 3 years
(n = 13)
23.1%
38.5%
30.7%
7.7%
0.0%
3 to 10 years
(n = 53)
32.1%
37.7%
15.1%
9.4%
5.7%
11 to 20 years
(n = 108)
30.6%
37.0%
13.9% 12.0%
6.5%
Note. No teachers with more than 20 years of experience completed the survey.

Total

100%
100%
100%

100%
100%
100%

Table 22
Knowledge and Understanding by Gender

Gender
#7. Understand the process of
awarding performance pay
Female
(n = 151)
Male
(n = 23)
#8. Understand the process of
calculating performance pay
Female
(n = 151)
Male
(n = 23)

Strongly
Disagree Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly
Agree Total

24.5%

30.5%

15.9%

22.5%

6.6%

100%

26.1%

21.7%

30.4%

13.0%

8.7%

100%

31.1%

38.4%

13.9%

9.9%

6.6%

100%

26.1%

30.4%

26.1%

17.4%

0.0%

100%
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Table 23
Knowledge and Understanding by Title 1 School Status
Title 1
School
#8. Understand the process of
calculating performance pay
Yes
(n = 147)
No
(n = 27)

Strongly
Disagree Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly
Agree Total

32.0%

36.7%

15.0%

12.2%

4.1%

100%

22.2%

40.7%

18.5%

3.7%

14.8%

100%

Table 24
Knowledge and Understanding by Receipt of Prior Performance Pay
Receipt of Prior
Performance Pay
#8. Understand the process of
calculating performance pay
Yes
(n = 53)
No
(n = 121)

Strongly
Disagree Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly
Agree Total

17.0%

41.5%

9.4%

18.9%

13.2%

100%

36.4%

35.5%

18.2%

7.4%

2.5%

100%

Teacher Efficacy
An astounding majority (over three-fourths) of participants regardless of the demographic
category agreed that their individual performance has a significant influence on student
achievement (Tables 25–29). However, these percentages dropped below 50% in each
demographic category with the exception of level of educational attainment when participants
were asked if an individual’s performance has a significant influence on earning performance
pay (Tables 25–29).
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Table 25
Teacher Efficacy by Years of Experience
Strongly
Strongly
Years of Experience
Disagree
Disagree Neutral Agree
Agree
#9. Individual performance
significant influence on student
achievement
Less than 3 years
(n = 13)
0.0%
15.4%
7.7%
46.2%
30.8%
3 to 10 years
(n = 53)
1.9%
5.7%
11.3% 56.6%
24.5%
11 to 20 years
(n = 107)
2.8%
5.6%
6.5%
52.3% 32.7%
#10. Individual performance
significant influence on earning
performance pay
Less than 3 years
(n = 13)
0.0%
15.4%
30.8% 23.1%
30.8%
3 to 10 years
(n = 52)
21.2%
17.3%
21.2% 32.7%
7.7%
11 to 20 years
(n = 107)
19.6%
23.4%
14.0% 29.9%
13.1%
Note. No teachers with more than 20 years of experience completed the survey.

Total

100%
100%
100%

100%
100%
100%

Table 26
Teacher Efficacy by Gender

Gender
#9. Individual performance
significant influence on student
achievement
Female
(n = 150)
Male
(n = 23)
#10. Individual performance
significant influence on earning
performance pay
Female
(n = 149)
Male
(n = 23)

Strongly
Disagree Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly
Agree Total

2.7%

6.7%

6.7%

52.7%

31.3%

100%

0.0%

4.3%

17.4%

56.5%

21.7%

100%

18.1%

20.1%

16.1%

32.2%

13.4%

100%

21.7%

26.1%

26.1%

17.4%

8.7%

100%
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Table 27
Teacher Efficacy by Level of Educational Attainment
Level of Educational
Attainment
#9. Individual performance
significant influence on
student achievement
Baccalaureate
(n = 101)
Masters
(n = 65)
Educational Specialist
(n = 5)
Doctorate
(n = 2)
#10. Individual performance
significant influence on
earning performance pay
Baccalaureate
(n = 101)
Masters
(n = 64)
Educational Specialist
(n = 5)
Doctorate
(n = 2)

Strongly
Disagree Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly
Agree Total

2.0%

5.0%

10.9%

51.5%

30.7%

100%

1.5%

9.2%

4.6%

56.9%

27.7%

100%

20.0%

0.0%

0.0%

40.0%

40.0%

100%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

50.0%

50.0%

100%

18.8%

15.8%

22.8%

28.7%

13.9%

100%

17.2%

31.3%

9.4%

31.3%

10.9%

100%

20.0%

0.0%

20.0%

40.0%

20.0%

100%

50.0%

0.0%

0.0%

50.0%

0.0%

100%
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Table 28
Teacher Efficacy by Title 1 School Status
Title 1
School
#9. Individual performance
significant influence on student
achievement
Yes
(n = 146)
No
(n = 27)
#10. Individual performance
significant influence on earning
performance pay
Yes
(n = 145)
No
(n = 27)

Strongly
Disagree Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly
Agree Total

2.1%

6.8%

7.5%

54.1%

29.5%

100%

3.7%

3.7%

11.1%

48.1%

33.3%

100%

17.9%

19.3%

17.2%

32.4%

13.1%

100%

22.2%

29.6%

18.5%

18.5%

11.1%

100%

Neutral

Agree

Table 29
Teacher Efficacy by Receipt of Prior Performance Pay
Receipt of Prior
Performance Pay
#9. Individual performance
significant influence on student
achievement
Yes
(n = 52)
No
(n = 121)
#10. Individual performance
significant influence on earning
performance pay
Yes
(n = 52)
No
(n = 120)

Strongly
Disagree Disagree

Strongly
Agree Total

0.0%

7.7%

5.8%

50.0%

36.5%

100%

3.3%

5.8%

9.1%

54.5%

27.3%

100%

5.8%

17.3%

13.5%

44.2%

19.2%

100%

24.2%

22.5%

19.2%

24.2%

10.0%

100%
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Summary
Chapter Four highlighted the results of the statistical analysis completed by the
researcher. Participants included 174 fourth- through eighth-grade educators in the seven far
western school districts of North Carolina. Each participant completed the TPPAS regarding the
current North Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus. The researcher conducted an ANOVA and
found no statistically significant differences between educators’ perceptions of the North
Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus Plan among fourth- through eighth-grade educators
eligible for no bonus, one bonus, or two bonuses. Additionally, a Pearson Product-Moment
correlation was calculated and resulted in a statistically significant relationship between an
educator’s perception score regarding the North Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus and the
educator’s EVAAS growth score. Finally, overall percentages from the survey were presented
based on demographic variables along with participant comments.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS
Overview
This chapter highlights the results of this study regarding educators’ perceptions of the
North Carolina Teacher Performance Pay Plan. The following sections discuss the results as they
relate to the three research questions and expectancy, equity, and goal-setting theories.
Additionally, implications, limitations, and recommendations for further research are discussed.
Discussion
The purpose of this study was to examine the perceptions of educators in the seven far
western school districts in North Carolina regarding the current teacher performance pay plan
and determine if any predictive relationship exists between these perceptions and the educators’
EVAAS growth score. This study was threefold and incorporated a causal-comparative and
correlational research design. The first goal of the study was to determine if differences and/or
relationships existed in the attitudes and perceptions of fourth- through eighth-grade educators
regarding the current North Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus. Next, this research study was
conducted to determine the strength and direction of any linear association between an
educator’s perception score regarding the North Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus and that
educator’s EVAAS growth score. Finally, educators’ perceptions of the North Carolina Teacher
Performance Bonus were compiled and reported based on demographics regarding
understanding, teacher efficacy, individual performance, and implementation.
Research Question #1
The first research question for this study was “Are there differences in educators’
perceptions of the North Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus Pay Plan among fourth- through
eighth-grade educators eligible for no bonus, one bonus, or two bonuses?”
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Results
No statistically significant differences were found in the overall educators’ perceptions
score concerning the North Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus Plan among fourth- through
eighth-grade educators eligible for no bonus, one bonus, or two bonuses as shown by the TPPAS,
Welch’s F(2, 72.126) = 0.756, p = .473 (Table 19).
Similar Studies
The single salary pay schedule is one of the most common forms of teacher compensation
across the nation (Gius, 2013). However, varying performance pay compensation programs
beyond the single salary schedule are being implemented in many public school districts in the
US (Dee & Wyckoff, 2015). Numerous programs provide additional monetary rewards for
knowledge or skills-based pay such as obtaining an advanced degree or pursing additional
certifications (Baker, 2014; Balch & Springer, 2015; Cowan & Goldhaber, 2018; Rice, 2015).
Difficult-to-staff bonuses have been designated for teachers willing to teach subjects such as
mathematics, science, and special education (Adnot et al., 2017). Recruitment and retention
bonuses have also been granted for educators employed in schools serving socioeconomically
disadvantaged, minority, or low performing students (Adnot et al., 2017; Baker, 2014; Grissom
& Strunk, 2012).
Several variations of performance pay programs exist throughout the US, but many of
these programs focus on retention and recruitment or on student achievement gains (Jacob &
Springer, 2008; Springer et al., 2016; Swain et al., 2019). The Governor’s Educator Excellence
Grant (GEEG), which is comprised of 75% school-based bonuses and 25% teacher-based
bonuses, included awards based on objective measures of student performance and teacher
quality as they related to professional development, teacher mentoring, participation in after-
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school programs, signing bonuses for difficult-to-staff subjects, and retention and recruitment
bonuses (Podgursky & Springer, 2016). The Tennessee Governor’s Office awarded retention
bonuses to any teacher receiving a high evaluation score and teaching in a priority school,
meaning a school in the bottom 5% based on assessment scores (Swain et al., 2019). Upon the
establishment of the Merit Award Program (MAP) in 2007, the Florida State Legislature
appropriated approximately $147.5 million to be awarded to teachers as bonuses for improved
instructional practices based on principal evaluations and student performance (Jacob &
Springer, 2008; Podgursky & Springer, 2007b).
The District Awards for Teacher Excellence (DATE) program in Texas, which was
initiated in 2008 and, appropriated approximately $197 million annually included a majority of
individual teacher incentives based on student achievement on state standardized assessments
(Springer et al., 2010). However, the DATE program was met by challenges such as fair
measures of teacher performance and the implementation of an adequate data program (Springer
et al., 2010). Most similar to the current study, the Project on Incentives in Teaching (POINT)
program conducted in Nashville, Tennessee awarded individual middle school mathematics
teachers on their EVAAS score during the 2006 through 2009 school years (Yuan et al., 2013).
Bonuses ranging from $5,000 to $15,000 were awarded to teachers reaching the 80th to 95th
percentile of EVAAS rankings (Yuan et al., 2013).
North Carolina has implemented several statewide performance pay programs over the
last 25 years. Created by the NCDPI in 1996, the ABCs of Public Education included monetary
awards for obtaining test score achievement targets in mathematics and reading. The ABCs
program awarded teachers $1,500 for “exemplary” growth or $750 for “expected” growth based
on student achievement scores in mathematics for grades 3 through 8 and specific high school
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courses (NCDPI, 2006). Initial teacher support was garnered for this program (Vigdor, 2008).
Additionally, the NCAE supported maintaining this program and advocated for even larger
monetary awards (Vigdor, 2008). Similar to the ABCs program, in 2011, North Carolina’s RttT
Act awarded $1,500 performance bonuses, to all certified staff in schools that achieved high
growth with an additional $500 for individual teachers of tested subjects in which students also
exceeded growth expectations regardless of school-wide performance (Brevetti, 2014, Liang &
Akiba, 2015).
Other Studies
No research studies could be found regarding educators’ perceptions of performance pay
among three eligibility groups. However, several studies have been conducted regarding two
groups, such as eligible and not eligible participants or a team/school bonus. Springer et al.
(2012) studied 159 teams of middle school teachers teaching core subjects with regards to
teachers’ attitudes, perceptions, and instructional practices and a team bonus based on a valueadded measure of student achievement. While the Springer et al. (2012) study focused on a team
bonus, the researchers found no significant differences between the control group and the bonus
intervention group echoing the results of the current study.
Springer et al. (2012) noted possible explanations including 54% of those receiving the
bonus did not completely comprehend the criteria for receiving the monetary award. In
comparison to the current study, of those participants receiving a performance bonus, 33.9% did
not clearly understand the process of awarding performance pay, and 58.5% did not clearly
understand the process for calculating the amount of performance pay (Table 24). Additionally,
Springer et al. (2012) noted 78% of the bonus intervention group reported they would make no
change in their instructional practices because of the bonus. Reporting on North Carolina’s RttT
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Act, Lauen and Kozlowski (2014) also noted that, overall, teachers were unaware of the
monetary incentive and would not have changed their instructional practices despite the bonus.
Springer and Taylor (2016) cited strong evidence of increased teacher turnover for those
who did not receive any monetary award along with a reduced rate of turnover for those teachers
who received a monetary award. These findings mirror past North Carolina performance pay
programs ABCs and RttT in terms of the unintended consequence of an escalated teacher
turnover rate in difficult-to-staff and low-performing schools indicative of teachers at these
schools being less likely to receive performance pay (Lauen & Kozlowski, 2013; Vigdor, 2008).
Several studies show positive participation and experiences with schools offering large monetary
awards with respect to student achievement using objective measures such as professional
development, teacher mentoring programs, participation in after-school programs, and a decrease
in teacher turnover (Podgursky & Springer, 2007b; Springer et al., 2010; Springer & Taylor,
2016).
Cowan and Goldhaber (2018) studied a similar program for awarding $3,500 to 5,000 to
NBCTs in Washington State that was considered very successful in recruiting and credentialing
highly qualified teachers but did not result in gains in student achievement. The Florida State
Legislature introduced the MAP which appropriated $147.5 million to provide bonuses to
teacher salaries with 40% dedicated to improving professional practices and 60% awarded based
on student performance (Jacob & Springer, 2008; Podgursky & Springer, 2007b). While
moderate support was found for the program with most participants more agreeable to individual
teacher performance awards, a significant association was revealed between teacher support of
performance pay and teacher experience, principal leadership, and teacher self-efficacy (Jacob &
Springer, 2008).
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Kelley et al.’s (2003) findings show 75% of teachers in Kentucky worked more hours as
the result of performance pay implementation in addition to 87% experiencing an increased
stress level. Job security and state intervention were noted as contributing to this increased stress
level (Kelley et al., 2003). Additionally, Kelley et al. (2003) cited a general feeling of unfairness
from teachers regarding performance pay bonuses based on student achievement and growth.
Adkins (2004) reported 37% of teachers’ workload had increased along with approximately half
of the instructional participants reporting an increase in workload and stress.
The current study focused on educators’ perceptions of performance pay within three
eligibility groups: no bonus, one bonus, and two bonuses. No significant differences were found
among the three eligibility groups. The only other research studies found regarding educators’
perceptions of performance pay included two eligibility groups: those eligible and those not
eligible (Adkins, 2004; Kelley et al., 2003; Lauen & Kozlowski, 2013; Lauen & Kozlowski,
2014; Springer et al., 2012; Springer & Taylor, 2016; Vigdor, 2008; Yuan et al., 2012). Several
studies reported similarities to the current study stating teachers did not understand the method
for awarding the bonus, were unaware of the bonus, or made no change to instructional practices
due to the implementation of performance pay (Lauen & Kozlowski, 2014; Springer et al., 2012).
Additionally, Adkins (2004), Kelley et al. (2003), and Yuan et al. (2013) all highlighted an
increase in teacher workload and stress as a result of performance pay implementation similar to
the current study’s results. While the current study did not analyze other forms of teacher
compensation, several studies showed promising results or positive associations for
compensation plans dedicated to improving instructional practices, recruitment and credentialing
of highly qualified teachers, or teacher experience (Cowan & Goldhaber, 2018; Jacob &
Springer, 2008; Podgursky & Springer, 2007b; Springer et al., 2010; Springer & Taylor, 2016).
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Conceptual Framework
Teachers are portrayed as public servants with qualities such as compassion, selfsacrifice, and a duty to perform socially and personally meaningful work (King et al., 2015;
Shifrer et al., 2017). With this service commitment in mind, it has been postulated teachers are
not motivated by a monetary incentive (Mintrop et al., 2018) and choose collegiality and
collaboration over competition (Shifrer et al., 2017). Table 30 shows more than 60% of
participants in this study who received prior performance pay believe that educators should be
compensated for individual performance and meeting student achievement goals compared to
approximately 50% of those participants who did not receive performance pay.
An educator’s civic duty or intrinsic motivation along with the extrinsic motivation of a
pay for performance program has been described as a double-edged sword (Frey et al., 2013;
Mintrop et al., 2018). A financial award based on individual effort leading to student academic
growth should boost teacher morale and incentivize increased productivity (Shifrer et al., 2017).
However, under performance pay programs, teachers may also become discouraged not only
with themselves but also with their colleagues if their increased efforts do not lead to the
expected outcomes (Frey et al., 2013, King et al., 2015; Mintrop et al., 2018). Regardless of the
receipt of prior performance pay, the results show participants in this study were not incentivized
to work harder, nor did they alter their instructional methods or modify assignments as a result of
performance pay (Table 30).
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Table 30
Survey Responses by Question Number and Receipt of Prior Performance Pay
Receipt of Prior
Performance Pay
#15. Performance pay an
incentive to work harder
Yes
(n = 53)
No
(n = 121)
#18. Altered instructional
practices as a result of
performance pay
Yes
(n = 53)
No
(n = 121)
#19. Modified assessment
methods as a result of
performance pay
Yes
(n = 53)
No
(n = 121)
#23. Compensation for
individual performance
Yes
(n = 53)
No
(n = 121)
#24. Compensation for meeting
student achievement goals
Yes
(n = 53)
No
(n = 121)

Strongly
Disagree Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly
Agree Total

22.6%

17.0%

13.2%

30.2%

17.0%

100%

14.9%

28.1%

33.1%

18.2%

5.8%

100%

28.3%

39.6%

11.3%

13.2%

7.5%

100%

24.8%

38.8%

30.6%

4.1%

1.7%

100%

26.4%

45.3%

5.7%

15.1%

7.5%

100%

24.8%

34.7%

31.4%

7.4%

1.7%

100%

7.5%

15.1%

11.3%

45.3%

20.8%

100%

6.6%

18.2%

24.8%

31.4%

19.0%

100%

9.4%

11.3%

13.2%

49.1%

17.0%

100%

6.6%

17.4%

28.9%

32.2%

14.9%

100%

While no significant differences were found among the three educator eligibility groups,
teacher self-efficacy and perceptions of control and autonomy are instrumental in the success of
any performance pay program (Ford et al., 2017; Rice et al., 2015). Teachers are primarily
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intrinsically motivated, and performance pay programs and accountability reform must build
upon this without adverse consequences of decreased self-efficacy and demotivation (Kelley et
al., 2002; Tirivayi et al., 2014).
Research Question #2
The second question from this study was “Is there a statistically significant relationship
between an educators’ perception score of the North Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus and
the educators’ EVAAS growth score?”
Results
The results showed a slight positive association, r(108) = .288, p < .01 (Table Q1),
between an educator’s perception score regarding the North Carolina Teacher Performance
Bonus and the educator’s EVAAS growth score.
Similar Studies
Teacher quality has long been cited as one of the top influences on student achievement
(Cowan & Goldhaber, 2018; Desimone et al., 2016; Rothstein, 2015; Skourdoumbis, 2014).
VAMs or growth models (student growth percentiles) numerically define a teacher’s
effectiveness or quality from a student’s growth measure on a standardized assessment (Geiger,
Amrein-Beardsley, & Holloway, 2020; NEA Department of Teacher Quality, 2011; North
Carolina Department of Public Instruction, 2018;). The current VAM used in North Carolina is
the EVAAS score, which has been used to determine performance pay recipients under the
current law (SB. 299-SL2018-5 N.C. Gen. Ass., 2018).
The most controversial alternative pay structure across the US has been based on
rewarding teachers for student achievement levels on standardized assessments (Baker, 2014;
Liu et al., 2017; Vosters et al., 2018). Defining and measuring teacher quality has proven to be
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contentious when linked to teacher compensation (Liu et al., 2017). Geiger et al. (2020) state the
US has taken the use of VAMs to the extreme in relation to evaluating teachers while other
affluent countries have exercised caution. Concerns regarding VAMs include (a) the reliability
and consistency of placing a numerical value on teacher quality over time, (b) the validity of
defining an effective teacher, and (c) immanent biases of student assignments to teachers
(Moran, 2017; Podgursky & Springer, 2007a; Rothstein, 2015; Winters & Cowen, 2013).
Cowan and Goldhaber (2018) contend performance pay plans based on student
achievement have been instrumental in improving teacher effectiveness. Additionally, Hill and
Jones (2020) posit the empirical literature regarding performance pay tends to show a small
positive impact on student outcomes.
Other Studies
No prior research studies could be found regarding educators’ perceptions of the North
Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus, and there is a paucity of research literature specifically
related to any performance pay plan based on an EVAAS growth score. Yuan et al. (2013) noted
Nashville, Tennessee’s POINT program aimed at rewarding middle school mathematics teachers
for their EVAAS scores resulted in historical rates of turnover among those teachers. Ironically,
while the average amount of the POINT program bonus was between $9,500 and $11,400, over
half of the participants reported making very few to no changes in their instructional practices
(Yuan et al., 2013). In comparison to the POINT program, the current study shows 67.9% who
had previously received a bonus and 63.6% who had stated they had not altered their
instructional practices as a result of performance pay implementation (Table 34). The results of
the POINT program study (Yuan et al., 2013) also align with a study completed by Jacob and
Springer (2008) on the MAP in Florida in which 34% of the participants stated the program
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would incentivize them to work harder. The results of the MAP are very similar to the current
study in that 31% of participants stated performance pay was an incentive to work harder to
improve student achievement (Table 34).
The DATE program in Texas included teacher incentives based on their students’
performance on state-standardized assessments and resulted in teachers reporting a positive
experience and a decrease in teacher turnover with the offering of larger monetary awards
(Springer et al., 2010). Additionally, performance pay plans based exclusively on student
performance garnered positive support and showed strong associations between teacher support
and teacher self-efficacy (Jacob & Springer, 2008; Springer et al., 2010). Liang and Akiba
(2015b) also found a positive association between performance related pay and improvements in
constructivist instruction which has been linked to improved academic achievement (Kim, 2005).
Dee and Wyckoff (2015) found that educators’ value-added scores were higher the following
year for teachers who received awards than for their colleagues who did not.
A similar monetary award aimed at teachers, support staff, and counselors was
implemented by the New York City Department of Education in 2007–08 using progress reports
of student performance on standardized tests (Marsh & McCaffrey, 2012; Podgursky & Springer,
2011; Springer et al., 2012; Yuan et al., 2013). However, the program was abolished after two
years due to no measurable gains shown in school or student achievement outcomes (Fryer,
2011; Goodman & Turner, 2011; Podgursky & Springer, 2011). Additionally, in a study of three
performance pay districts in North Carolina using standardized test scores and teachers’ valueadded scores, Hill and Jones (2021) concluded performance pay made little impact on student
achievement scores and subsequent educator EVAAS ratings.
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Bowen and Mills (2017) conducted surveys with 120 teachers from both a charter school
and a public school who had experienced performance pay. The subsequent analysis linking
teachers’ survey responses with their corresponding value-added score showed a negative
association (Bowen & Mills, 2017). In other words, a lower perception score of merit pay was
associated with a higher teacher effectiveness, value-added, score (Bowen & Mills, 2017).
Ironically, Bowen and Mills (2017) found the opposite to be true of the performance pay
perceptions and principal evaluation scores of these same teachers. As merit pay perceptions
increased, the principal evaluation scores of the same teachers also increased (Bowen & Mills,
2017).
Amrein-Beardsley (2016) advised using any type of growth model in a performance pay
plan citing growth as extremely difficult to measure and unfair as related to the fairness,
reliability, and validity of the growth measures. Additionally, Moran (2017) issues a warning
against using a VAM to evaluate teacher effectiveness in high-stakes decisions such as
performance pay citing these measures as not valid or reliable. In concurrence, Shifrer et al.,
(2017) state the EVAAS methodology is ineffective in accounting for differences across schools
affecting student achievement that are not within teachers’ control such as student body
demographics, class composition, and home life.
Many school systems and state educational departments offer alternate performance pay
programs not determined by student growth measures. These programs include an increased
monetary award for additional duties and/or obtaining certifications such as achieving NBPTS
certification and are explicitly defined (Balch & Springer, 2015; Cowan & Goldhaber, 2018;
Rice et al., 2015). Other studies also show difficult-to-staff bonuses such as those for teaching in
a mathematics, science, or special education classroom have been implemented in
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socioeconomically disadvantaged school districts with some success (Adnot et al.; 2017, Baker,
2014; Grissom & Strunk, 2012).
The results of the current study note a small positive association between an educators’
perception of performance pay and that educator’s corresponding EVAAS growth score. Mixed
results have been shown in several studies regarding this positive association. Several studies
suggest a problematic parallel between an educator effectiveness score and teacher perceptions
citing higher rates of teacher turnover, increased workload, and validity of measurement score
(Amrein-Beardsley, 2016; Moran, 2017; Smith & Holloway, 2020). Studies noting positive
associations included lower rates of teacher turnover with increased monetary awards, a link
between performance pay and teacher efficacy, and improvements to instructional practices
(Jacob & Springer, 2008; Liang & Akiba, 2015b; Springer et al., 2010).
Conceptual Framework
The concern regarding teacher performance pay programs has become an issue of
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation for teachers as well as a level of equality and fair balance of
input versus output (Mintrop et al., 2018; Tirivayi et al., 2014; Yuan et al., 2013). Conroy and
Gupta (2016) argue equity theory could be applied to a performance pay program for educators
as a fair balance of individual teacher effort and increased salary or recognition. Ford (2018)
contends an educator’s values, beliefs, and prior experiences will shape the educator’s perception
of any performance pay plan based on a VAM. Unfortunately, many factors affecting student
achievement and subsequent education value-added scores such as economic disparities in
schools are outside an educator’s control (Amrein-Beardsley, 2016; Horne et al., 2014; Shifrer et
al., 2017).
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While an overwhelming majority of participants (approximately 80%) across all
demographics stated their individual performance had a significant influence on student
achievement, the percentage of participants stating their individual performance had a significant
influence on receiving performance pay decreased by half (Tables 25–29). This is indicative of
teachers who believe their individual efforts matter yet have a low expectation of obtaining the
reward (Purvis et al., 2015). In addition, the majority of participants do not understand the
process for calculating the monetary award (Table 21–24). Thus, if they do not understand how
to achieve the goal of a higher EVAAS rating, the extrinsic motivator of the monetary award is
futile (Dishon-Berkovits, 2014; Kelley et al., 2002; Locke & Latham, 2006).
Many aspects affect the motivating factors and equity of performance pay (Liu et al.,
2016). A monetary award may allow school districts to retain and recruit highly effective
teachers and motivate teachers to improve their instructional practices (Tirivayi et al., 2014).
However, the EVAAS score used to evaluate teachers and determine eligibility is controversial,
with critics citing issues of the reliability and validity of measuring teacher effectiveness
(Amrein-Beardsley et al., 2016; Berk, 2016; Hendrick, 2014).
Research Question #3
The final research question was “What are fourth- through eighth-grade educators'
perceptions of the North Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus Plan in regards to (a) years of
experience, (b) gender, (c) personal level of educational attainment, (d) Title 1 school, and (e)
receipt of performance pay?”
Results
The most applicable survey response percentages pertain to the knowledge and
understanding of the current teacher performance pay system and teacher efficacy (Tables 21–
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29) as well as participant responses by demographic category or receipt of prior performance pay
(Table 34).
Similar Studies
Advocates of performance pay in education argue incentives aligned with measurable
outcomes increases the success of the incentive by motivating educators to increase student
achievement (Bowen & Mills, 2017). These programs are touted as better attracting and retaining
educators who are more likely to be effective in the classroom (Bowen & Mills, 2017;
Kozlowski & Lauen, 2019). However, these extrinsic rewards are in direct contrast to the publicservice motivation driving most educators (Kozlowski & Lauen, 2019). As such, policymakers
should not only consider this important factor when determining how to best reward educators
but should also consider the varying demographics of the teacher population.
In a review of recent literature, Springer and Taylor (2016) along with Bowen and Mills
(2017) noted that more experienced teachers were less supportive of pay for performance
policies. Additionally, Springer and Taylor (2016) stated teachers new to the profession were
more supportive of individual performance pay than a group incentive program. Recent literature
also suggests women are less likely to support a competitive performance pay plan, which is
attributed to the idea that women are more risk averse than men are (Hill & Jones, 2020). By
nature, women are assumed to be more nurturing and are more likely to thrive in a collaborative
environment with a collective goal (Hill & Jones, 2020; Springer & Taylor, 2016). Bowen and
Mills (2017) also assert educators with a higher risk factor should be more favorable to
performance-based pay.
Expectancy theory is based on valence, expectancy, and instrumentality and as such is
directly aligned with teacher efficacy (Purvis et al., 2015, Yuan et al., 2013). Teacher efficacy
and expectancy have been defined as teachers’ beliefs in their ability to positively affect student
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achievement and receive a valued outcome (Rice et al., 2015). In the context of the results of this
study, more than half of the participants believed their increased efforts would lead to increased
student growth and ultimately result in a monetary award (Tables 25–29). A teacher’s selfefficacy is that teacher’s belief in his or her ability to significantly influence student achievement
and subsequent teaching effectiveness. Jacob and Springer (2008) along with Goldhaber et al.
(2011) found that teachers with a higher sense of self-efficacy were more supportive of
performance pay. The results of this study are similar to those of the Adkins’ (2004) study in
which 91% of the instructional respondents were in strong agreement that individual
performance has a significant influence on student achievement. Yet, 51% of these same
respondents did not agree their individual performance significantly influenced their chances of
earning the performance bonus (Adkins, 2004).
Other Studies
The following sections highlight various results of the current study using total
percentages based on the demographic categories of (a) years of experience, (b) gender, (c) level
of educational attainment, (d) Title 1 school status, and (e) receipt of prior performance pay
regarding educators’ perceptions of the North Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus. These
percentages are discussed in comparison to other studies.
Years of Experience. It should first be noted no teachers with more than 20 years of
experience completed the survey. Teachers with all other years of experience reported high
percentages of agreement with regard to teacher efficacy (Table 21), which coincides with
Adkins’ (2004) study of one Florida school district using the same survey instrument. The results
indicated teachers at all other levels of experience agreed or strongly agreed additional
compensation should be awarded for outstanding individual performance (a) less than three years
– 92%, (b) 3 to 10 years – 55%, and (c) 11–20 years – 51% (Table 21). When asked if additional
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compensation should be awarded for meeting student achievement goals, participant percentages
dropped slightly for teachers with less than three years of experience (77%) and 11 to 20 years of
experience (48%; Table 21).
Baker (2014) noted no significant differences for schoolwide bonuses by years of
teaching experience for music educators in New Jersey but expressed concern that the results
underrepresented rural music educators’ opinions of merit pay. A study of the Washington State
Teacher Compensation Survey (Goldhaber et al., 2011) resulted in overwhelming opposition to
merit pay from teachers at all levels of experience. Upon a more detailed analysis, Goldhaber et
al. (2011) stated that teachers with fewer years of experience (three years or less) are slightly
more supportive of performance pay than teachers with 25 years of experience are.
Gender. Approximately 80% of participants (male and female) agreed or strongly agreed
a teacher’s performance has a significant influence on student achievement (Table 26). Several
other studies were found regarding an educator’s perceptions of performance pay based on
gender. In a study of 3,121 full-time classroom teachers who completed the Washington State
Teacher Compensation Survey, Goldhaber et al. (2011) stated female teachers were less
supportive of a performance pay plan, especially one tied to subject area incentives, but were
more supportive of a monetary award for additional teaching certifications such as a NBPTS
certification.
In comparison, using the SASS, Jones (2013) also noted men responded to performance
pay more favorably than women did with regard to Florida’s four types of performance pay
plans including individual and school level awards. While one study (Goldhaber et al., 2011)
showed women were more supportive of monetary awards based on additional certifications,
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Jones (2013) noted that men were more receptive to performance pay linked to individual and
group rewards.
Level of Educational Attainment. An overwhelming majority of participants in the
current study, regardless of level of educational attainment, agreed or strongly agreed a teacher’s
individual performance has a significant influence on student achievement (Table 27). However,
these percentages were cut in half when participants were asked if a teacher’s individual
performance has a significant influence on receiving performance pay for those participants with
a bachelor’s or master’s degree (Table 27).
Adkins (2004) found significant differences in the area of individual efficacy and level of
agreement for those participants holding a bachelor’s degree versus an educational specialist
degree. It was difficult to make comparisons to the Adkin’s study due to the small sample size (n
= 5) of participants with an educational specialist degree (Table 27). However, there were no
noticeable differences between the percentage of agreement between participants with a
bachelor’s degree and educational specialist regarding individual teacher efficacy (Table 27).
While Russ (2015) only surveyed teachers with a bachelor’s or master’s degree, those
participants with a bachelor’s degree were more supportive of a performance pay plan. The
percentages of participants with a bachelor’s or master’s degree in the current study were
approximately equivalent in the area of teacher efficacy (Table 27).
Results from the current study and other studies revealed evidence educators with a
bachelor’s degree appeared to be more favorable of performance pay plans (Adkins, 2004;
Goldhaber et al., 2011; Russ, 2015). Across all levels of educational attainment, prior studies
have shown that educators emphatically agree upon the importance of teacher quality on student
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achievement, yet there is no common agreement on the type or usefulness of one particular type
of performance pay plan (Adkins, 2004; Goldhaber et al., 2011; Russ, 2015).
Title 1 School Status. Regardless of whether the participants worked in a Title 1 school
district, a majority of all participants in both categories agreed a teacher’s individual
performance had a significant influence on student achievement (Table 28). However, over half
of all participants altered their instructional practices or modified assessments as a result of the
monetary award due to the performance bonus regardless of Title 1 school status (Table 28).
Liang and Akiba (2015a) studied an incentive pay program implemented in Missouri that
offered additional compensation for National Board certification or advanced degrees,
completing additional duties such as mentoring new teachers, or teaching in difficult-to-staff
areas such as mathematics or in difficult-to-staff schools. While this performance pay program
was not directly related to a teacher’s value-added growth measure, it was found that small and
economically disadvantaged school districts, notably many including Title 1 schools, were less
likely to provide additional incentives for these types of duties (Liang & Akiba, 2015a). This
trend raised a concern for the recruitment and retention of highly effective teachers in small rural
districts such as those in the current study (Liang & Akiba, 2015a).
Once again, the direct correlation between teacher quality and student achievement was
mirrored in participants in both this study and other studies regardless of the Title 1 school status
(Cowan & Goldhaber, 2018; Podgursky & Springer, 2007b). The majority of performance pay
studies in Title 1 schools are based on additional teaching certifications and difficult-to-staff
bonuses in certain subject areas such as mathematics and special education instead of an
education value-added measure (Cowan & Goldhaber, 2018; Podgursky & Springer, 2007b). A
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major area of concern across all studies is recruitment and retention of quality educators within
high-poverty neighborhoods (Cowan & Goldhaber, 2018; Podgursky & Springer, 2007b).
Receipt of Prior Performance Pay.
While Springer et al. (2012) caution against any interpretation of their results, their
analysis of 159 teams of middle school teachers regarding a performance bonus is nonetheless
interesting. Teachers who received a bonus in the first year of the study were less likely to
emphasize standardized testing than those who did not receive a bonus (Springer et al., 2012).
Additionally, teachers’ perceptions regarding the amount of the bonus varied between those who
received a bonus and those who did not receive a bonus (Springer et al., 2012). Teachers who
received a bonus noted the monetary amount was large enough to motivate them to work harder
(Springer et al., 2012).
Despite the lack of data from other studies regarding educators’ perceptions of a
performance pay bonus, this study’s results disclosed receipt of prior performance pay did not
necessarily influence educators’ perceptions of performance pay as they pertained to teacher
efficacy (Table 29). However, both groups agreed additional compensation should be awarded
for outstanding individual performance and for meeting student achievement goals (Table 34).
Analysis of Comments
Participants were given the opportunity to provide additional comments at the end of the
survey (Table 31). These comments provided additional data relevant to overall educator
perceptions regarding the North Carolina Teacher Performance Pay Plan. Comments were
classified based on the main emphasis of the content with regard to (a) knowledge and
understanding, (b) individual efficacy, (c) impact on individual performance – motivation, (d)
impact on individual performance – negative impact, (e) teacher performance pay

119
implementation, (f) teacher performance pay implementation – fairness, (g) amount of the award,
and (h) Other. Additionally, participant comments were classified as generally positive regarding
performance pay, generally negative regarding performance pay, or neutral.
Table 31 provides the percentage distribution of the comments by category.
Approximately 45% of participants’ comments regarding the perceived fairness of the
performance pay plan noted the fact not every teacher was eligible to receive the bonus.
Table 31
Comment Frequency Distribution
Comment Category
Knowledge and understanding
Individual efficacy
Impact on individual performance – motivation
Impact on individual performance – negative impact
Teacher performance pay implementation
Teacher performance pay implementation – fairness
Amount of the award
Total

f
12
16
7
5
7
39
1
87

%
13.9%
18.4%
8.0%
5.8%
8.0%
44.8%
1.1%
100%

In particular, one teacher stated, “All the teachers a student/class has ever had have
influenced the student’s growth not any one individual teacher.” A science and social studies
teacher noted, “I work hard in ELA integration with my lessons but I do not have a chance to
share in this ‘reward’.” Another teacher stated, “I think NC had it correct years ago when pay
incentives were tied in with the ABC model from the early ‘90s. All school staff were included
in this model.” These comments are supported by the level of disagreement shown in the survey
response percentages by gender (Table 32) and receipt of prior performance pay (Table 33).

120
Table 32
Perceived Fairness by Gender

Years of Experience
#25. Performance pay plan
fairly distributed
Female
(n = 151)
Male
(n = 23)

Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree Total

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

27.8%

22.5%

40.4%

6.6%

2.6%

100%

43.5%

21.7%

26.1%

8.7%

0.0%

100%

Table 33
Perceived Fairness by Receipt of Prior Performance Pay
Receipt of Prior
Performance Pay
#25. Performance pay plan fairly
distributed
Yes
(n = 53)
No
(n = 121)

Strongly
Disagree Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly
Agree Total

22.6%

30.2%

30.2%

13.2%

3.8%

100%

33.1%

19.0%

42.1%

4.1%

1.7%

100%

Individual efficacy, a person’s ability to succeed in a particular situation, was the next
highest comment category as shown in Table 31 at 18.4%. Participants commented, “Testing is a
one day snapshot,” “I always strive to do my best for my students,” and “knowing that the bonus
is based on student GROWTH and not simply a passing score is what makes me happy.” Survey
responses with regard to teacher efficacy were also highlighted in Tables 25 through 29.
Ironically, the knowledge and understanding category ranked the third highest at 13.9%
(Table 31). Survey percentages for this demographic are also highlighted in Tables 21 through
24. This study showed the majority of the participants did not understand the process for
awarding performance pay. In fact, one participant contacted the researcher by email stating,
“There is no such thing as a North Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus. This was suggested

121
about 12 years ago but was never implemented.” This particular participant teaches science in a
middle school and was not eligible for the bonus but did not understand other elementary and
middle school teachers in the school district are eligible for a performance bonus.
Table 34 provides the general overall feeling or valence of the comments within each
category. Of the 87 comments provided, 40.2% were generally negative, 33.4% neutral, and
26.4% generally positive regarding the current performance pay plan. While the majority of the
knowledge and understanding comments (75%) were neutral many participants were completely
unaware of the performance pay plan communicating, “I know nothing,” “I have never been
given information about it,” and “I was not aware that teachers received any bonus or pay for
growth … I thought that was taken away in 2008–2009.” Most disturbingly, one teacher
commented, “I did not know teachers got Performance Pay … Guess that means I am not a good
teacher because I have never received it.”
While only seven participants commented on the perceived motivation of performance
pay, only one comment was positive, noting, “I have received teacher performance pay in the
past and I believe I earned every dollar of the bonus.” The majority of the motivational
comments declared, “I can look at myself in the mirror and know that I gave it my all,” and
“Putting a carrot in front of me is demeaning and devalues the experience of education in and of
itself.”
There are also unintended consequences such as an alienation from other teachers or a
feeling of competitiveness that completely negates the idea of a community and the advancement
of the whole rather than the individual. This feeling of estrangement was evident in several
participant comments, “Performance pay brings animosity into the profession which should be
built of teamwork,” and “The use of this system promotes unnecessary and counterproductive
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hierarchy among educators.” Five participants commented on the negative aspects of
performance pay, claiming that it “discriminated against some and creates animosity among
staff,” “pits teacher against teacher and foster stress on teachers,” and “promotes an unnecessary
and counterproductive hierarchy among educators.”
The seven participants who commented on performance pay implementation expressed
various opinions. Four negative comments included, “Performance pay has no effect at all in my
teaching … teachers should be collaborating, not competing,” “puts an emphasis on ‘teaching to
the test,’” “degrades certain subject areas as not important,” and “improvement and gains I make
with my students do not benefit me.”
Comments about teacher performance pay implementation – fairness were largely
negatively skewed at 84.6% (Table 34). Several teachers who reported receiving prior
performance pay acknowledged feelings of guilt about receiving the bonus pay, stating “What
about the pk–2 teachers who set the foundation for success in grades 3+” and “Every teacher
before me has put work into these children and it seems unfair that I am reaping the reward for
that.” Additionally, others commented, “All subjects are equally important … devaluing the
learning in other classrooms,” and “Performance pay brings animosity into a profession which
should be built of team work.”
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Table 34
Category Valence Frequency Distribution
Comment Category
Knowledge and understanding

Individual efficacy

Impact on individual
performance – motivation

Impact on individual
performance – negative impact

Teacher performance
pay implementation

Teacher performance
pay implementation – fairness

Amount of the award

Overall Valence
Positive
Negative
Neutral
Total
Positive
Negative
Neutral
Total

f
2
1
9
12
5
8
3
16

%
16.7%
8.3%
75.0%
100%
31.2%
50.0%
18.8%
100%

Positive
Negative
Neutral
Total

1
6
0
7

14.3%
85.7%
0.0%
100%

Positive
Negative
Neutral
Total

0
4
1
5

0.0%
80.0%
20.0%
100%

Positive
Negative
Neutral
Total

2
2
3
7

28.6%
28.6%
42.8%
100%

Positive
Negative
Neutral
Total
Positive
Negative
Neutral
Total

2
33
4
39
1
0
0
1

5.1%
84.6%
10.3%
100%
100.0%
0.0%
0.0%
100%
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Implications
A performance pay plan should acknowledge and respond to the needs of recruitment and
retention of high-quality teachers in all school districts across North Carolina. Very little
research could be found related to educators’ perceptions of the current performance plan. Any
future compensation plans must be thoroughly communicated, transparent, and consider the
varying needs of students and teachers across all demographics.
Table 16 shows the majority of participants agree their individual performance has a
significant influence on student achievement regardless of eligibility status. Yet, the
implementation of the current performance pay plan did not motivate them to alter their
instructional practices, modify assessments, or work harder (Table 16). There were some
interesting comparisons in the percentages for those receiving and not receiving prior
performance pay (Table 30). Participants receiving prior performance pay were fairly split
regarding whether a monetary award was an incentive to work harder to improve student
achievement (Table 30). However, two-thirds of the same participants stated they would not alter
their instructional practices or modify their assessment methods as a result of performance pay
but agreed that additional compensation should be awarded for meeting student achievement
goals and outstanding individual performance (Table 30). These results show participants
receiving prior performance pay may possibly value additional compensation not necessarily tied
to student achievement. Performance pay associated with additional certifications or difficult-tostaff bonuses may motivate these participants.
The results from the current study suggest that educators with a higher EVAAS growth
score are more favorable toward the current performance pay plan based on a VAM. However,
while the survey did not explicitly question participants regarding their EVAAS growth score,
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there are looming questions regarding teacher efficacy, design, and the equitable distribution of
these programs, particularly when the monetary reward is based on teacher value-added growth
scores from state standardized tests (Adnot et al., 2017; Cowan & Goldhaber, 2018; Smith &
Holloway, 2020). Participant reactions to this measure were overwhelmingly against this
component. One participant noted, “…there are too many factors that go into a teacher’s EVAAS
score that they do not have control over.” Another participant commented, “I’d rather see the
state actually pay Master’s pay to their teachers than to spend money ‘rewarding’ teachers for the
job they are supposed to be doing well regardless of incentive.” Thus, it would be wise for state
and local policy makers to consider alternative forms of compensation aimed at collegiality,
personal growth, and capability of generating consistently valid measures.
Across all demographics, participants did not understand the process for awarding or
calculating teacher performance pay (Tables 21–24). Developing an understandable performance
pay program with a feasible goal linked to teacher effort that is fairly measured and distributed
should be taken into consideration. Tables 25 through 29 highlight educators’ perceptions across
demographics of the current performance pay plan with regards to self-efficacy and motivation.
One participant stated, “Individual performance pay will always create a divide among
educators. If a whole system is geared toward creating success in student learning, then the
village that is bringing the success should be rewarded.” Hence, any performance pay plan
should consider the collective efforts of collaboration rather than competition.
Limitations
As with any research study, certain limitations and threats to internal and external validity
are bound to exist. Within the context of this research, limitations arose concerning the sample
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size, the demographic context of participating school districts and teachers, the time constraints
of the survey release, and a worldwide pandemic.
Population and Sample
The small sample size and potential participant bias of the study threatens the internal
validity of the findings and can be attributed to several factors. The participants and setting for
this study were intentionally decided upon in order to examine the perceptions of rural educators
who are geographically isolated from state policymakers in North Carolina. While approximately
400 teachers received the survey, 165 participants fully completed the survey. Nine respondents
did not complete all the survey questions. The study had an approximate 41% participation rate.
Several participants did not provide the last five digits of their unique employee
identification number or provided inaccurate numbers. Therefore, the school district’s EVAAS
coordinator was unable to match these employees’ identification numbers to their EVAAS
growth scores. Additionally, several teachers did not have an EVAAS growth score because they
were beginning teachers in North Carolina, had transferred to North Carolina from a different
state, or had previously taught in a private and/or charter school not participating in statewide
assessments. These factors contributed to a smaller sample size. The results of this convenience
sample cannot be generalized to the target population due to attrition. Thus, any inferences based
on this sample can only be made regarding the sample itself.
Quantitative Research Design
An additional limitation can be attributed to the survey’s quantitative design in which data
were only collected from a Likert scale of participants’ survey responses. The Likert scale
ranged from strongly agree (5) to strongly disagree (1) including a score of 3 indicating a neutral
opinion. One participant stated, “There was no option for ‘NA.’” This participant taught in a
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subject ineligible for the performance bonus and thus chose a neutral response to every question.
While the participants were also given the opportunity to provide additional comments, the study
did not include qualitative measures such as focus groups or teacher interviews that would have
allowed teachers to elaborate on their attitudes regarding their perceptions of the current
performance pay plan
COVID-19 Pandemic, Maturation, and Participant Bias
Due to the worldwide COVID-19 pandemic, the researcher had to adapt and revise the study
in response to the governmental shutdowns of public schools in North Carolina, thus threatening
the external validity of the results. Initially, the researcher was to distribute the survey on-site in
each school district. Because of health and safety protocols, the survey had to be distributed
online with the assistance of each school district’s EVAAS coordinator. This online distribution
of the survey instrument did not allow the researcher to answer any participant questions in
person. However, one participant did contact the researcher via email with regard to science
teachers being ineligible for the bonus.
The survey was initially set to be open for two weeks, but this window had to be extended to
allow participants sufficient time to complete the survey while balancing simultaneously
teaching face-to-face and online students during the COVID-19 pandemic. The pressure these
public school teachers were under was immeasurable since many surely experienced increased
stress levels while trying to maintain high instructional expectations for all students, both faceto-face and online, while also assuming the risk of effectively sanitizing their room and
instructional resources daily to avoid infecting students and themselves. Additionally, the largest
school district in the study experienced an online hacking incident in which their internal
infrastructure was compromised by outside sources. This incident further delayed respondents
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and presumably affected the participant rate in this school district, which had the lowest
percentage of participation.
When this research study began, the North Carolina Accountability program included
statewide assessments for EOG tests in third- through eighth-grade mathematics and English
language and fifth- and eighth-grade science as well as North Carolina Final Exams (NCFEs) for
social studies in fourth through eighth grades and science in fourth, sixth, and seventh grades
(North Carolina General Assembly, 2018). During the 2019–20 school year, the NCFE
assessments were eliminated from the state’s accountability program, meaning those teachers of
NCFEs would no longer receive an EVAAS growth score, which reduced the population size for
this study (North Carolina General Assembly, 2019). While these teachers were not eligible for
the performance bonus before the elimination of the NCFEs, they now no longer receive an
EVAAS growth score potentially resulting in a bias regarding the performance bonus.
Additionally, this study was unable to clarify whether participant’s misunderstanding of the
current performance pay plan was based on a general understanding of the process for awarding
and calculating the monetary award or on the determination of the teacher’s EVAAS score.
The potential participant bias based on a non-response bias resulting in underrepresentation
of the three eligibility subgroups or the extreme response bias resulting from a worldwide
pandemic could have ultimately affected the external validity of the research study results. When
the survey was distributed, many school districts were fully remote, while others were
implementing some form of hybrid learning. Educators across the state were having to rethink
their instructional practices and learn how to teach online. Understandably, their focus was
student instruction and the ability to adequately teach students in a unique learning environment.
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Thus, many teachers may have chosen not to complete the survey because it was not germane to
their instruction.
Recommendations for Future Research
To further increase knowledge of educators’ attitudes and perceptions regarding the
current North Carolina Teacher Performance Pay plan, future research should include the
following:
1. Incorporate school districts with varying socio-economic demographics from across the
state. The present study was limited to the seven far western school districts in North
Carolina. Including additional school districts across the state with varying demographics
will help to alleviate threats to internal and external validity by having a larger sample
size and reducing the potential for participant bias.
2. Limit the survey participants to only those eligible for the performance pay plan bonus.
By limiting the survey participants, it will help to reduce participant bias from those
ineligible for the performance bonus and allow the researcher to focus on specifics
components of the performance pay plan.
3. Incorporate a mixed study design using qualitative methods. Using a mixed method
research design allows the researcher to examine contradictions between quantitative
results and qualitative findings such as those from participant comments. In the context of
this study, a mixed methods approach would have allowed the participants a voice to
clarify and expound upon their perceptions, further revealing the educator’s perceptions.
4. Study educator perceptions of different forms of performance pay such as bonuses for
additional certifications or bonuses presumed to increase student achievement in lieu of
student growth measures. Because value-added growth measures appear to be
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controversial, more research is needed to ascertain the perceived advantages and
disadvantages of differing pay plans such as monetary awards for additional
certifications, incorporating “looping” in which a teacher instructs the same group of
students for at least two school years, teaching in difficult-to-staff subjects, or teaching in
socio-economically disadvantaged districts.
5. Study educator perceptions of an individual performance bonus versus a school-wide
performance bonus. School-wide bonuses could minimize conflicts between colleagues
and champion a spirit of cooperation and cohesiveness in the school. However, schoolwide performance bonuses may not motivate educators to exert any effort to improve
their instructional practices if attaining the bonus is dependent upon other teachers’
collective efforts.

131
REFERENCES
Adams, J.S. (1963). Towards understanding of inequity. Journal of Abnormal and Social
Psychology, 67(5), 422–436. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0040968
Adkins, G. K. (2004). Teacher performance pay: The perceptions of certified school-based
personnel (Doctoral dissertation). http://purl.fcla.edu/fcla/etd/CFE0000200
Adnot, M., Dee, T., Katz, V., & Wyckoff, J. (2017). Teacher turnover, teacher quality, and
student achievement in DCPS. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 39(1),
54–76. https://doi.org/10.3102/0162373716663646
Amrein-Beardsley, A., Polasky, S. & Holloway-Libell, J. (2016). Validating “value added”
in the primary grades: One district’s attempts to increase fairness and inclusivity in its
teacher evaluation system. Educational Assessment, Evaluation and Accountability,
28(2), 139–159. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11092-015-9234-5
Arnstine, D. & McDowell, J. A. (1993). Unfair rewards: Merit pay, grades, and a flawed system
of evaluation. Teacher Education Quarterly, 20(2), 5–21.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/23475190
Baker, E. L. & Gordon, E. W. (2014). From the assessment OF education to the assessment
FOR education: Policy and futures. Teachers College Record, 116(11), 1–24.
https://doi.org/10.1177/016146811411601107
Baker, W. R. (2014). Perceptions of New Jersey music teachers regarding merit pay and
other forms of compensation. Visions of Research in Music Education, 25, 1–23.
https://doi.org/10.1080/10632913.2014.914395
Balch, R., & Springer, M. G. (2015). Performance pay, test scores, and student learning
objectives. Economics of Education Review, 44, 114–125.

132
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2014.11.002
Barrera-Osorio, F. & Raju, D. (2017). Teacher performance pay: Experimental evidence from
Pakistan. Journal of Public Economics, 148, 75–91.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.02.001
Berk, R. A. (2016). Value of value-added models based on student outcomes to evaluate
teaching. Journal of Faculty Development, 30(3), 73–81.
https:ronberk.com/articles/2016_value-added.pdf
Bowen, D. H. & Mills, J. N. (2017). Changing the education workforce? The relationships
among teacher quality, motivation, and performance pay. Teachers College Record,
119(4), 1–32. http://doi.org/10.1177/016146811711900403
Brehm, M., Imberman, S. A., & Lovenheim, M. F. (2017). Achievement effects of individual
performance incentives in a teacher merit pay tournament. Labour Economics, 44, 133–
150. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2016.12.008
Brevetti, M. (2014). Reevaluating narrow accountability in American schools: The need for
collaborative effort in improving teaching performances. The Delta Kappa Gamma
Bulletin, 81(1), 32–35. https://www/questia.com/library/journal/IP33450761911/reevaluating-narrow-accountability-in-american-schools
Brodsky, A., DeCesare, D., & Kramer-Wine, J. (2010). Design and implementation
considerations for alternative teacher compensation programs. Theory Into Practice,
49(3), 213–222. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40890948
Caillier, J. (2010). Paying Teachers According To Student Achievement: Questions Regarding
Pay-For-Performance Models in Public Education. The Clearing House, 83(2), 58–61.
http://ezproxy.liberty.edu/login?qurl=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.proquest.com%2F

133
scholarly-journals%2Fpaying-teachers-according-student-achievement%2Fdocview%
2F596621208%2Fse-2%3Faccountid%3D12085
Carbaugh, B., Marzano, R., & Toth, M. (2017). The Marzano focused teacher evaluation
model. West Palm Beach, Florida: Learning Sciences Marzano Center.
https://learningsciences.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/2017-Update-The-MarzanoFocused-Teacher-Evaluation-System.pdf
Chiang, H., Wellington, A., Hallgren, K., Speroni, C., Herrmann, M., Glazerman, S. &
Constantine, J. (2015). Evaluation of the teacher incentive fund: Implementation
and impacts of pay-for-performance after two years. Washington, DC: Mathematica
Policy Research.
Choi, H. J. & Park, J. (2016). An analysis of critical issues in Korean teacher evaluation
systems. Center for Educational Policy Studies Journal, 6, 151–171.
https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ1128905.pdf
Conroy, S. A. & Gupta, N. (2016). Team pay-for-performance: The devil is in the details.
Group & Organization Management, 41(1), 32–65.
http://doi.org/10.1177/1059601115607746
Cornman, S. Q., Zhou, L., Howell, M. R., & Young, J. (2018). Revenues and expenditures for
public elementary and secondary education: School year 2014–15 (Fiscal year 2015).
Retrieved from the U. S. Department of Education, National Center for Education
Statistics website: https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2018/2018301.pdf
Cowan, J. & Goldhaber, D. (2018). Do bonuses affect teacher staffing and student achievement
in high poverty schools? Evidence from an incentive for national board certified teachers

134
in Washington state. Economics of Education Review, 65, 138–152.
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2018.06.010
Creswell, J. W. (2009). Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods
approaches (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA, US: Sage Publications.
Dee, T. S., & Wyckoff, J. (2015). Incentives, selection, and teacher performance: Evidence from
IMPACT. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 34(2), 267–297.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/43866371
Desimone, L., Hochberg, E. D., & McMaken, J. (2016). Teacher knowledge and instructional
quality of beginning teachers: Growth and linkages. Teachers College Record, 118(5),
1–54. http://doi.org/10.1177/016146811611800507
Dishon-Berkovits, M. (2014). A study of motivational influences on academic
achievement. Social Psychology of Education: An International Journal, 17(2), 327–342.
http://doi.org/10.1007/s11218-014-9257-7
Doherty, K. M. & Jacobs, S. (2015). State of the states 2015: Evaluating teaching, leading,
and learning. Washington, DC: National Council on Teacher Quality.
https://nctq.org/dmsView/StateofStates2015
Edenfield, J. (2014). Teachers’ perceptions of merit pay in Georgia (Doctoral dissertation,
Georgia Southern University). Retrieved from
https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/etd/1058/
Fauth, B., Decristan, J., Decker, A., Buttner, G., Hardy, I., Klieme, E., Kunter, M. (2019). The
effects of teacher competence on student outcomes in elementary science education: The
mediating role of teaching quality. Teaching and Teacher Education, 86, 1–14.

135
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/336262789_The_effects_of_teacher_
competence_on_student_outcomes_in_elementary_science_education_The_mediating_
role_of_teaching_quality
Field, L. (2015). Using outperformance pay to motivate academics. Australian Universities’
Review, 57(2), 5–16. http://hdl.handle.net/1959.14/358613
Flake, J. K., Barron, K. E., Hulleman, C., McCoach, B. D., & Welsh, M. E. (2015).
Measuring cost: The forgotten component of expectancy-value theory. Contemporary
Educational Psychology, 41, 232–244. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cedpsych.2015.03.002
Forand, S. (2012). Teachers' attitudes and perceptions about pay-for-performance (Doctoral
dissertation). ProQuest Dissertations & Theses Global. https://www.proquest.com/
docview/1039154194?pq-origsite=gscholar&fromopenview= true
Ford, T. G. (2018). Pointing teachers in the wrong direction: understanding Louisiana elementary
teachers’ use of Compass high-stakes teacher evaluation data. Educational Assessment,
Evaluation and Accountability, 30(3), 251–283. http://doi.org/10.1007/s11092-018-9280x
Ford, T. G., Van Sickle, M. E., Clark, L. V., Fazio-Brunson, M., & Schween, D. C. (2017).
Teacher Self-Efficacy, Professional Commitment, and High-Stakes Teacher Evaluation
Policy in Louisiana. Educational Policy, 31(2), 202–248.
http://doi.org/10.1177/0895904815586855
Fowler, F. J. Jr. (1993). Survey research methods (2nd ed.). Newbury Park, CA: Sage
Publications, Inc.
Frey, B. S., Homberg, F., & Osterloh, M. (2013). Organizational control systems and
pay-for-performance in the public service. Organizational studies, 34, 949–972.

136
http://doi.org/10.1177/0170840613483655
Fryer, R.G. (2013). Teacher incentives and student achievement: Evidence from New York City
Public Schools. Journal of Labor Economics, 31(2), 373–407.
http://doi.org/10.1086/667757
Galaz-Fontes, J. F. & Gil-Anton, M. (2013). The impact of merit-pay systems on the work and
attitudes of Mexican academics. Higher Education, 66(3), 357–374.
http://doi.org/10.1007/s10734-013-9610-3
Gall, M., Gall J. P., & Borg, W. R. (2007). Educational research: An introduction (8th ed.).
Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson.
Geiger, T. J., Amrein-Beardsley Audrey, & Holloway, J. (2020). Using test scores to evaluate
and hold school teachers accountable in New Mexico. Educational Assessment,
Evaluation and Accountability, 32(2), 187–235. http://doi.org/10.1007/s11092-02009324-w
Gius, M. (2013). Using a difference-in-differences approach to estimate the effects of teacher
merit pay on student performance. Eastern Economic Journal, 39, 111–120.
http://doi.org/10.1057/eej.2012.22
Gius, M. (2014). Using fixed effects to estimate the impact of merit pay on teacher job
satisfaction. Journal of Economics and Economic Education Research, 15(1), 17–30.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/287248565_Using_fixed_effects_to_estimate_t
he_impact_of_merit_pay_on_teacher_job_satisfaction
Goldhaber, D., Dearmond, M., & Deburgomaster, S. (2011). Teacher attitudes about
compensation reform: Implications for reform implementation. ILR Review, 64(3),
441–463. http://doi.org/10.1177/001979391106400302

137
Goldhaber, D. & Walch, J. (2012). Strategic pay reform: A student outcomes-based evaluation
of Denver’s ProComp teacher pay initiative. Economics of Education Review, 31(6),
1067–1083. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2012.06.007
Goldring, R., Taie, S., & Riddles, M. (2014). Teacher attrition and mobility: Results from the
2012–13 teacher follow-up survey. (Report No. 2014-077). U.S. Department of
Education
Goodman, S., & Turner, L. (2011). Does whole-school performance pay improve student
learning? Education Next, 11(2), 6672.
https://www.educationnext.org/does-whole-school-performance-pay-improve-studentlearning/
Green, S. B., & Salkind, N. J. (2014). Using SPSS for windows and macintosh: Analyzing and
understanding data. (7th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education.
Grissom, J. A., & Strunk, K. O. (2012). How should school districts shape teacher salary
schedules? Linking school performance to pay structure in traditional compensation
schemes. Educational Policy, 26(5), 663–695. http://doi.org/10.1177/0895904811417583
Hendricks, M. D. (2014). Does it pay to pay teachers more? Evidence from Texas. Journal
of Public Economics. 109, 50–63. http://doi.org/ 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.11.001
Hill, A.J., & Jones, D.B. (2020). The Impacts of Performance Pay on Teacher Effectiveness and
Retention: Does Teacher Gender Matter? Journal of Human Resources 55(1),
349–385. https://www.muse.jhu.edu/article/747888
Hill, A. J., & Jones, D. B. (2021). Paying for Whose Performance? Teacher Incentive Pay and
the Black–White Test Score Gap. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 43(3),
445–471. https://doi.org/10.3102/01623737211001421

138
Horne, J., Foley, V. P., Flora, B. H. (2014). Race to the paycheck: Merit pay and theories of
teacher motivation. Journal of Academic Administration in Higher Education, 10(1),
35–39. https://dc.etsu.edu/etsu-works/3057/
Hulleman, C. S., & Barron, K. (2010). Performance pay and teacher motivation: Separating
myth from reality. Phi Delta Kappa International, 91(8), 27–31.
http://doi.org/10.1177/003172171009100806
Jacob, B. A. & Levitt, S. D. (2003). Rotten apples: An investigation of the prevalence and
predictors of teacher cheating. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(3), 843–877.
http://doi.org/10.1162/00335530360698441
Jacob, B. & Springer, M. G. (2008). Teacher attitudes toward pay for performance:
Evidence from Hillsborough County, Florida. Nashville, Tennessee: National Center on
Performance Incentives.
https://my.vanderbilt.edu/performanceincentives/files/2012/10/200808_JacobSpringer_At
titudePayPerf.pdf
Jeon, L., & Wells, M. B. (2018). An organizational-level analysis of early childhood teachers’
job attitudes: Workplace satisfaction affects early head start and head start teacher
turnover. Child & Youth Care Forum, 47(4), 563–581.
http://doi.org/10.1007/s10566-018-9444-3
Johnson, S. M. (2012). Build the capacity of teachers and their schools. Phi Delta Kappa
International, 94(2), 62–65. https://eric.ed.gov/?id=EJ1003140
Jones, M. D. (2013). Teacher behavior under performance pay incentives. Economics of
Education Review, 37, 148–164. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2013.09.005
Jones, M. & Hartney, M. T. (2017). Show who the money? Teacher sorting patterns and

139
performance pay across the U.S. school districts. Public Administration Review, 77(6),
919–931. http://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12789
Kainz, K. (2019). Early academic gaps and Title 1 programming in high poverty, high minority
Schools. Early Childhood Research Quarterly, 47, 159–168.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/353623373_Early_academic_gaps_and_Title_I
_ programming_in_high_poverty_high_minority_schools
Kelley, C., Heneman III, H., & Milanowski, A. (2002). Teacher motivation and school-based
performance awards. Educational Administration Quarterly, 38, (3), 372–401.
http://doi.org/10.1177/0013161X02383004
Kelley, C. J. & Finnigan, K. (2003). The effects of organizational context on teacher
expectancy. Educational Administration Quarterly, 39(5), 602–634.
http://doi.org/10.1177/0013161X03257299
Kim, J. S. (2005). The effects of a constructivist teaching approach on student academic
achievement, self-concept, and learning strategies. Asia Pacific Education Review, 6(1),
7–19. https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ728823.pdf
Kobussen, G., Kalagnanam, S. & Vaidyanathan, G. (2014). The impact of better-than-average
bias and relative performance pay on performance outcome satisfaction. Accounting
Perspectives, 13(1), 1–27. http://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3838.12022
Koppich, J. E. (2010). Teacher unions and new forms of teacher compensation. The Phi Delta
Kappan, 91(8), 22–26. http://doi.org/10.1177/003172171009100805
Kozlowski, K. P. & Lauen, D. L., (2019). Understanding teacher pay for performance: Flawed
assumption and disappointing results. Teachers College Record, 12(2), 1–38.
https://www-tcrecord-org.ezproxy.liberty.edu/library/content.asp?contentid=22587

140
Krahenbuhl, K. S. (2016). Student-centered education and constructivism: Challenges,
concerns, and clarity for teachers. The Clearing House: A Journal of Educational
Strategies, Issues and Ideas, 89(3), 97–105.
http://doi.org/10.1080/00098655.2016.1191311
Lauen, D. L., & Kozlowski, K. P. (2013). Teacher performance incentives in North Carolina.
Chapel Hill, North Carolina: Consortium for Educational Research and Evaluation-North
Carolina. https://publicpolicy.unc.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/107/2015/07/TeacherPerformance-Incentives-in-NC.pdf
Lauen, D. L., & Kozlowski, K. P. (2014). Race to the top performance incentives in North
Carolina: A summative report. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: Consortium for Educational
Research and Evaluation-North Carolina. https://publicpolicy.unc.edu/wpcontent/uploads/sites/107/2015/07/Race-to-the-Top-Performance-Incentives-in-NorthCarolina-August-2014.pdf
Liang, G. & Akiba, M. (2015a). Teacher evaluation, performance-related pay, and constructivist
instruction. Educational Policy, 29(2), 375–401.
http://doi.org/10.1177/0895904813492379
Liang, G. & Akiba, M. (2015b). Characteristics of teacher incentive pay programs: A
statewide district survey. Journal of Educational Administration, 53(6), 702–717.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281610059_Characteristics_of_teacher_
incentive_pay_programs_A_statewide_district_survey
Liu, S. & Zhao, D. (2013). Teacher evaluation in China: Latest trends and future directions.
Educational Assessment, Evaluation, and Accountability, 25(3), 231–250.
http://doi.org/10.1007/S11092-013-9168-8

141
Liu, S., Zhao, D. & Xie, W. (2016). Chinese teachers’ attitudes toward performance pay: The
cases of three schools. International Journal of Educational Management, 30(6),
791–808. https://eric.ed.gov/?id=EJ1109240
Liu, S., Xu, X. & Stronge, J. (2017). The influences of teachers’ perceptions of using student
achievement data in evaluation and their self-efficacy on job satisfaction: Evidence
from China. Asia Pacific Education Review, 1–17. https://eric.ed.gov/?id=EJ1198377
Locke, E.A. & Latham, G. P. (2006). New directions in goal-setting theory. Current Directions
In Psychological Science, 15(5), 265–268.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8721.2006.00449.x
Loeb, S., Miller, L. C., & Strunk, K. O. (2009). The state role in teacher compensation.
Education Finance and Policy, 4(1), 89–114.
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/edfp.2009.4.1.89
Marsh, J. S. (2014). Performance-based pay: Perceptions of elementary teachers of the Pandora
school district (Doctoral dissertation). ProQuest Dissertations & Theses Global.
https://hdl.handle.net/10355/45609
Marsh, J.A. & McCaffrey, D.F. (2012). What are achievement gains worth – to teachers?
The Phi Delta Kappan, 93(4), 52–56. https://doi.org/10.1177/003172171109300413
Meng, F. & Wu, J. (2015). Merit pay fairness, leader-member exchange, and job engagement:
Evidence from Mainland China. Review of Public Personnel Administration, 35(1),
47–69. http://doi.org/10.1177/0734371X12453057
Meng, F. & Wu. J. (2017). Policy expectation moderates the relationship between merit pay
policy effectiveness and public service motivation. Social Behavior and Personality:
An International Journal, 45(8), 1–13. https://doi.org/10.2224/sbp.4917

142
Milanowski, A. (2000). School-based performance award programs and teacher motivation.
Journal of Education Finance, 25(4), 517–544. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40691079
Mintrop, R., Ordenes, M., Coghlan, E., Pryor, L., & Madero, C. (2018). Teacher evaluation, pay
for performance, and learning around instruction: Between incentives and resonant
procedures. Educational Administration Quarterly, 54(1), 3–46.
http://doi.org/10.1177/0013161X17696558
Mintrop, R., Pryor, L., & Ordenes, M. (2018). A complex adaptive system approach to
evaluation: Application to a pay-for-performance program in the USA. Educational
Assessment Evaluation and Accountability, 30, 285–312.
http://doi.org/10.1007/s11092-018-9276-6
Moran, R. M. R. (2017). The impact of a high stakes teacher evaluation system: Educator
perspectives on accountability. Education Studies, 53(2), 178–193.
http://doi.org/10.1080/00131946.2017.1283319
Munroe, A. (2017). Measuring student growth within a merit-pay evaluation system:
Perceived effects on music teacher motivation career commitment. Contributions to
Music Education, 42, 89–105. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26367438
National Center for Education Statistics. (2020). Characteristics of Public School Teachers.
Washington, D.C.: Institute of Education Sciences, U.S. Department of Education.
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_clr.asp
National Education Association Department of Teacher Quality. (2011). Promoting and
Implementing the National Education Association Policy Statement on Teacher
Evaluation and Accountability. Washington, D.C.
https://www.nea.org/sites/default/files/2020-07/2011NEA_Teacher_Eval_Toolkit_0.pdf

143
National Education Association Research. (2021). Rankings of the states 2020 and estimates
of school statistics. Washington, D.C. https://www.nea.org/aboutnea/media-center/press-releases/covid-19-pandemic-threatens-small-gains-madenational-teacher
Nieto, S. (2001). What keeps teachers going? New York, NY: Teacher’s College Press.
North Carolina Department of Public Instruction. (2019). North Carolina School Report Cards.
https://www.dpi.nc.gov/data-reports/school-report-cards
North Carolina Department of Public Instruction. (2018a). 2016–2017 State of the teaching
profession in North Carolina: Report to the North Carolina General Assembly. Raleigh,
North Carolina. https://www.dpi.nc.gov/media/380/open
North Carolina Department of Public Instruction. (2018b). Third Grade Read to Achieve Teacher
Bonus Program: Report to the North Carolina General Assembly. Raleigh, North
Carolina. https://www.dpi.nc.gov/districts-schools/testing-and-schoolaccountability/state-tests/grade-3-read-achieve-rta
North Carolina Department of Public Instruction. (2020). Fiscal Year 2020–2021 North Carolina
Public School Salary Schedules. Raleigh, North Carolina.
https://www.dpi.nc.gov/media/8596/download
North Carolina Department of Public Instruction. (2020a). Teacher Legislated Performance
Bonuses – LEAs and other public schools. SL2018-5. Raleigh, North Carolina.
https://www.dpi.nc.gov/media/7246/download
North Carolina General Assembly. (2017). Teacher Legislated Performance Bonuses – LEAs
and other public schools. SL2017-57, Raleigh, North Carolina: North Carolina
General Assembly. http://.dpi.state.nc.us/docs/fbs/budget/conferencesummary2018.pdf

144
North Carolina General Assembly. (2018). Teacher Legislated Performance Bonuses – LEAs
and other public schools. SB. 99 SL2018-5, Raleigh, North Carolina: North Carolina
General Assembly. http://.dpi.state.nc.us/docs/fbs/budget/budgetsummary2019.pdf
North Carolina General Assembly. (2019). An Act to Reduce Testing Administered to Students in
Public Schools and to Make Various Technical and Clarifying Changes Related to
Education Laws. SB. 621, Raleigh, North Carolina: North Carolina General Assembly.
https://www.ncleg.gov/Sessions/2019/Bills/Senate/PDF/S621v7.pdf
Podgursky, M. J., & Springer, M. G. (2007a). Credentials versus performance: Review of the
teacher performance pay research. Peabody Journal of Education, 82(4), 551–573.
http://doi.org/10.1080/01619560701602934
Podgursky, M. J., & Springer, M. G. (2007b). Teacher performance pay: A review. Journal of
Policy Analysis and Management, 26(4), 909–949. http://doi.org/10.1002/pam.20292
Podgursky, M. J., & Springer, M. G. (2011). Teacher compensation systems in the United States
K–12 public school system. National Tax Journal, 64(1), 165–192.
http://ezproxy.liberty.edu/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.ezproxy.liberty.edu/docview/857185038?accountid=12085
Protsik, J. (1995). History of Teacher Pay and Incentive Reforms. Madison, Wisconsin:
Consortium for Policy Research in Education.
https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED380894.pdf
Purvis, R. L., Zagenczyk, T. J., & McCray, G. E. (2015). What’s in it for me? Using
expectancy theory and climate to explain stakeholder participation, its direction and
intensity. Science Direct, 33, 3–14.
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S026378631400043X

145
Rice, J. K., Malen, B., Jackson, C., & Hoyer, K. M. (2015). Time to pay up: Analyzing the
motivational potential of financial awards in a TIF program. Educational Evaluation
and Policy Analysis, 37(1), 29–49. http://doi.org/10.3102/0162373714524622
Incentives: Insights from a TIF program. Leadership and Policy in Schools, 16(3),
475–501. http://doi.org/10.1080/15700763.2016.1205201
Ritter, G. W., & Jensen, N. C. (2010). The delicate task of developing an attractive merit pay
plan for teachers. Phi Delta Kappa International, 91(8), 32–37.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20697115
Rothstein, J. (2015). Teacher quality policy when supply matters. The American Economic
Review, 105(1), 100–130. http://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20121242
Rovai, A. P., Baker, J. D., & Ponton, M. K. (2014). Social Science Research Design and
Statistics (2nd ed.). Chesapeake, VA: Watertree Press LLC.
Russ, R. D. (2015). Teacher attitudes regarding performance-based pay (Order No. 3707142).
Available from ProQuest Central; ProQuest Dissertations & Theses Global; Social
Science Premium Collection. (1696057914).
http://ezproxy.liberty.edu/login?qurl=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.proquest.com%2Fdissertat
ions-theses%2Fteacher-attitudes-regarding-performance-basedpay%2Fdocview%2F1696057914%2Fse-2%3Faccountid%3D12085
Schmidt, J. A. (2015). Does pay-for-performance strain the employment relationship?
The effect of manager bonus eligibility on nonmanagement employee turnover.
Personnel Psychology, 69(2), 395–429. http://doi.org/10.1111/peps.12106
Shifrer, D., Turley, R. L., & Heard, H. (2017). Do teacher financial awards improve teacher
retention and student achievement in an urban disadvantaged school district?

146
American Educational Research Journal, 54(6), 1117–1153.
http://doi.org/10.3102/0002831217716540
Shriki, A., & Patkin, D. (2016). Elementary school mathematics teachers' perception of their
personal needs. Teacher Development, 20(3), 329–347.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13664530.2016.1155476
Skourdoumbis, A. (2014). Teacher effectiveness: Making the difference to student
achievement? British Journal of Educational Studies, 62, 111–126.
http://doi.org/10.1080/00071005.2014.930413
Smith, W. C., & Holloway, J. (2020). School testing culture and teacher satisfaction.
Educational Assessment, Evaluation and Accountability, 32(4), 461–479.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11092-020-09342-8
Soupir-Fremstad, J. (2013). The expectancy theory: Teachers' perspectives of motivation and
compensation (Order No. 3596727). Available from ProQuest Central; ProQuest
Dissertations & Theses Global; Social Science Premium Collection. (1449199734).
http://ezproxy.liberty.edu/login?qurl=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.proquest.com%2Fdissertat
ions-theses%2Fexpectancy-theory-teachersperspectives%2Fdocview%2F1449199734%2Fse-2%3Faccountid%3D12085
Springer, M. G., Ballou, D., Hamilton, L. S., Le, V.-N., Lockwood, J. R., McCaffrey, D. F.,…
Stecher, B. M. (2010). Teacher pay for performance: Experimental evidence from the
project on incentives in teaching. Nashville, TN: National Center on Performance
Incentives at Vanderbilt University.
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reprints/2010/RAND_RP1416.pdf
Springer, M. G. & Gardner, C. D. (2010). Teacher pay for performance: Context, status, and

147
direction. Phi Delta Kappa International, 91(8), 8–15. https://jstor.org/stable/20697111
Springer, M. G., Lewis, J. L., Podgursky, M. J., Ehlert, M. W., Taylor, L. L., Lopez, O. S.,
Ghoshdastidar, B., & Peng, A. (2010). Districts awards for teacher excellence (D.A.T.E)
program: Year one Evaluation Report. National Center on Performance Incentives.
Austin, TX.
https://my.vanderbilt.edu/performanceincentives/files/2012/10/DATE_Final_Report_ES5
.pdf
Springer, M. G., Pane, J. F., Le, V., McCaffrey, D. F., Burns, S. F., Hamilton, L. S., & Stecher,
B. (2012). Team pay for performance: Experimental evidence from the Round Rock
pilot project on team incentives. American Educational Research Association, 34(4),
367–390. http://doi.org/208.95.50.183
Springer, M. G., Swain, W. A., & Rodriguez, L. A. (2016). Effective teacher retention bonuses:
Evidence from Tennessee. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 38(2), 199–221.
http://doi.org/10.3102/0162373715609687
Springer, M. G., & Taylor, L. L. (2016). Designing incentives for public school teachers:
Evidence from a Texas incentive pay program. Journal of Education Finance, 41(3),
344–381. https://muse.jhu.edu/article/613779
Swain, W. A., Rodriguez, L. A., & Springer, M. G. (2019). Selective retention bonuses for
highly effective teachers in high poverty schools: Evidence from Tennessee. Economics
of Education Review, 68, 148–160. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.econ.edu.rev.2018.12.008
Tirivayi, N., van den Brink, H. M., & Groot, W. (2014). Group incentives for teachers and their
effects on student learning: A systematic review of theory and evidence. School

148
Effectiveness and School Improvement, 25(4), 570–601.
http://doi.org/10.1080/09243453.2013.857697
U. S. Department of Education. (2012). Teacher incentive fund: First implementation report,
2006 and 2007 grantees. Washington, D.C.: Evaluation and Policy Development, Policy
and Program Studies Service, Office of Planning, U.S. Department of Education.
https://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/teaching/tif/report.pdf
U. S. Department of Education. (2018). Teacher incentive fund. Washington, D.C.: Office of
Innovation and Improvement, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, U. S.
Department of Education. https://oese.ed.gov/teacher-incentive-fund/
U. S. Department of Education. (2018). Study of title 1 schoolwide and targeted assistance
programs: Final report. Washington, D.C.: Office of Innovation and Improvement,
Office of Planning, Evaluation, and Policy Development, Policy and Programs Study
Service, U. S. Department of Education.
https://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/title-i/schoolwide-program/report.pdf
Vosters, K. N., Guarino, C. M. & Wooldridge, J. M. (2018). Understanding and evaluating
the SAS EVAAS univariate response model (URM) for measuring teacher effectiveness.
Economics of Education Review, 66, 191–205.
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2018.08.006
Vigdor, J. L. (2008). Teacher Salary Bonuses in North Carolina. Nashville, Tennessee:
National Center on Performance Incentives.
https://my.vanderbilt.edu/performanceincentives/files/2012/10/200803_Vigdor_TeacherB
onusesNC.pdf
Vroom, V. H. (1995). Work and motivation. New York, NY: Jossey-Bass.

149
Warner, R. M. (2013). Applied statistics: From bivariate through multivariate techniques
(2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Winters, M. A., & Cowen, J. M. (2013). Would a value-added system of retention improve the
distribution of teacher quality? A simulation of alternative policies. Journal of Policy
Analysis and Management, 32(3), 634–654. http://doi.org/10.1002/pam.21705
Woestman, D. S., & Wasonga, T. A. (2015). Destructive leadership behaviors and workplace
attitudes in schools. National Association of Secondary School Principals. NASSP
Bulletin, 99(2), 147–163. http://doi.org/10.1177/0192636515581922
Yuan, K., Le, V., McCaffrey, D. F., Marsh, J. A., Hamilton, L. S., Stecher, B. M., & Springer,
M.G. (2013). Incentive pay programs do not affect teacher motivation or reported
practices: Results from three randomized studies. American Educational Research
Association, 35(1), 3–22. http://doi.org/10.3102/0162373712462625
Zee, M., & Koomen, H. M. Y. (2016). Teacher Self-Efficacy and Its Effects on Classroom
Processes, Student Academic Adjustment, and Teacher Well-Being: A Synthesis of 40
Years of Research. Review of Educational Research, 86(4), 981–1015.
http://doi.org/10.3102/0034654315626801
Zhang, X. & Ng, H. (2017). An effective model of teacher appraisal: Evidence from secondary
schools in Shanghai, China. Educational Management Administration, & Leadership,
45(2), 196–218. http://doi.org/10.1177/1741143215597234

150
APPENDICES
Appendix A
Institutional Review Board Approval

151
Appendix B
School District Permission Request Form
May 22, 2020
Dr. Jeana Y. Conley
Superintendent, Cherokee County Schools
911 Andrews Road
Murphy, NC 28906
Dear Dr. Conley:
As a graduate student in the School of Education at Liberty University, I am conducting research
as part of the requirements for a Doctor of Education, Ed.D., degree. The title of my research
project is Fourth- Through Eighth-Grade Educator Perceptions of the North Carolina Teacher
Performance Bonus. The purpose of my research study is to better understand educators’
perceptions about, and attitudes towards, the North Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus Plan.
Additionally, I will be determining if a difference exists between fourth- through eighth-grade
educators’ perceptions from those educators eligible for a bonus, teachers of End of Grade
(EOG) assessment courses, and not eligible for a bonus, teachers of North Carolina Final Exam
(NCFE) assessment courses. Participants will be separated into three eligibility groups (a) no
bonus, (b) one bonus, and (c) two bonuses based on the EOG and/or NCFE assessment courses
they teach. Finally, I will be examining the relationship between an educators’ perception score
and their Education Value-Added Assessment System (EVAAS) score.
I am writing to request your assistance in contacting your fourth- through eighth-grade
mathematics, science, social studies and English educators in the Cherokee County School
District. I will provide an initial participant recruitment email inviting eligible fourth- through
eighth-grade educators to participate in the research study. I would ask this recruitment email be
sent to all eligible educators in the fourth through eighth grade. All participant responses will
remain anonymous. I am also asking permission to work with your EVAAS district coordinator
in order to pair each participant’s survey responses with their most recent EVAAS growth score
using the last five digits of their unique ten digit employee identification number.
Participants will be asked to complete the attached survey. Each educator’s EVAAS growth
score will be linked to their respective survey responses by the last five digits of their ten digit
employee identification number generated by the North Carolina Department of Public
Instruction. Participants will be presented with informed consent information prior to
participating. Taking part in this study is completely voluntary, and participants are welcome to
discontinue participation at any time.
Upon completion of the study, I will share a written copy of the results with you. Again, any
research data collected will not be identifiable to any participants. If I believe a direct quote from
the comment section could possibly identify an individual, it will not be used.
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For education research, school/district permission should be on approved letterhead with the
appropriate signature(s). Thank you for considering my request. If you choose to grant
permission, please provide a signed statement on official letterhead indicating your approval. A
permission letter document is attached for your convenience.
Thank you for your consideration.
Tiffany S. Clapsaddle
Doctoral Candidate
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School District 6 Consent Form

159
Appendix I
School District 7 Consent Form

160
Appendix J
Participant Information Letter and Consent to Participate
Month Day, 2020

Cherokee County Schools Educator
Cherokee County Schools
Dear Cherokee County Schools Educator:
As a graduate student in the School of Education at Liberty University, I am conducting research
as part of the requirements for a Doctor of Education, Ed.D, degree. The purpose of my research
study is to better understand educators’ perceptions about, and attitudes towards, the North
Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus Plan (NCTPBP). Additionally, I will be determining if a
difference exists between fourth- through eighth-grade educators’ perceptions of the NCTPBP
from those educators eligible for the bonus, teachers of End of Grade (EOG) assessment courses,
and educators not eligible for the bonus, teachers of North Carolina Final Exam (NCFE)
assessment courses. Participants will be separated into three eligibility groups (a) no bonus, (b)
one bonus, and (c) two bonuses based on the EOG and/or NCFE assessment courses they teach.
Finally, I will also be examining the relationship between an educator’s perception score and
their Education Value-Added Assessment System (EVAAS) score. I am writing to invite eligible
participants to join my study.
Participants must teach English Language Arts, mathematics, science or social studies in the
fourth- through eighth-grade in one of the seven school districts located in the far western
counties of North Carolina. Participants, if willing, will be asked to complete an online survey. It
should take approximately 15 minutes to complete the survey. The school district’s EVAAS
Coordinator will link your EVAAS growth score to your survey responses through the last five
digits of your unique ten digit employee identification number, but the information will remain
anonymous. Participation will be completely anonymous, and no personal, identifying
information will be collected. If a direct quote from the comment section could possibly identify
an individual, it will not be used. Please keep in mind you do not have to provide comments.
To participate, please click on the survey link. You will be asked for the last five digits of your
ten digit employee identification number and the school system in which you work to begin the
survey. The survey link will remain live for two weeks.
A consent document is provided as the first page of the survey. The consent document contains
additional information about my research. After you have read the consent document, please
click the link to proceed to the survey. Doing so will indicate that you have read the consent
information and would like to take part in the survey.
If you choose to participate, you will be entered in a raffle to receive a $50 VISA gift card.
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Sincerely,
Tiffany S. Clapsaddle
Doctoral Candidate
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Appendix K
Reminder Letter to Participants
Month Day, 2020

Dear Cherokee County Schools Educator:
As a graduate student in the School of Education at Liberty University, I am conducting research
as part of the requirements for a Doctor of Education, Ed.D, degree. One week ago, an email was
sent inviting you to participate in a research study. This follow-up email is being sent to remind
you to complete the survey if you would like to participate and have not already done so. The
survey will close in one week.
If you choose to participate, you will be asked to complete an online survey. It should take
approximately 15 minutes for you to complete. Participation will be completely anonymous, and
no personal, identifying information will be collected. If a direct quote from the comment section
could possibly identify an individual, it will not be used. Please keep in mind you do not have to
provide comments. You will be asked for the last five digits of your ten digit employee
identification number and the school system in which you work to begin the survey. This
information will only be used by the school district’s EVAAS coordinator to link your EVAAS
score to your survey responses.
To participate, please click on the survey link.
A consent document is provided as the first page of the survey. The consent document contains
additional information about my research. After you have read the consent form, please click the
link to proceed to the survey. Doing so will indicate that you have read the consent information
and would like to take part in the survey.
If you choose to participate, you will be entered in a raffle to receive a $50 VISA gift card.
Sincerely,
Tiffany S. Clapsaddle
Doctoral Candidate
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Appendix L

Participant Consent Form
Participant Consent
Title of the Project: FOURTH- THROUGH EIGHTH-GRADE EDUCATOR PERCEPTIONS
OF THE NORTH CAROLINA TEACHER PERFORMANCE BONUS
Principal Investigator: Tiffany Clapsaddle, Liberty University
Invitation to be Part of a Research Study
You are invited to participate in a research study. In order to participate, you must teach English
Language Arts, mathematics, science or social studies in the fourth- through eighth-grade in one
of the seven school districts located in the far western counties of North Carolina. Taking part in
this research project is voluntary.
Please take time to read this entire form and ask questions before deciding whether to take part in
this research project.
What is the study about and why is it being done?
The purpose of the study is to better understand educator perceptions’ about, and attitudes
towards, the North Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus Plan. Additionally, the study will
determine if any differences exist between fourth- through eighth-grade educator perceptions of
the North Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus Plan from those educators eligible for the bonus,
teachers of End of Grade (EOG) assessment coursed and not eligible for the bonus, teachers of
North Carolina Final Exam (NCFE) assessment courses. Additionally, the study will be
examining the relationship between an educator’s perception score and their Education ValueAdded Assessment System (EVAAS) score.
What will happen if you take part in this study?
If you agree to be in this study, I would ask you to do the following things:
1. Complete an online survey containing 28 questions using a Likert-scale rating (strongly
agree to strongly disagree) as well as provide any additional comments relating to the
North Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus Plan. The survey should take approximately
15 minutes to complete.
How could you or others benefit from this study?
Participants should not expect to receive a direct benefit from taking part in this study.
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Benefits to society include improving the opportunity in which every student receives a quality
education. State and local policymakers may gain a better understanding of what motivates
educators and render fiscally responsible decisions regarding alternative compensation plans.
What risks might you experience from being in this study?
The risks involved in this study are minimal, which means they are equal to the risks you would
encounter in everyday life.
How will personal information be protected?
The records of this study will be kept private. Research records will be stored securely, and only
the researcher will have access to the records.
• Participant responses will be anonymous. Participants will provide the last five digits of
their ten digit employee identification number and the school system in which they work
to begin the survey.
• Once the survey is closed, the researcher will provide the last five digits of the employee
identification number of those completing the survey to each school district’s EVAAS
coordinator
• The school district’s EVAAS Coordinator will provide the participant’s EVAAS growth
score linked to the last five digits of the participant’s ten digit employee identification
number. The EVAAS growth score and the employee identification number are only
accessible by the participant and the EVAAS Coordinator.
• Data will be stored on a password-locked computer and may be used in future
presentations. Any printed copies of the data will be stored in a locked file cabinet inside
a locked office in which only the researcher will have access. After three years, all
electronic records will be deleted, and any printed copies will be shredded.
How will you be compensated for being part of the study?
Participants will not be compensated for participating in this study. However, at the conclusion
of the survey, one participant will be compensated for participating in this study. Any
participants who fully answer the 28 Likert item questions will be entered in a raffle to receive a
$50 VISA gift card. The gift card will be delivered to the winning participant’s school district
EVAAS coordinator and identified using the last 5 digits of the participant’s 10 digit employee
identification number.
Is study participation voluntary?
Participation in this study is voluntary. Your decision whether to participate will not affect your
current or future relations with Liberty University. If you decide to participate, you are free to
not answer any question or withdraw at any time prior to submitting the survey without affecting
those relationships.
What should you do if you decide to withdraw from the study?
If you choose to withdraw from the study, exit the survey and close your internet browser. Your
responses will not be recorded or included in the study.
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Whom do you contact if you have questions or concerns about the study?
The researcher conducting this study is Tiffany Clapsaddle. You may ask any questions you have
now. If you have questions later, you are encouraged to contact her at tsclapsaddle@liberty.edu.
You may also contact the researcher’s faculty sponsor, Dr. Linda Holcomb, at
ljholcomb@liberty.edu.
Whom do you contact if you have questions about your rights as a research participant?
If you have any questions or concerns regarding this study and would like to talk to someone
other than the researcher, you are encouraged to contact the Institutional Review Board, 1971
University Blvd., Green Hall Ste. 2845, Lynchburg, VA 24515 or email at irb@liberty.edu
Your Consent
Before agreeing to be part of the research, please be sure that you understand what the study is
about. You can print a copy of the document for your records. If you have any questions about
the study later, you can contact the researcher/study team using the information provided above.
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Appendix M
Permission Request to Use Survey Instrument
July 19, 2019
Tiffany Clapsaddle
Liberty University
School of Education
321 Carriage Lane
Murphy, NC 28906
Dear Mr. Adkins:
I am a doctoral student from Liberty University writing my dissertation titled Fourth- Through
Eighth-Grade Educator Perceptions of the North Carolina Teacher Performance Bonus, under
the direction of my dissertation committee chaired by Dr. Linda Holcomb, who can be reached at
ljholcomb@liberty.edu.
I would like your permission to use the Teacher Performance Pay Attitudinal Survey instrument
in my research study. I would like to use and print your survey under the following conditions:
• I will use the surveys only for my research study and will not sell or use it with any
compensated activities.
• I will include the copyright statement on all copies of the instrument.
• I will send a copy of my completed research study to your attention upon completion of
the study.
If these are acceptable terms and conditions, please indicate so by replying to me through e-mail:
tsclapsaddle@liberty.edu.
Sincerely,
Tiffany Clapsaddle
Doctoral Candidate
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Consent to Use Survey Instrument
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Appendix O
Teacher Performance Pay Attitudinal Survey
A written form of the online version of the Teacher Performance Pay Attitudinal Survey will be
placed here once consent for use has been obtained.
Teacher Performance Pay Attitudinal Survey
Purpose: The purpose of this survey is to obtain information from certified school-based
personnel regarding their attitudes and perceptions of teacher performance pay. All information
collected in this survey is confidential and respondents are anonymous. The data obtained in this
survey will be used as the basis for a dissertation being completed at Liberty University
involving the assessment of teacher attitudes about teacher performance pay systems.
Part I: Participant Information:
Please provide the last 5 digits of your unique 10 digit employee identification number.
This number is your North Carolina Staff Unique Identification (UID) and is also the
number you use to access your PowerSchool account.

Please provide the name of the school district in which you work.

Part II: Demographic Information
Directions - Please circle one option for each item which best describes your current situation.
1. What is your current teaching assignment at your school this year? Choose all that apply.
ELA

Math

Science

Social Studies

2. Which best describes the total number of years you have been employed as a professional
educator?
Less than 3 years

3 to 10 years

11 to 20 years

21 or more years

3. What is your gender?
Female

Male

4. Which one best describes your personal level of educational attainment?
Baccalaureate

Masters

Specialist

Doctorate
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5. Is your school labeled a Title 1 school as defined by the North Carolina Department of
Public Education (NCDPI)?
Yes

No

6. Have you received performance pay at any time during the last four years?
Yes

No
Response Key

Directions – Please fill in the appropriate circle for each item to indicate
your level of agreement with the statement for Parts II, III, IV, and Va. If
you do not feel you know the correct answer, leave the space provided
blank and move to the next question.

Part III: Knowledge and Understanding

Strongly Agree
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Strongly Disagree

SA
A
N
D
SD

SA

A

N

D

SD

SA

A

N

D

SD

7. I clearly understand the process for awarding teacher
performance pay to individual teachers in NC.
8. I clearly understand the process for calculating the
amount of teacher performance pay disbursed to the
individual teacher.

Part IV: Individual Efficacy
9. My individual performance as an educator has a
significant influence on student achievement
10. My individual performance as an educator has a
significant influence on whether or not I earn teacher
performance pay.
11. I have adequate resources (i.e. materials, supplies) to
support my efforts in obtaining teacher performance
pay.
12. I have adequate administrative assistance to
support my efforts in obtaining teacher performance
pay.
13. My chance of receiving teacher performance pay is
the same as any other teacher.
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14. Student body composition has a greater impact on my
ability to receive teacher performance pay than my
individual effort as a teacher.

Part V: Impact on Individual Performance

SA

A

N

D

SD

SA

A

N

D

SD

15. Teacher performance pay provides an incentive for
me to work harder toward improving student
achievement.
16. Teacher performance pay encourages me to
participate in staff development to improve my skills
as an educator.
17. Increasing the size of the teacher performance pay
bonus would increase my motivation to improve
student achievement.
18. I have altered my instructional practice as a result of
teacher performance pay.
19. I have modified my assessment methods as a result of
teacher performance pay.
20. My workload has increased as a result of the
implementation of teacher performance pay.
21. I have experienced increased stress as a result of the
implementation of teacher performance pay.
22. I work longer hours as a result of the implementation
of teacher performance pay.

Part VIa: Teacher Performance Pay Implementation
23. Educators should receive additional compensation for
outstanding individual performance.
24. Educators should receive additional compensation for
meeting student achievement goals.
25. The current teacher performance pay plan is fair in
how it distributes performance pay awards.
26. The current teacher performance pay plan is aligned
with school goals in how it rewards performance.

Part VIb: Teacher Performance Pay Implementation
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Directions – Please circle the letter of the one option that completes the sentences in a manner
best expressing your opinion.
27. The amount of the performance pay reward should be
A. zero
B. below $500 per teacher
C. between $500 and $800 per teacher
D. between $1000 and $2000 per teacher
E. more than $2000 per teacher
28. The proportion of a teacher’s pay related to performance should be
A. zero
B. less than 1% of base salary
C. between 1% and 5% of base salary
D. between 6% and 10% of base salary
E. more than 10% of base salary
You have reached the end of this survey. Thank you for your participation.
If you have additional comments regarding Teacher Performance Pay, please include these
comments on the bottom of this survey form.

